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ABSTRACT
In 1988, Linda Nicholson and Nancy Fraser published an article entitled “Social
Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism,” arguing
that this essay would provide a jumping point for discussion between feminisms and
postmodernisms within academia. Within this essay, Nicholson and Fraser largely disavow a
number of second wave feminist theories due to their essentialist and foundationalist
underpinnings in favor of a set of postmodernist frameworks that might help feminist theorists
overcome these epistemological impediments. A “postmodern feminism,” Nicholson and Fraser
claim, would become “the theoretical counterpart of a broader, richer, more complex, and
multilayered solidarity, the sort of solidarity which is essential for overcoming the oppression of
women” (35).
Interpreting “Social Criticism” through a feminist cultural studies model in which texts
are understood to be simultaneously constituted by and reflective of their own sociopolitical
spaces, I argue that the construction of Nicholson and Fraser’s “postmodern feminism” is, first
and foremost, neither a postmodernist critique nor a means of overcoming the pitfalls of
essentialism and foundationalism. Instead, the construction of this theoretical paradigm can be
shown to be complicit with postfeminist discourses, wherein an implicitly patriarchal discourse
of postmodernism is called upon to repair the deficiencies of feminisms, deficiencies that
postmodernisms, in some ways, helped to bring into view. To provide a conceptual backing for
these claims, I move toward an examination of mass culture, surveying the similarities between
“Social Criticism” and the film What Women Want. Such a comparison, I suggest, facilitates a
better understanding of how “Social Criticism” can be shown to be imbedded in a postfeminist
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narrative structure in which feminisms are relegated to a discursively subordinate gendered
position in relation to postmodernisms.
Finally, in what I find to be the most important aspect of this thesis’ inquiry, I ask what it
means to build a “broader, richer, more complex, and multilayered solidarity” by disavowing
second wave feminisms in favor of postmodernisms. I conclude that, in using postmodernisms as
a panacea for feminist theories, Nicholson and Fraser curtail what might have been a rigorous
interrogation of and direct engagement with second wave feminist theories that would also attend
to the phallogocentric underpinnings of postmodern theories. To underline the potential
consequences, I turn to a set of televisual and filmic texts including Sex and the City, Desperate
Housewives, and The Devil Wears Prada to gauge what their “postmodern feminism” might
represent in practice rather than what it entails as philosophy. This juxtaposition of these two
differently defined and yet overwhelmingly similar postmodern feminisms, I propose,
underscores the potential that Nicholson and Fraser may have instituted a postmodern feminist
methodology in which it is possible that feminisms might emerge not as discourses essential for
“overcoming the oppression of women” but rather as discourses that can be critiqued into
oblivion.
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PREFACE: BETWEEN MARGIN AND CENTER
This thesis emerges from within, from some distinct part of the mind that is finally
capable of understanding only some of the current contradictions within feminist articulations
and surrounding the term “feminism” in general. It flows from a concern, personal and political
in origin, over perceived stagnancy assigned to feminisms by backlash politics, created by a
somewhat paralyzing culture that preaches individualism, agency, and equality to girls and
women, while always holding those ideals a little beyond the arm’s reach.
Most specifically, this thesis erupts from an infernal frustration with three subjective
experiences that shape my interpretation of the contradictions related to feminist-inflected speech
and the social definition of feminisms in general: first, being taught from birth that I was a
feminist, inheriting an equal world and the potential to inhabit that world in any way I desired;
second, learning, through literary and feminist analysis, that the cultural representations I have
been taught to interpret as representing gender equality and female agency were more one-sided
than equal and promoted male satisfaction rather than female achievement; and third, finding,
after penetrating feminist theory from inception to the present moment, that no theoretical
perspective thus far offered me a means of articulating the immeasurable cultural divide that I
had encountered – between academic feminisms, avant-garde feminist texts, radical feminist
activism, and versions of feminisms portrayed within American mainstream mass media – much
less the subjective splitting that occurred somewhere along the way.
This thesis, then, is my attempt to speak about and from what has become another
unspeakable position – occupying a feminist subject position in a society that largely considers
itself to be “postfeminist” or “beyond feminism.” To accomplish this, which perhaps can only be
done by speaking through existing discourses, I juxtapose a series of women-centered, mass
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culture texts alongside postfeminist and postmodern feminist theories, and interrogate their
interconnectivity, realizing at the same time that these discourses do not necessarily maintain that
connectivity beyond my own critical articulation. Drawing attention to the way these discourses
collectively inform perceptions of feminist subjectivity, female agency, and gender equality,
however, seems to offer a way of understanding what Toril Moi describes as a waning of
feminisms within our contemporary cultural climate (“I Am Not A Feminist, But . . .” 1735).
After much reading, thinking, writing, revising, and rethinking, I’ve come to understand
that the primary question motivating this thesis is one concerning the intersection of margin and
center and the improbable simplicity of moving between the two or eliminating the lines of
division altogether. I see this waning of feminisms as being directly related to a partially
postmodern moment in which the distinctions between margin and center are temporarily and
speciously blurred. Akin to questions regarding other binaries, man/woman for example, where
“who” speaks of them and “how” and “why” they are used are primary concerns, responding to
this question involves the difficulty of suggesting that the envelopment of the margin within the
center, when this centering of the margin is initiated by the centered speakers and for their own
purposes, is contradictory to causes that seek to promote equality. In an attempt to provisionally
resolve this problematic aspect of my inquiry, I also draw a distinction between the “who” that is
involved in blurring this margin/center dichotomy and the “how” and “why” this blurring is
accomplished.
Nevertheless, as this thesis is part of a larger investigation that I have yet to fully theorize
and articulate in written form, the work herein can only be said to encapsulate half of this story.
Because my own definition of “feminism” places an emphasis on gendered oppression in relation
to other subject positions for which one might be discriminated against, I know no way to
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commence my project other than by beginning with and proceeding from analyses that take
gender as their primary object of inquiry. But along the way, I point toward what I hope will
someday consist of the second half of this inquiry (possibly in the form of a dissertation),
analyses that get eclipsed in asking these gender-specific questions, specifically those that
consider the intersection of gender with class, race, sexuality, and ethnicity. I find the part of this
project that has yet to be written the most important element, and thus the potential meaning or
purpose of this thesis is also only half-articulated. Nonetheless, I feel obligated, ethically, to
explore the construction of feminisms in relation to gender within my own sociopolitical
contexts before I can begin to explore different positionalities (my own included) that inform,
confront, and disrupt those constructions.
Simply stated, instead of attempting to shift the position of “woman,” or rather myself,
from margin to center, I examine some ways in which the margin becomes useful to the center in
perpetuating long-maintained hierarchies of gender, class, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. I situate
this exploration in two discourses specific to my spatiotemporal location, each of which allege to
dissolve the distinction between margin and center by simultaneously appropriating
“Otheredness” and denouncing “modern” or “second-wave” feminisms as a means of justifying
those ends: the first, a “postfeminist” discourse that I locate within a set of women-centered,
mass culture texts, and the second, a “postmodern feminist” discourse specific to Linda
Nicholson and Nancy Fraser’s essay “Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter
between Feminism and Postmodernism” (1988). Rather than providing an answer to its own
inquiry, this thesis undertakes the task of exploring the subjective splitting that can occur within
rhetorical and cultural frameworks that effectively (though speciously) dissolve the
margin/center binary, consequently silencing and paralyzing subjects speaking from the margins
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by convincing them that their own perceived marginality no longer exists or perhaps was always
a misconception.
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INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF POSTMODERNISMS
Yet such nonmimetic, non-western modes also seem to lay
themselves open to the academized procedures of a
peculiarly western, historically singular, postmodern
epistemology that universalizes the self-conscious
dissolution of the bourgeois subject, with its now
characteristic stance of self-irony, across both space and
time. The expansive forms of the modern and the
postmodern novel appear to stand in ever-polite readiness
to recycle and accommodate other cultural content . . .
-Kum Kum Sangari, “The Politics of the Possible” (1987)

Since at least the early 1980s, the complexities and paradoxical dispositions of the term
“postmodernism” have been debated both within and outside the walls of American academia.1
As a theoretical and cultural signifier acquiring status alongside the emergence of an “age of
globalization” – which to some means a process of economic colonization on a global scale to
produce Western, imperialist rewards – the significations of the term “postmodernism” have
been as varied as they have been imprecise, thus making any question specific to the term an
error without first stipulating the definition of the term “postmodernism” itself. To ask such a
question would be to violate the very principles of what many understand to be postmodernity,
wherein the term, even as it contains all things “postmodern,” has no single postmodern referent
or set of characteristics that comprises its sum total. But given the wide-array of attention that
postmodernisms have received and its international impact, these questions must surely be asked.

1

Note use of “postmodernism,” “feminism,” “postcolonialism,” “Marxism,” “Psychoanalysis,” and all other
references to theoretical positions classified under single universal signifiers like these will be italicized to indicate
that these terms have either been used by others in this way or that I am responding to their use of this terminology. I
think it is important to my argument to draw a distinction between the way these terms are used in their singular and
plural forms, although I myself am not immune from tending to apply these terms universally, especially within
informal discussion. As much as this italicization serves to point toward this tendency within feminist theories, it
also serves as personal exercise in unlearning the marginalizing and universalizing practices of the larger American
culture.
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Some youth-oriented, American subgroups, in particular, have developed a distinct
fascination with the postmodernness of an object, text, or individual, often relying on queries as
to how “po-mo” something or someone is (or is not) not simply as a form of entertainment but
more importantly as a way of forming identities, communities, and the standards of “cool.”2
Within a particular set of these communities in Orlando, Florida, “postmodern” is enacted as a
term that describes an object or individual’s particular quirkiness and unacceptability. Thus,
these youngsters, my presumed peers, provide a set of credentials for obtaining or proceeding
from a postmodern status. Orlando, Florida is perhaps one of the most interesting sites of
investigation as to how these groups operate and maintain themselves given Orlando’s
inestimable suburban conclaves and daunting (and sometimes disturbing) constructed
environments – like the Disney-owned, “Mainstreet U.S.A” town Celebration – each of which
are severed and further fragmented by Orlando’s endless assortment of strip malls – the
newborn, the trendy, the refurbished, and the commercial graveyards of strip malls dead. The
characteristics of these “po-mo” collectives are most certainly dependent on whether the
investigation is conducted in one of Orlando’s alternative hair salons, coffee shops, or concert
venues, as well as which specific location within these categories has been chosen as the site of
research. But there is certainly a degree of overlap between various social spaces – XM radio
stations, vintage clothing, and a variety of imported beers, to name only a few. What remains
clear, however, is that no matter how loosely drawn the definition of the postmodern terrain or
the disparity of definitions between groups, “po-mo” has been defined and so have the
prerequisites that precede any distribution of the exclusionary “po-mo” label.
2

This is a personal observation and semi-hypothetical account derived from my own discussions with individuals
and groups of individuals who identify with this subgroup and frequent these Orlando-specific locales: Bar-B-Que
Bar, Stardust, Alchemy, I Spy, Austin’s Coffee Shop, Independent Bar, Will’s Pub, the Peacock Room, the Social,
Back Booth, D’echoes, and other no longer existent spaces such as the Kit Kat Club, Java Jabbers, and Guinevere’s.
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Within academia, intellectuals have propagated rather different inquiries, focusing not
simply on an object or person’s “postmodernness,” or rather “postmodernity,” but digging into
the mysterious subterrane of the term itself. Nevertheless, their reasons for asking these
questions are not that dissimilar from the emo-punk-indie “alt. kids” in Orlando – signifiers
ready to signify – who wonder how their peers will regard them if they have not exhibited
themselves as truly postmodern. Like these alt. kids who discuss this nonconformist “po-mo”
label as a way of accepting themselves as not part of the glorified popular cookie-cutter mold
(though, notably, there has been a continual surge of appropriation and infiltration of the “pomo” alternative since at least the early 1990s by the popular itself3), intellectuals operating “from
the margins” have found a selection of postmodernist concepts to substantiate their “difference”
and provide a similarly alluring degree of acceptance and forward-thinking.
Despite the innumerable definitions and theoretical approaches that have come to be
categorized under the signifier “postmodernism,” a few particular concepts have been solidified
in the logic of postmodern theories, mainly those that call into question the stability of
signification, the authenticity of the Cartesian subject, the dynamics of power and authority, and
the decentering of transcendental reason and narrative discourse. For the aforementioned
youngsters, the disruption of youth-centered, conformist ideologies seems to play out quite
agreeably, but it is also worth noting that a new “po-mo” Cartesian subject is created and

3

Since the context in which I situate my analyses of mass culture mostly centers on the decade and a half spanning
from 1990 to 2006, I point here towards a discourse that surrounded allegedly non-Billboard music in the early
1990s that was first described as progressive but became known later as alternative – a signifier that often connoted
“grunge” culture and “garage” bands. Within this discourse, discussions arose in which bands and group members
were described as “selling out” and a particular distaste was developed for the appropriation of the flannel shirts and
torn jeans by the mainstream “Polo” wearers (though such appropriation was no unprecedented process) who had
been known to deride the poverty within which “grunge” culture was often thought to be ingrained. This
terminology would of course be overwritten by discourses on “indeed” rock and film. See Dick Hebdige’s
Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979) for a more theoretical and thorough discussion of mainstream mass
media’s incorporation and assimilation of subcultures.
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advertised and becomes particularly conformist in its own justification and entitlement. Yet the
dynamics of power and authority that these “po-mo” youths try to elude remain relatively intact,
principally because the “po-mo” focal point disregards both the acceptance and rejection of
“normality” required by that authority (and society), even though a certain homage is paid to the
term postmodern in the acceptance of “idiosyncrasy” as a rule. But the systematic dynamics of
hegemonic American society also persist due to the fact that the disregard enacted in defining the
“po-mo” as unorthodox is invested in a subsidiary of that authority’s power – appearance –
rather than the dynamics and structures of the system itself. This is not to say that other systems
of belief do not emerge as a result of this performativity, underlie this signifier, or attach
themselves to the definition of the “po-mo” identity as a reverberation of its very dissidence.
Notwithstanding, as this acknowledgement of and abidance to appearance (and the appearance
of postmodernity) exists as one of the primary structures of the “po-mo” label within this
subgroup, it serves as a sketch to evoke in relation to similar postmodernizations within
American academia.
During the moment when a variety of voices in academia were attempting to speak from
the margins and legitimate their voices and experiences, regardless of the conformity and
assimilation being foisted upon them (within higher education, intellectual circles, and American
society in general), the congruities between their own discourses and these postmodern concepts
sometimes seemed to suggest that an affiliation with postmodernisms would be a complimentary
and communal relationship. Moreover, in some cases, this affiliation, however provisory, has
been accepted sometimes without fully considering which previous structures might remain
integral to individual experiences as a consequence of a rather different form of conformity and
assimilation to postmodernism itself. This thesis undertakes an inquiry that explores the
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questions that postmodernisms should raise for feminist theories by analyzing the relationship
between postmodernism and feminism established in Linda Nicholson and Nancy Fraser’s
“Social Criticism without Philosophy” and attempts to show how their postmodern feminism
becomes fully embedded in the subordinate and feminized position that the discourses of
postmodernisms leaves open for them.

The Question of Postmodernism
Within feminist and postcolonial theories, a number of voices have emerged that appear
to move beyond some of the premises and assumptions of earlier movements and toward an
exploration of a more postmodern form of subjectivity and self/other relations that challenges the
identity-based politics underwriting previous modes of investigation and critique. However,
while some postcolonial theorists seem to have maintained a distance from postmodernisms,
claiming that the “post” in postcolonialism and postmodernism uphold rather different political
specificities, certain feminist terrains throughout the 1980s and 1990s, undergoing changes of
their own, attempted to argue instead that a postmodern discourse does not retain a contradictory
political element if considered through a feminist lens, an assertion that Nicholson and Fraser
insist upon in their facilitation of the discussion regarding the merger of feminist and postmodern
theories4 (Ashcroft et al 118). Moreover, feminist theorists like Nicholson and Fraser, many of
whom previously identified with what would come to be known as second wave feminism,
regarded these postmodern theoretical positions as ones that might help them overcome the

4

In generalizing about these two decades here, I am referring to feminist specific critiques that teeter upon the edge
of considering a merger between feminisms and postmodernisms as unproblematic or those that use postmodernisms
to critique what they see as the flawed aspects of feminist theories. I am not referring to other feminist theories that
engage cautiously and critically with postmodernisms in a way that considers the negative possibilities in regard to
race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender.
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tendency within a large portion of second wave feminist theories to marginalize the voices of
women who are not part of the white middle-class.
Within “Social Criticism,” Nicholson and Fraser define postmodernism as a discourse
that obstructs the “tendency [within feminisms] to universalize instrumental reason,” or “to
subject all discursive practices indiscriminately to the single criterion of efficiency, or
‘performativity’” (25). In other words, Nicholson and Fraser understand postmodernism as a
discursive practice that will help feminisms avoid the essentialist and foundationalist
underpinnings that infected the philosophical frameworks of second wave feminisms and
“repressed” the “differences among women of different classes, races, sexual orientations, and
ethnic groups” (31). A postmodern feminism, Nicholson and Fraser write, would combine a
postmodernist incredulity toward metanarrative with the social-critical power of feminism” and
create “a practice made up of a patchwork of overlapping alliances, not one circumscribable by
an essential definition” (35, my emphasis). Instead, a postmodern feminism would be based upon
the core principle that, “while some women share some common interests and face some
common enemies, such commonalities are by no means universal; rather, they are interlaced with
differences, even with conflicts” (35)
Yet despite Nicholson and Fraser’s existing perception of postmodernist discourses as
less marginalizing in terms of race, class, sexuality, and ethnicity, other theorists of feminist and
postcolonial origins persist in affirming that, realistically, the discourses of postmodernisms are
equally marginalizing and, as follows, any fusion between these differently inflected theoretical
positions cannot be thoroughly egalitarian.5 For example, postcolonial theorists such as Kwame
Appiah argue, conversely, that the “post” in both postcolonialism and postmodernism are
5

See bell hooks, Seyla Benhabib, and Judith Butler for example
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certainly “space clearing gestures,” but he continues to uphold the previous distinction between
the use of this prefix, claiming that postmodernism is “not concerned with going beyond
colonialism” and that “‘syncretism’ in global exchange is not a result of this space clearing
gesture”6 (119). Contrary to a space cleared that might permit the subject some form of
autonomy and discursive power, the space vacated by postmodernism, as Kum Kum Sangari
points out, is a position that, however critical, disempowers the subject as “an enabling idea and
relocates the impulses for change as everywhere and nowhere”7 (146). Echoing this concern
from a feminist perspective, Sandra Lee Bartky suggests that the location of “power is
everywhere and nowhere” as well (79).
Some postcolonial theorists such as Simon During persist in thinking beyond the
improbable Utopian sphere of a postmodern world of syncretism, speculating that “[f]rom the
side of the post-modernity, English (multinational capitalism’s tongue) will museumify those
pre-colonial languages which have attached themselves to print and the image so belatedly”8
(128). Rather than being a discourse of liberation, postmodernism, as a discourse that fuses
disparate subject positions that are often appropriated randomly from distanced and separate
locations to constitute postmodern subjectivity or textuality,9 is exemplified by During as a
discourse that presses flat the differentiations within the term “difference” and enfolds the
specificity of “differences” within its comprehensive Western, Anglocentric discourse. As
Sangari suggests, postmodernism “sets out to rework or ‘process’ the knowledge systems of the
world in its own image” (146). But in spite of these further warnings regarding postmodernism’s
6

From In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. London: Methuen, 1992.
From “The Politics of the Possible.” Cultural Critique 7, 1987.
8
From “Postmodernism or Post-colonialism Today.” Textual Practice 1(1), 1987.
9
Along this line of thought, it could be argued that postmodern mass culture, particularly American postmodern
mass culture, is perhaps a product of, if not a manifestation of and testimony to, imperialism and colonialism – to the
extent that mass culture can be said to bear witness to America’s pillaging of others’ cultures, artifacts, etc.
7
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colonizing power,10 Nicholson and Fraser have continued to speak of this space clearing gesture
as an opportunity of their own right, as one that resulted from their own efforts, and as one that
demonstrates the degree of equality that has been achieved by them.11
Similar to the “po-mo” alt. kids’ hastily sketched, revolutionary standpoint of
transcending established conventions of dominant American society by refusing recognition of
the system’s existence, Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism without Philosophy” plunges
into the indecipherable space of the postmodern with little skepticism toward the power
structures that remain securely in place in the sociopolitical spheres of postmodernity or in
postmodern theories themselves. Moreover it does so without asking how the postmodern subject
both “continues to nourish the self defining critiques of the West” and labors in its own
preoccupation with its “ongoing disruptions and reformulations” as “the self-ironizing
[postmodern] bourgeois subject” (Sangari 146). Thus in defining the answers to the feministproposed question of postmodernism (and postmodern identification) as being a theoretical
stance that allows feminism to open up an emancipated sociopolitical space for all subjects,
Nicholson and Fraser commit the error of asking the question of postmodernisms without first
stipulating a definition (or referential critique) that might grant access to all subjects. What is
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Looking at the criticisms offered by postcolonial theorists prior to the first publication of “Social Criticism” seems
important here in relation to my secondary claim regarding Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism – that
Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to deal with the marginalizing aspects of feminist theories in relation to race,
ethnicity, and sexuality actually abbreviates these questions if not elides them altogether.
11
In looking critically at Nicholson and Fraser’s work regarding feminisms and postmodernisms I examine their
work as being in dialogue with other work that falls either before or during the timeframe beginning when “Social
Criticism” was first published in Communication (1988) and ending with the reprinting of “Social Criticism” in
Nicholson’s edited collection The Play of Reason (1999). These texts also include Feminism/Postmodernism (edited
by Nicholson with introduction and a reprint of “Social Criticism” 1990), “Feminism and the Politics of
Postmodernism” (1992), Feminist Contentions (edited by Nicholson with introduction in 1995), The Second Wave
(edited by Nicholson with introduction and framing of hers and Fraser’s postmodern feminism in 1997), and
Nicholson’s “A Response to My Critics” (2001), I take them at their word when they say they are attempting to
start a discussion regarding feminisms and postmodernisms and thus find it important to understand which voices
get neglected in or excluded from this discussion and how these alternate points of view are contextualized by
Nicholson and Fraser within this discussion as being non-contradictory.
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more, they assume that such a liberating definition can and does exist, one seemingly bestowed
upon feminisms by critiquing feminist theories according to the terms of postmodern theories.
The error here seems to be that Nicholson and Fraser, first, do not consider whether and how
postmodernisms are marginalizing discourses and, second, do not provide any new means of
analysis for examining female subject formation in postmodern spatiotemporal locales from a
feminist perspective.
Yet while no tangible postmodern subjective referent is proposed in “Social Criticism,”
limits are certainly fixed upon a proper subject, even if an absent subject, and those who do not
fall within those boundaries are certainly shifted yet again to the outer fringes, if not excluded
completely. In other words, Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism suffuses an already
cleared sociopolitical space in feminist theories with a certain postmodern notion of subjectivity
that is, like the alt. kids conception defined above, dependent upon the untiringly visible
definitive flux and interminable construction of the female feminist subject. But their
postmodern feminism falls short of defining the ways by which this constructed, fluid
subjectivity might be interpreted and deconstructed in the theoretical space that is cleared within
postmodernism for feminism.12 In the absence of a viable critical method of subjective
investigation, interpretation of the subject is either left wide-open or rendered utterly
inaccessible. As Laura Kipnis argues in a 1989 essay “Feminism: The Political Conscience of
Postmodernism”: “The subject that drops its veils one by one to reveal its naked status as
construction, rather than nature, bares everything except the answer to its insistent appearance: if
everywhere we look the subject is all that is visible, what is it that is hidden?” (158). In response
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In fact, what becomes clear is that Nicholson and Fraser do not really clear a space within feminism for
postmodernism but seem, conversely, to be attempting to clear a space within postmodernism for female subjects
and feminist theories.
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to this question, one might answer that the subject’s visible inaccessibility submerges every
possible meaning that the subject, whether consciously or unconsciously, strives to signify in her
construction as a subject. Removing the possibility of intentional subjective signification as well
as the tools that allow for more intensive forms of subjective investigation, this ill-defined
application of the “postmodern” label that is attached to feminism in Nicholson and Fraser’s
“Social Criticism” takes for granted the “reality” of and the substantiation of that reality of and
by the very entity being rendered to this state of uncertainty. Along these lines, to ask the
question regarding postmodernism in this imprecise manner is to completely dance around the
question of subjectivity rather than answer it. Moreover, in avoiding the question of subjectivity
in relation to their postmodern feminist theory, Nicholson and Fraser also circumvent questions
of race, ethnicity, and sexuality in relation to gender.
Kipnis’ theoretical texts are often polemical, stretching concepts to their limits to
compel discussions of a concept’s subterrane, or rather, exploring ideas that are likely to fall
outside conventional discursive and logic-based structures or those that linger behind theoretical
disregard and indifference. But in suggesting that the “mysterious subterrane” of the signifier
postmodernism has not been sufficiently considered in this line of feminist thought, Kipnis sets
the stage for what will be the focus of my own consideration of the feminism/postmodernism
debate and my simultaneous attempt to more fully excavate the term’s significations and suggest
possible answers to these already raised questions: Which power structures remain in the
framework of Nicholson and Fraser’s allegedly postmodern feminism and how do they come into
or maintain their existence? How do Nicholson and Fraser interpret, describe, and control
postmodern feminist subjectivities? Within Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism, what
kind of agency do these subjects wield, how much agency is ascribed to them, and by whom?
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What potential consequences result from neglecting and/or omitting these questions in asking
this feminist-specific question of postmodernism, and how might these end results foster the
precise marginalizations that Nicholson and Fraser intend to purge in exploring this question of
how postmodernism can remedy the deficiencies of feminisms?
The polemical characteristics of and the concepts illustrated in Kipnis’ essay are highly
constructive in clarifying the consequences that result from the feminist-initiated merger of
feminism and postmodernism in Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism,” what becomes a
marriage between feminism and postmodernism in every respect of the power asymmetry and
confinement within America’s hegemonic matrimonial institution. Kipnis seems to suggest that
the failures of these philosophical arrangements result from each respective theory’s ability to be
“constitutive of” mergers between feminist and other critical theories but not “reflexive about the
consequent formation” with regard to the juncture at which their encounter is initiated and
defined. This is the argument I will make regarding the postmodern feminism that Nicholson and
Fraser bring into being (150). In fact, the only subject that I will attempt to formulate a definitive
thesis around is the way in which Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism folds under its
own theoretical configuration and lends to, rather than stops or curtails, marginalization.

A Risky Move: From Postmodernisms to American Mass Culture
I begin this inquiry in Chapter One by sifting through the tangled facets of Nicholson and
Fraser’s “Social Criticism without Philosophy” in an attempt to show that their postmodern
feminism is neither a postmodernist critique nor a means of overcoming the pitfalls of
essentialism and foundationalism, the philosophical deficiencies that they perceive as the cruxes
upon which the Anglocentric tendencies of second wave feminism turn. However, my analysis is
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not primarily an attempt to suggest that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism is
theoretically unsound, though my analysis at times does and must move towards this conclusion
even as it can offer no answer as to what a theoretically sound postmodern feminist critique
might entail. (And I think that this is the point.) Instead, my analysis in this chapter is more
precisely a deconstructive move, one that points toward the fact that Nicholson and Fraser do not
and necessarily cannot adequately gauge the limitations or conditions of a thoroughly
postmodern feminism specifically because their understanding of both the postmodern condition
and their own subjective positioning in a social space characteristic of postmodernity are
inevitably incomplete. Along this line of thought, I suggest that the theoretical flaws of
Nicholson and Fraser’s work regarding their postmodern feminism from 1990-1999 can be
attributed to a lack of historicity and an implicit assertion of irrevocability and terminality. In
other words, as one result of their categorical abandonment of feminisms past, Nicholson and
Fraser miss the point being made regarding the Anglocentric biases of feminist theories to which
their postmodern feminism seems to be a response – that “a” postmodern feminism cannot be
definitely defined or assume it can speak for “all” women or “the” conditions of postmodernity
in which they are implicated, and that postmodern feminisms,13 as they would be better
understood, are never fixed, but always in progress.
To provide a conceptual backing to this claim, I move toward an examination of mass
culture in Chapters Two and Three. For the purposes of this project, mass culture operates as a
space in which their postmodern feminism can be examined to reveal how it is embedded in and
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Nicholson and Fraser acknowledge this in “Social Criticism” when they say: “One might best speak of it in the
plural as the practice of feminisms” (35) However, this notion gets lost when they begin looking back upon and
defending their essay and the postmodern feminism it calls into being. Moreover, the plural “feminisms” is reduced
to its singular form when Nicholson and Fraser begin suggesting that all feminisms could fit comfortably under
thesignifier postmodernism.
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constructed by two of the leading discourses of its sociopolitical space – a discourse of
postfeminisms illustrated in Tania Modleski’s Feminism Without Women and a popularized
discourse of postmodernisms. Interpreting Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism” through a
feminist cultural studies model, in which texts are perceived to be simultaneously constituted by
and reflective of their own sociopolitical spaces, I suggest that the intrinsic theoretical flaws of
their postmodern feminism (as are outlined in Chapter One) manifest, in part, because their
theoretical paradigm is unmistakably implicated within these discourses and not because of a
lack of ethics (feminist or otherwise) or an unsophisticated mode of feminist inquiry. These two
differently defined examinations of mass culture, then, serve as opportunities to allude not
simply to the tangible and potential repercussions for both female subjects and feminisms under
Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminist paradigm but more importantly the current
contextualization of feminisms and female agency within the American mainstream.
In Chapter Two, I draw comparisons between the structure of Nicholson and Fraser’s
essay “Social Criticism” (as well as the feminism/postmodernism debate they supervise in two
edited collections on this subject) and the film What Women Want (2000) in an attempt to show
how their essay emerges within a postfeminist discursive structure and seems to be implanted in
what Tania Modleski describes as a postfeminist moment. Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social
Criticism” is certainly not the first postfeminist text written from a feminist theoretical
perspective, as a number or those are already analyzed in Modleski’s Feminism Without Women
(1991).14 However, while feminized men are the primary subject of analysis in Feminism
Without Women, it is the female subject in What Women Want and “Social Criticism” who
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Modleski’s analysis includes some comments regarding the collection Postmodernism/Feminism edited by
Nicholson.
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invokes the specter of the “male gaze,” an all but absent apparition who defines how she
interprets both herself and her feminist standpoints despite the fact that she thinks these thoughts
are a product of her own consciousness and agency.
The function of Chapter Two is two-fold. As part of the fundamental work of this
chapter, I use What Women Want to illustrate the composition of postfeminist texts and the
hierarchal orientation of the feminized male subject within them, drawing comparisons along the
way to the structure of “Social Criticism” and the positioning that Lyotard receives in this essay.
This helps to imagine “Social Criticism” outside of its theoretical platform, the locus of my
examination in Chapter One, to show that the structure of the essay and the debate that it calls
into being can be interpreted as complicit (albeit compulsively and not consciously) with the
postfeminist discursive structure from which they both surface, one that demarcates gender
hierarchies quite definitively while adorning itself with the auspices of gender equality.
Underscoring the potential implications of this discursive complicity, the secondary work of this
chapter, I argue that a new form of female agency is written upon female bodies in these fictional
texts, wherein the female subject is allocated an authority to reject feminisms as a flawed aspect
of her subjectivity. Moreover, the agency inscribed upon these female bodies is the veritable
vehicle for the delineation of gender hierarchies within their metaphorical field of gender
equality. This comparison between What Women Want and “Social Criticism” is thus
constructive in considering how feminisms are written into a subordinate gendered position in
“Social Criticism” by two of the leading feminist theorists dealing with theories of
postmodernity at this historical juncture.
In Chapter Three, I explore, in depth, the position of the female subject in what could be
called an emergent form of postmodern, postfeminist texts and her relationship with feminisms
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past and present. Because these texts can be interpreted, structurally, as postmodern texts, they
provide an opportunity to consider the blowback of Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism
in relation to the female subject if their theoretical paradigm transpired as a realistic feminist
subject position within this postmodernist, postfeminist discursive structure. Within the fictional
texts examined– What Women Want, Sex and the City, Desperate Housewives, and The Devil
Wears Prada – the female characters can be read as collectively and individually representative
of an amalgam of feminisms past and present, as they often think about and choose between a
number of feminist responses with regard to their temporal and spatial locales. Their subjective
composition is one, thus, that easily lends itself to comparison with the definition of postmodern
feminism offered in “Social Criticism,” characterized as being:
inflected with temporality, with historically specific institutional categories like
the modern restricted, male-headed, nuclear family taking precedence over
ahistorical, functionalist categories like reproduction and mothering. [. . .]
Moreover, postmodern feminist theory would be nonuniversalist. When its focus
became cross-cultural or transepochal, its mode of attention would be
comparativist rather than universalizing. [. . .] Finally, a postmodern-feminist
theory would dispense of the idea of a subject of history. [. . .] In general,
postmodern feminist theory would be pragmatic and fallibilistic. (34-35)
One cannot speculate that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism has actually
influenced the construction of the forms of postmodern feminism found in the fictional texts
examined. However, it can be argued that each of these postmodern feminisms, regardless of any
insinuation of inclusivity and diversity, construct a very narrow definition of feminism in the
present moment, one that seems to undermine the broadened conceptualizations of a complex
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and incongruous female subjectivity to which some previous feminisms granted access. But the
perhaps more telling feature of these texts, and the one that illuminates the underlying work of
Chapter Three, is the way in which female subjects in these mediated texts write feminism into
oblivion through a fictionalized rendering of postmodern feminist critique. By “writing” I mean
the literal authorship of this critique through the female voiceover and the various forms of press
sited within these texts. Highlighting the similarities between authorship in these two divergent
media is useful, first, because they point toward the way a multiply signifying postmodern
feminism can be rendered determinate within hegemonic discourses (specifically postfeminist
and postmodern discourses), and secondly, because they underscore the possibility that
Nicholson and Fraser, too, have written feminism into a subordinate position in answering the
“question of feminism and postmodernism” without being “reflexive about the consequent
formation” (“Feminism: The Political Conscience of Postmodernism” 150).
In part, the undertaking of this thesis breaks down the barriers between genre-based
literary analysis by proposing that “Social Criticism” and the feminism/postmodernism debate
that Nicholson and Fraser command can be read as something of a story where Nicholson and
Fraser can be analyzed in the same way that the characters in film and television are. Drawing
comparisons between their work and American mass culture is also a way of arguing that there is
no distinct divide between academic culture and mass culture, but rather they inform and reflect
upon each other and together can reveal the more pervasive ideologies of the sociopolitical space
that surrounds them.
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CHAPTER ONE: POSTMODERN FEMINISM: THE METANARRATIVE OF LINDA
NICHOLSON AND NANCY FRASER’S “SOCIAL CRITICISM WITHOUT PHILOSOPHY”
Over the last few years, however, I have also begun to see
that, rather than deconstruction simply opening a way for
feminists, the figure and discourse of woman opened the
way for Derrida as well.
-Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, In Other Worlds

In the years that immediately preceded the publication of Linda Nicholson and Nancy
Fraser’s “Social Criticism without Philosophy” in 1988, American academia witnessed both a
waning of confidence in feminist theories – due in part to justified claims regarding a negligent
attention to the diversity between women’s experiences – and a rise of interest in theories that
attended to the structural aspects of an era of postmodernity – the sociopolitical locale in which
those experiences would now be embedded. From a historical perspective, a feminist interest in
postmodernist theoretical perspectives could be logically attributed to reviving the credibility of
and investment in critical feminist perspectives, and this pragmatic rationale is to a large extent
confirmed within Nicholson and Fraser’s essay. In fact, Nicholson and Fraser’s essay has been
regarded as groundbreaking in establishing a discussion between feminisms and
postmodernisms, so much so that a number of prominent feminist theorists have engaged in that
discussion by placing their essays within two collections on the intersection of feminisms and
postmodernisms edited by Nicholson – Feminism/Postmodernism (1990) and Feminist
Contentions (1995). The feminist theorists taking part in the discussions within these collections
include: Jane Flax, Christine Di Stefano, Sandra Harding, Seyla Benhabib, Susan Bordo, Nancy
Hartsock, Elspeth Probyn, Donna Haraway, Andreas Huyssen, Anna Yeatman, Iris Marion
Young, and Judith Butler. As Eloise A. Buker notes in the review of Nicholson’s collection of
her own previously published essays The Play of Reason: From the Modern to the Postmodern,

21

“Social Criticism” “was important in initiating dialogue about postmodernism among feminists,
but the issues raised have been more elaborately developed in subsequent works, including an
important book Nicholson edited, Feminism/Postmodernism” (983, my emphasis)
It could also be argued, as this chapter does, that theories of postmodernity offered a
cursory solution to what Seyla Benhabib and Laura Kipnis describe as the “profound identity
crisis” confronting feminist academia in the early 1980s (“Feminism and Postmodernism” 20).
Nicholson and Fraser’s implementation of postmodern theory as a remedy for the problems
facing feminist theories, however, was problematic in a number of respects. First, as Gayatri
Spivak makes clear, the substantial claims elicited within postmodern theories owe some credit
to preceding discourses of feminisms. In relying on postmodern theory as an authority that could
validate the critiques already articulated within feminist theories, Nicholson and Fraser sidestep
the Eurocentric tendency within the larger terrain of American feminist theory to occlude issues
of race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class, among others, in favor of a postmodern theoretical
perspective that denies the claim to the authority that would make subordination and oppression
possible. In essence, the previously established power dynamics and hierarchal structures of
American hegemonies are disavowed rather than challenged or altered in their postmodern
feminism. Secondly, Nicholson and Fraser become responsible for a skewed historical revision of
a diverse array of feminist critical theories and activism that spans more than two decades,
lumping this work together in less than eight pages of descriptive analysis as categorically
“wrong” in pragmatics and practice. In addition, because Nicholson and Fraser depict their
postmodern feminism as having the “right” pragmatics and thus the “right” practices, their
theoretical standpoint becomes a totalizing theory itself, one that is distinctively a product of the
modernist discursive structure from which it emerges. As a result, the theoretical perspective
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they espouse lacks a method of analysis that could attend female subjectivity and experience
within the sociopolitical locales of postmodernity.

The Encounter: A Discursive Analysis of “Social Criticism”
For Nicholson and Fraser, the “coincidental” juncture at which feminist tensions seem to
coincide with postmodernism’s central theses becomes for them an indispensable encounter that
would help feminisms avoid falling into the traps of “foundationalism” and “essentialism” (1920). Throughout their essay, they purport to show why an encounter between feminism and
postmodernism would be one with positive outcomes for feminists attempting to deal, on a
historical level, with the marginalization of specific feminist voices as well as one that would
prevent, in terms of feminist social criticism, future marginalizations. Asserting that “the
‘modern’ conception [of feminism] must give way to a new ‘postmodern’ one in which criticism
floats free of any universalist theoretical ground,” Nicholson and Fraser perform two fairly
extensive critiques of postmodern and feminist theories within the first two sections of their
essay (21, my emphases).
In the first section, “Postmodernism,” they take Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern
Condition as a representative source of postmodernism’s “tendencies”; outline the “internal
tensions” of his argument, which amount to what Nicholson and Fraser see as “the” limitations
of postmodernism; and claim to “suggest some alternative formulations” (20). In “Feminism,”
the second section in which they take to task feminism’s tendency to incline toward “the sorts of
philosophical metanarratives rightly criticized by postmodernism,” Nicholson and Fraser outline
a small “representative” selection of feminist theories that they ascertain to fall, in some way,
within the philosophical categories of essentialism and foundationalism and suggest that the
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experiences articulated by other feminist voices are marginalized as a result (26, my emphasis).
When juxtaposed, these sections provide what can be described as a fairly encouraging analysis
of postmodernism and a rather unsympathetic censure of feminism. Together, this staged
encounter, described in their introduction as “the initial, critical phase” in developing a
postmodern feminist “perspective,” becomes “the” trajectory for establishing, in the third section
of their essay “Toward a Postmodern Feminism,” what they describe as the conception of a
thoroughly postmodern mode of feminist thought and inquiry (20).
Presumably, in the introduction and in the title of this third section, Nicholson and Fraser
are developing insights “toward” what they believe might become a form of postmodern feminist
critique. However, in this third section, they demarcate the characteristics of what they
categorize as postmodern feminism quite definitively, despite their description of this practice as
“a patchwork of overlapping alliances” that might be described “best” “in the plural as the
practice of feminisms” (35) Esteeming the value of the phrase “justice of multiplicities” quoted
from Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition earlier in “Social Criticism,” the plural configuration
of feminisms that they propose is represented by the sign “postmodern feminism.” Taken in its
singular form, their postmodern feminism restructures feminist thought in accordance with the
particular structure of postmodernism offered by Lyotard. This theoretical position is not one,
then, that coexists beside other forms of feminist criticism such as Marxist feminist theories or
postcolonial feminist theories or even different conceptions of postmodern feminist theories.
Rather, their postmodern feminism incorporates “all” other feminist theories as part of a mixed
whole, a convergence that they champion as one that “floats free” from the limitations outlined
in reference to preceding feminist theories and as one that would create “a broader, richer, more
complex and multilayered feminist solidarity” (“Social Criticism” 35).
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During the fifteen years that followed the initial publication of this essay, however, a
number of feminist voices whose work is placed textually by Nicholson and Fraser within the
framework of their feminism/postmodernism debate have called the signifier “postmodern
feminism” itself into question and expressed considerable feelings of marginalization in relation
to this “broader, multilayered feminist solidarity” that Nicholson and Fraser claim to generate.
This is the line of inquiry I explore in this chapter. In addition to arguing that Nicholson and
Fraser’s ‘Social Criticism without Philosophy’ fails to meet its own objectives and marginalizes
other voices as a result, I return to the fundamental premise upon which their postmodern
feminism is established – the encounter between feminism and postmodernism that they stage as a
means of producing this thoroughly postmodern feminism. I examine, first, the parameters of this
postmodern feminism, parameters that Nicholson and Fraser claim are “requirements which
constrain the development of such a perspective” (20). I then sift through their conception of
Lyotard as being representative of a postmodernism that provides, for them, “a postmodernist
reflection on feminist theory” that “can help remedy [feminism’s] deficiencies” (20). It is only by
returning to the “initial, critical phase of the encounter,” I believe, that questions can be
approached regarding how this postmodern feminism has functioned within the field of feminist
theories and why it never materialized as the kind of “free floating” theoretical position that
Nicholson and Fraser imagined.
In exploring the possible insights that these questions might produce, I analyze their
postmodern feminism in Chapters Two and Three as one enveloped in the social context of a
thread of feminist backlash culture – the phenomenon of postfeminisms1 - and as one obscured
by and impinged upon by the cultural implications of a massified definitions of postmodernism.
1

See Tania Modleski’s Feminism Without Women: Culture and Criticism in a “Postfeminist” Age (1991).
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But within this chapter, I suggest that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism, at the point
of and shortly after its conception, does not conform to their own understanding of postmodern
theories and is not, despite their own claims, postmodernist. Finally, I explore their postmodern
feminism as a modern discourse and theoretical structure, one that intensifies rather than
alleviates the marginalization of voices within feminist theories.

Nicholson and Fraser’s Thoroughly Postmodern Feminism: An Explication of Initial Concerns
Postmodernists, as Fraser and Nicholson claim, “seek, inter alia, to develop conceptions
of social criticism which do not rely on traditional philosophical underpinnings,” or, in other
words, postmodernism seeks to deem “grand narratives of legitimation” unreliable and replace
them instead with local narratives in which legitimation becomes “plural, local, and immanent”
(21). Thus in the section entitled “Toward a Postmodern Feminism,” Nicholson and Fraser apply
the postmodernist concept above to their understanding of feminism and offer this often quoted
definition as an explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of their postmodern feminism:
[T]he categories of postmodern feminist theory would be inflected with
temporality, with historically specific institutional categories like the modern
restricted, male-headed, nuclear family taking precedence over ahistorical,
functionalist categories like reproduction and mothering. [. . .] Moreover,
postmodern feminist theory would be nonuniversalist. When its focus became
cross-cultural or transepochal, its mode of attention would be comparativist rather
than universalizing. [. . .] Finally, a postmodern feminist theory would dispense of
the idea of a subject of history. [. . .] In general, postmodern feminist theory
would be pragmatic and fallibilistic. (34-35)
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For Nicholson and Fraser, the essentialist and foundationalist philosophical cornerstones of
second wave feminist theories are the very theoretical obstructions that postmodernism appears
to eradicate. Claiming that a number of these “representative genres of feminist social criticism [.
. .] rely on the sorts of philosophical underpinnings which their own commitments, like those of
postmodernists, ought in principle to rule out,” Nicholson and Fraser base the formulation of
their postmodern feminism largely upon several critiques of the works of other feminist theorists
who they find guilty of this charge (namely: Shulamith Firestone, Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo,
Nancy Chodrow, Ann Ferguson, Nancy Folbre, Nancy Hartsock, Catherine MacKinnon, and
Carol Gilligan), hoping to “encourage such theory to become more consistently postmodern”
(20, 34).
The above definition (an extensive excerpt from their page and a half rendering of a
postmodern feminism) is highly aspirational. However, it is important to consider, more than
momentarily, that the possibility of avoiding the theoretical traps of foundationalism and
essentialism remains, almost unquestionably, as impractical as removing the subject from the
confines of the social world and examining her or him as an isolated entity. In particular, those
who have tried to eschew essentialism in their work, as demonstrated by Diana Fuss in
Essentially Speaking, have never completely succeeded. Thus when Fuss proposes that “the logic
of essentialism can be shown to be irreducible even in those discourses most explicitly concerned
with repudiating it,” the question of whether and how Nicholson and Fraser fall into the very
theoretical traps of essentialism and foundationalism that they critique becomes an important one
to ask, and this is an inquiry that informs a large portion of this chapter (2). Furthermore, the
fundamental concepts of postmodernism that Nicholson and Fraser find appealing and those
upon which their definition of a postmodern feminist critique rests are similarly unrealistic,
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principally in postmodernism’s situatedness as a theoretical position that eschews both
philosophy and power, a position that must be and is carried over into their postmodern
feminism. In considering the improbable if not impossible professed positionality of being
without philosophy and power, the question of whether and how their theoretical position
becomes imbued with both power and philosophical legitimacy should also be raised, one that is
only provisionally answered here when examining Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism”
and their postmodern feminism as modern discourses.
In addition to eradicating tendencies toward essentialism and foundationalism, Nicholson
and Fraser assume that, under the philosophical construct of a postmodern feminism,
“legitimation descends to the level of practice,” where speakers “problematize, modify, and
warrant the constitutive norms of their own practice even as they engage” them (23). At the same
time that these speakers control the norms of their own practice, they also, as Nicholson and
Fraser claim, “assume responsibility for legitimizing their own practice” (23). The contradiction
that seems embedded in these two statements is located in an underlying humanist rationale that
these speakers will reshape these social norms to produce equality (in any shape or form) and
that they will legitimize practices that are beneficial to the “cultural specificity of different
societies and periods and to that of different groups within societies and periods” and not declare
themselves an authority or their theoretical standpoint as absolute (34). In fact, one need not look
any further than “Social Criticism” itself to see the shortcomings of such an assumption,
especially when looking at the way Nicholson and Fraser respond to and situate contesting
voices, like Seyla Benhabib’s, within their feminism/postmodernism debate.
While Nicholson and Fraser certainly qualify their postmodern feminism in such a way
that seems to allow for the other feminist theorists to “problematize, modify, and warrant”

28

alternative constitutive norms, they also claim that “there is nothing self-contradictory in the idea
of a postmodern theory” and rarely allow contradicting voices the chance to “problematize,
modify, and warrant” any portion of this theoretical position according to their own cultural
specificity. Rather, as it will become clear in this chapter, Nicholson and Fraser do assume the
responsibility for legitimizing their own practice, but in the process of doing so, they similarly
delegitimize a number of other voices as well as the practices that each silenced voice attempts to
legitimize. Without even examining the consequences that arise when postmodern theory is
established as a save-all for the collective whole of feminist inquiry, Nicholson and Fraser’s
assertion of authority should raise a few troubling concerns in relation to the history of privileged
feminist activism and theory that they attempt to simultaneously rewrite and erase.
These “practitioners,” as feminist theorists are referred to in “Social Criticism,” face
tremendous difficulties legitimizing interpretations of already existing institutions and
preexistent feminist theoretical positions, which should suggest an even greater struggle in
legitimizing their “practices” under Nicholson and Fraser’s proposed paradigm. This is not to
mention the paradox that arises in legitimizing a practice or method of analysis without
espousing either power or authority. Secondly, feminist theorists and activists face an even more
difficult task when their already suspect practices are rendered doubly illegitimate both by
Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism2 and the postmodern abandonment of grand
narratives of legitimation. The problematic aspect of relinquishing these narratives, politically
and socially, is that the very discourses still seeking legitimation become paralyzed in the middle
of their own ongoing processes of laying claim to that legitimacy in the first place. At the same
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This double marginalization begins to sound like a chilling echo of the very voices Nicholson and Fraser purport to
represent.
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time, those non-legitimized discourses are subject to the continued denial of authenticity within
hegemonic discourses that have in no way relinquished their own power (or had that power
stripped from them) because of their envelopment in any emergent forms of a postmodern
condition. This problematic aspect of postmodern theories, especially when it comes to feminist
discourses, has often led leading intellectuals like bell hooks to ponder the question: “Should we
not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the “subject” when they surface at a historical
moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?”
(“Postmodern Blackness” 2482).
At the same time that this very legitimation becomes impossible due to the “selfnegation” implicit in their model of “legitimation as practice,” the discursive power (still on the
throne) continues to “hover above,” as Nicholson and Fraser put it, in other words suggesting, I
suspect, the position of a “god’s eye view” (“Social Criticism” 23). Thus this enables the
unchallenged discursive powers, “hovering above,” to continue to contradict marginalized
interpretations of reality (the interpretations that call into question these “powers that be”) by
superimposing their own dominant narratives, while impeding, through new modes of
suppression, the attempts of marginalized voices to legitimize themselves, as has been the state
of affairs since those marginalized voices first began demanding legitimation. Nicholson and
Fraser’s presupposition that legitimation will be local, plural, and immanent remains an all too
Utopian fantasy that involves an ability to predestine a reorganization of power structures,
structures impervious to full identification and dissection. Moreover, Nicholson and Fraser’s
attention to Lyotard’s postmodern theory falls short of considering the already altered hierarchy
of discursive powers has transpired precisely as an effect of the postmodern condition, a point
that will be explored more thoroughly in the analysis of What Women Want in Chapter Two.
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Postmodernisms’ Archetype: Jean-François Lyotard as a Modern Sign
In defining this postmodern feminist critique, Nicholson and Fraser rely on Jean-François
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, a text they find to be “generally exemplary of the larger
tendency” of postmodern plurality, to open up feminist critique and solve the problems of racial,
ethnic, and sexual exclusion (21). From this point, they develop their postmodern feminism,
offering definitions that largely seem to conform to their reading of Lyotard’s text and that, as
they claim, will be specific enough to the needs of feminism as to avoid the occlusion of voices
and experiences that inevitably results when feminist writers attempt to speak for all women,
everywhere. Correspondingly, they offer this reading of Lyotard’s description of the
“postmodern condition”:
For Lyotard, postmodernism designates the general condition of contemporary
Western civilization. The postmodern condition is one in which ‘grand narratives
of legitimation’ are no longer credible. By grand narratives, he means overarching
philosophies of history like the Enlightenment story of the gradual but steady
progress of reason and freedom, Hegel’s dialectic of Spirit coming to know itself,
and, most importantly, Marx’s drama of the forward march of human productive
capacities via class conflict culminating in proletarian revolution. (“Social
Criticism” 22)
Because of what they take here to be an official description of postmodernism, one that resounds
similar feminist critiques of psychoanalytic and Marxian concepts expressed in the 1960s,
Nicholson and Fraser correspondingly assess the potential that Lyotard’s critique of these
metanarratives has to render powerless any discourse that “purports to be a privileged discourse
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capable of situating, characterizing, and evaluating all other discourses but not itself to be
infected [. . . by] historicity and contingency” (“Social Criticism” 22). Thus, in their discussion
of Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, which moves from this point to Lyotard’s discussion of
the power implicit in the privileged modern discourses, Nicholson and Fraser become
particularly interested in the way that The Postmodern Condition calls “truth” and “justice” into
question. As a result, they rely on the brief encapsulation of the answer that they maintain
Lyotard sketches in answering his own question of where “legitimation reside[s] in the
postmodern era”: “there will necessarily be many discourses of legitimation dispersed among the
plurality of first-order discourses” in which “legitimation becomes plural, local, and immanent”
(23).
At the same time, Nicholson and Fraser seem equally concerned with repudiating what
they see as Lyotard’s attempt to show that social criticism has no place within “postmodernism”:
We submit, it would be apparent that many of the genres rejected by
postmodernists would be necessary for social criticism. [. . .] A phenomenon as
pervasive and multi-faceted as male dominance simply cannot be adequately
grasped with the meager critical resources to which they would limit us. [. . .] On
the contrary, effective criticism of this phenomenon requires an array of different
methods and genres. It requires, at minimum, large narratives about changes in
social organization and ideology. (26)
Despite their recognition, here, that postmodernism is limiting in dealing with phenomena that
feminist theorists confront in struggles toward equality, notably struggles not strictly specific to
male dominance, Nicholson and Fraser do not qualify their postmodern feminism in such a way
that would prevent the imposition of “merely any form of postmodernism,” like Lyotard’s, on
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feminist theories in a manner that would render social criticism inadequate (“Social Criticism”
34, my emphasis). Instead, Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism” is subject to their own
word-for-word critique of Lyotard. In other words, Nicholson and Fraser “narrate [sic] a fairly
tall tale about a large-scale social trend” – feminist theories – confining feminist theories as a
whole within the constraints of a specific postmodern archetype, Lyotard, with the exception of
the mostly hollow description of what they call “appropriate” forms of metanarrative and social
criticism (25, 34).
Another problematic aspect of Nicholson and Fraser’s reading and classification of
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition can be found in a quote I referenced earlier in which
Nicholson and Fraser’s claim that “postmodernists seek, inter alia, to develop conceptions of
social criticism which do not rely on traditional philosophical underpinnings” (21). In the same
paragraph, Fraser and Nicholson exemplify the meaning of this statement, as I did earlier, by
stating that the “‘modern’ conception [of philosophy] must give way to a new ‘postmodern one
in which criticism floats free of any universalist theoretical ground” (21). Nevertheless, what is
important here is the contradiction that occurs two paragraphs after Nicholson and Fraser clarify
this basic postmodernist concept when they begin using Lyotard’s theoretical analysis to defend
their postmodern feminism.
Fraser and Nicholson, as exemplified in their use of these two statements, are attempting
to convince their readers that postmodernism can operate as an open-ended category with no
unilateral domain and no implicit or explicit claim to authority. Yet, in a counterproductive move
they tell the reader to consider the example of Jean-François Lyotard, energetically introducing
him as “genuinely exemplary of the larger tendency” and his The Postmodern Condition as “the
locus classicus for contemporary debates” that “reflects [. . .the ] concerns and tensions of the
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movement” (21, 22). By setting up Lyotard and his work as an unconditional representative of
postmodernism, they lump all other postmodern theorists under the all-inclusive sign
“postmodernism,” for which Lyotard is to serve as postmodernism’s principal embodiment. In
doing this, they seemingly exclude the qualifying phrase in their description of postmodern
theories, “inter alia,” and canonize Lyotard’s work and Lyotard himself as “the” overarching
authority, one that conceivably “hovers above” all other postmodern discourses (21). As a result,
Nicholson and Fraser homogenize and oversimplify the diverse array of postmodernist thinkers
who they define as part of what they call the “postmodern movement,” which must inevitably
result in the exclusion of any competing or contradictory postmodernist critiques.
The postmodern “movement” or “tendency” itself, in the way that Nicholson and Fraser
categorize and define it, then, also becomes a metanarrative (a story about the story of
postmodernist philosophy) and in some ways even the projection of a narrative about philosophy
onto and into the future. Nicholson and Fraser’s narrative, thus, does not tread far from other
“grand Enlightenment narratives,” what Hal Foster refers to in “Postmodernism in Parallax”
(1993) as a penchant for fascist tendencies within the history of American critical theory. Rather,
their reading bolsters the legitimacy of the already articulated metanarratives of postmodern
theories, and in effect, further diminishes any revolutionary power that postmodernist theory
might have once furnished.
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Terminological Squibbles: The Delegitimation of Voice within Nicholson and Fraser’s
Postmodern Feminism
In providing a five page discussion on Lyotard as the representative theorist of
postmodernisms, Nicholson and Fraser, I think, are trying to rebut the claim that the use of
postmodernism leads to a philosophical methodology in which all points of view are equally
valid and all belief systems are equally true, or rather, relativism. They must do this because such
a methodology would obviously impede the political potentiality of feminisms if the effect were
the creation of an incapacitated feminist subject who could not call phallogocentric discourses
into question. However, they actually proceed and again quite reductively, to do something quite
different in comments regarding Seyla Benhabib’s critique of “Social Criticism” and her use of
Lyotard as an example. Nicholson and Fraser’s five page discussion on Lyotard in “Social
Criticism” is perhaps either what triggers Benhabib’s essay, “Epistemologies of the Postmodern:
A Rejoinder to Jean-François Lyotard,” which appears later in Nicholson’s
Postmodernism/Feminism collection (1990) or a consequent reaction to the theoretical positions
upon which Benhabib takes issue with Lyotard. The origin of this discussion never becomes
clear. Nevertheless, though “Epistemologies of the Postmodern” is not the essay I will be using
to illuminate Benhabib’s position on the postmodernism/feminism debate, Nicholson comments
in a section of her introduction to the Feminism/Postmodernism collection about Benhabib and
Benhabib’s essay illuminates Nicholson’s inability to at least reconsider the complexity of the
debate and the potential shortcomings of their postmodern feminist stance.
Referring again to the theoretical essentialism of feminist theories emerging from the
period spanning between 1960 and 1980, Nicholson and Fraser argue that feminist theories “have
been susceptible to the same kinds of criticisms that postmodernists make against philosophy”
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(5). It is from this point, to emphasize this once more, that Nicholson and Fraser appear to find a
need to use postmodern theories, in its singular form, as a universal system of checks and
balances for the broad spectrum of feminist theories that emerged during the period often
referred to as second wave feminism. To this assertion, which is at best a conclusion reached by
traveling on a very slippery slope, Nicholson claims that Benhabib has “no objection” (7, my
emphasis). In (and after) making this statement, Nicholson simplifies Benhabib’s “objection” to
a “quarrel” with the writings of Lyotard and his tendency towards relativism and inconsistency,3
using two words, objection and quarrel, that seem to imply that Benhabib has a particular distaste
for one line of postmodern thought based on an immature notion that has not been thought
through to its “correct” conclusion (7-8). The implications of Nicholson’s censure and the
authority they exercise here suggests that if Benhabib could overcome her objection to or simply
overlook this particular aspect of postmodern theories, she would understand, as Nicholson and
Fraser do, postmodernism’s “centrality to the needs of feminism” (16, my emphasis). As
Nicholson asserts with a particular certainty: “With such a conclusion, I believe, all of the
contributors of this volume would surely agree” (16). However, since many of the contributors in
their Feminism/Postmodernism collection do not reach this conclusion, taking issue with much
more complex issues regarding postmodern theories than relativism and contradiction, Nicholson
and Fraser once again place the voices and practices of a collection of other feminist critics into a
quite reductive category of Nicholson and Fraser’s own definition.

3

Fraser and Nicholson, of course, elaborate on these words “relativism” and “inconsistency” in the five page
discussion of Lyotard in “Social Criticism” and attempt to rectify a tricky obstacle by calling for a “trading of
criticisms” (20). In doing this, they also assume that postmodern theorists would participate in this union as if it
were a two way boulevard and invite feminist theorists to “help remedy the deficiencies of the other,” or rather, that
postmodern theorists would invite a feminist reflection and reworking of postmodernisms according to some
primary feminist epistemologies(20).
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In “Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance,” an article published in 1991 by
the journal Praxis International and again in a 1995 collection edited by Nicholson (Feminist
Contentions), Benhabib, perhaps inadvertently, rejoins Nicholson’s above stated “belief,” saying:
Feminism and postmodernism are often mentioned as if their current union was a
foregone conclusion; yet certain characterizations of postmodernism should make
us rather ask “feminism or postmodernism?” At issue, of course, are not merely
terminological quibbles. (17, my emphases)
For Benhabib, neither postmodernism nor feminism is useless, but her disagreement with
feminism/postmodernism union is also not, as she puts it, a “terminological quibble.”
In contradistinction to Fraser and Nicholson’s elucidation of postmodernism as a
“modern” sign4 that Jean-François Lyotard can adequately represent, Benhabib identifies
postmodernism, and feminism as well, as “constitutive and evaluative terms, informing and
helping define the very practices they attempt to describe” (20). Thus, she seems to see these
terms as ‘signs’ that constitute (shape and design) and not as ‘signs’ that have been constituted
(rendered fixed and terminal). In other words, postmodern theories interpret a set of experiences
and conditions within a social milieu and are, likewise, affected by the very social environment
under investigation. Postmodernisms cannot, then, be understood as fixed categories from which
feminist theory can emerge and remain. “As categories of the present,” she continues, “they
project modes of thinking about the future and evaluating the past” (20-21). Benhabib is more
than willing to take into consideration the importances of postmodern theories, the postmodern
condition, and their effects on both the subject and her or his social world. However, as a central
concern to Benhabib’s argument, seeing postmodernism as an uncomplicated or indispensable
4

Butler identifies postmodernism in the essay “Contingent Foundations” as a necessarily modern sign.
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ally to feminism means failing to highlight the already postmodern aspects of feminisms and
feminist theories, failing to recognize these already postmodern aspects are legitimate in their
own right, and failing to observe that postmodern theories can be marginalizing discourses in and
of themselves.

Already Postmodern Feminisms: A Rejection of Nicholson and Fraser’s Categorical Assessment
of Feminism in “Social Criticism”
Referencing Jane Flax’s book Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West, Seyla Benhabib leans on Flax for a “characterization
of the ‘postmodern moment’ provided by a feminist theorist” (the very feminist theorist who has
said that white women categorically reject postmodernisms as an easy solution to the guilt,
discomfort, and anxiety they feel coming to terms with difference) (Benhabib 18). Benhabib
then uses Flax’s portrayal to show that the central theses of postmodern theories—“The Death of
Man,” “The Death of History,” and “The Death of Metaphysics”—have already been articulated
in feminist terminology—the “Demystification of the Male Subject of Reason,” the
“Engendering of Historical Narrative,” and “Feminist Skepticism toward the Claims of
Transcendent Reason” (17-18). While Nicholson, Fraser, and Flax claim that the alliance
between feminism and postmodernism would produce a more desirable and more productive
feminism, Benhabib, by deconstructing points of correlation between the two, shows that each
postmodern thesis actually undermines its corresponding feminist endeavor. As she asserts, these
three fundamental theses of postmodern theories, again using Flax’s illustration as a case in
point, cause these corresponding results: “The Death of Man” prevents the subject from being
“self-reflexive” or “acting on principle,” “The Death of History” dissolves the “epistemic interest
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in history of struggling groups in constructing their past narratives,” and “The Death of
Metaphysics” circumvents any “criticizing or legitimizing [of] institutions, practices and
traditions other than through the immanent appeal to the self-legitimation of ‘small narratives’”
(29). From the expanded version of these points that she provides in her essay, Benhabib
expresses the urgency of her appeal to reconsider the negative possibilities of Nicholson and
Fraser’s need to use postmodernism as a feminist safeguard:
Feminist theory is undergoing a profound identity crisis at the moment. The
postmodernist position(s) thought through to their conclusions may eliminate not
only the specificity of feminist theory but place in question the very emancipatory
ideals of the women’s movement altogether. [. . .] A certain version of
postmodernism is not only incompatible but would undermine the very possibility
of feminism as a theoretical articulation of the emancipatory aspirations of
women. [. . .] Thus, postmodernism undermines the feminist commitment to
women’s agency and sense of selfhood, to the reappropriation of women’s own
history in the name of an emancipated future, and to the exercise of radical social
criticism which uncovers gender ‘in all its endless variety and monotonous
similarity. (20, 29, my emphases)
Given the weight of Benhabib’s concerns and the great stakes she seems to perceive in relation to
a merger of postmodern and feminist theoretical tenets, it is hard to believe that Nicholson and
Fraser would classify Benhabib’s position so simply in suggesting that the foundation of her
perspective was merely a terminological squibble. But as Laura Kipnis proposes, such is the
depth of denial that has been known to infect the sum total of such theoretical mergers,
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especially when, as Benhabib points out, the subject (feminist theory in this case) is in a state of
crisis looking for an immediate subjective resolution.

Postmodern Feminism: A Modern Discourse
Perhaps the most contradictory element of Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism
is that, by appropriating postmodernism as a remedy for the underlying subjective crises facing
feminist theories in American academia, their postmodern feminism becomes part of the
modernist structure of feminist critique that it sets out to dismantle. In other words, the nontotalizing theory that they attempt to implement suggests that a union of postmodernism and
feminism would allow for the formation of an all-encompassing feminist perspective, and
therefore, Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism becomes, by default, a totalizing theory
itself. The specific postmodern feminism that Nicholson and Fraser’s essay embodies, applied as
a totalizing theory, speaks quite authoritatively about those who find the stakes of the union to be
deceptively dangerous. While this can be demonstrated explicitly in the preceding example of
Seyla Benhabib, it perhaps becomes more transparent when observing the way the power-ridden
and silencing aspects of their postmodern feminism are carried over into and utilized within the
work of other feminist theorists.
For example, in her essay “The End of Innocence,” pushing for a postmodern feminism
similar to that defined by Fraser and Nicholson, Jane Flax describes a conference on the
feminism/postmodernism debate that she attended in 1990 as having an “atmosphere of tension
and hostility,” implying in the context of the paragraph that the debate was neither a “friendly
[n]or productive exchange” (445). In the next paragraph, she proceeds to report “on the claims
that some feminists make about postmodernism” that had been articulated during the conference,
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describing these claims with the arrogant flare and a tone of intolerance that Nicholson and
Fraser take when diminishing the concerns of feminist critics who take issue with their
postmodern feminism (446).
More importantly, Flax’s conveyance of the claims she describes (made by feminists who
question an alliance between feminism and postmodernism) is simply articulated, lacks context,
and, as a parade of soundbites, fails to offer the elaboration that might constitute the legitimacy
and/or importance of those claims. For instance, similar to Nicholson and Fraser’s assumption
that postmodernism would help feminism solve its Eurocentric tendencies, Flax takes it upon
herself to judge the appropriateness of postmodernisms in addressing issues of race, asserting
that “the projects of postmodernism and women of color overlap” (459). From this postulation,
Flax stumbles along the trajectory of her own logical fallacy to claim that the oppositions of
white feminists to engagements with postmodernism are based upon their own “guilt and
anxieties about racism (and our anger at the ‘others’ for disturbing the initial pleasure and
comfort of ‘sisterhood’)” (459). Where Seyla Benhabib and bell hooks’ resistance to the
postmodernism/feminism union might fit into Flax’s categorical, “if you’re white, your either
with us or you’re a racist” paradigm is also an imperative question, but one that only Flax could
answer. But as Benhabib and hooks’ “hostility”5 towards a feminist engagement with
postmodernisms makes clear, it would be more plausible to argue, as I do in this thesis, that the
appropriation of postmodernism by these white feminists circumnavigates the issue of diversity
altogether.
In a twice-removed application, a quotation is taken from the latter part of Flax’s “The
End of Innocence” and used in Robyn Wiegman’s American Anatomies, a study that Wiegman
5

For Flax, oppositions to postmodernisms can be read as hostility toward postmodernisms.
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claims dwells on “two main currents of conversation”—“the critique, on one hand, of feminism’s
historically white female subject and the postmodern suspicion, on the other, concerning the
constitution of the subject altogether” (179, my emphasis). Wiegman states:
Most crucially, Flax interprets white women’s hostility to the postmodern as a
displacement of their own “guilt and anxieties about racism (and our anger at the
‘others’ for disturbing the initial pleasure and comfort of ‘sisterhood’).” But
because any direct challenge to the way whiteness has been critiqued “would be
politically unthinkable,” Flax suggests that it is “easier and more acceptable for
white women to express our discomfort with difference . . . and the politics of
knowledge claims by categorically rejecting postmodernism. (185, quotations
from “The End of Innocence” page 459) 6
The quotation, disconcerting in and of itself, is also troubling given that it is offered in American
Anatomies, a book about the intersection of race and gender, with little context or explanation by
Wiegman. But as it follows a quite favorable view, on Wiegman’s part, of Fraser and
Nicholson’s “Social Criticism,”7 Flax’s all but tangible claim to authority simultaneously points
towards Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism as a modernist discourse and theoretical
position and suspends its legitimacy by calling into question its ability to ever manifest from one
theoretical text to another without silencing and unequivocally rejecting the dissentions of other
feminist theorists.
These examples are important in showing that, as a modernist discourse, the authority
and power of Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism extends beyond the temporality and

7

See the chapter “The Alchemy of Disloyalty” in Robyn Wiegman’s American Anatomies: Theorizing Race and
Gender (1995).
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locality of its own publication. But considering how this power and authority might have been
carried over from the postmodernism they invoke is also crucial. In “Contingent Foundations:
Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism,’”8 Judith Butler begins this inquiry. Suggesting
that “the question of postmodernism be read not merely as the question postmodernism poses for
feminism, but as the question, what is postmodernism?,” Butler begins her essay with this set of
questions:
The question of postmodernism is surely a question, for is there, after all,
something called postmodernism? Is it an historical characterization, a certain
kind of theoretical position, and what does it mean for a term that has described a
certain aesthetic practice not to apply to social theory and to feminist social and
political theory in particular? Who are these postmodernists? (35, my emphases)
Answering, she explains that postmodernism is often taken as an overarching methodology, as it
is in “Social Criticism,” under which “many modalities and permutations” are lumped under a
singular and thus unquestionably “modernist” sign (36-37). While the postmodern project seeks
to “call into question the ways in which such ‘examples’ and ‘paradigms’ serve to subordinate
and erase,” it, in fact, operates as a subterfuge of power that “domesticates” and “colonizes” the
theoretical positions included under its name—particularly the theories of Lacan, Kristeva,
Foucault, Cixous, Derrida, and Irigaray, to name a few—some of which are posited against or
emphatically in contention with others (37).
By investigating what postmodernism is rather than how feminism can benefit by fitting
comfortably within its boundaries, Butler uses her critique of postmodernism to show that power

8

Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange (1995) is a collection also edited by Nicholson and includes
work written by Fraser.
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always precedes, no matter what provisions are made in terms of methodology, politics, or
identity. As a methodology that makes no claims to power, postmodernism can be shown, in
quite the opposite manner, to be imbued with even more power than discourses that explicitly
marginalize other speakers:
If postmodernism as a term has some force or meaning within social theory, or
feminist social theory in particular, perhaps it can be found in the critical exercise
that seeks to show how theory, how philosophy, is always implicated in power.
[…] To establish a set of norms that are beyond power or force is itself a
powerful, forceful conceptual practice which subliminates, disguises, and extends
its own power through recourse to the tropes of normative universality. (38-39,
my emphasis)
Using postmodernism as an example of the way an alleged non-authority and non-entity acquires
power and, in that, the power to dominate even as it appears to have no power at all, Butler lays
the foreground for the question of how Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism acquires
power and, in that, the power to dominate even as it appears to have no power at all (36-39).
As suggested in the beginning of this chapter, understanding how Nicholson and Fraser’s
postmodern feminism has existed within its cultural, sociopolitical, and theoretical contexts
requires examining the bases upon which this theoretical position was founded. In exploring this
question, I would like to return again to the theoretical underpinnings of postmodern feminism
wherein Nicholson and Fraser establish Lyotard as the figurehead and archetype of
postmodernism and offer the following reading of The Postmodern Condition:
For Lyotard, postmodernism designates the general condition of contemporary
Western civilization. The postmodern condition is one in which “grand narratives
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of legitimation” are no longer credible. By grand narratives, he means
overarching philosophies of history (22, my emphases)
Identifying Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition as a form of postmodernism that “designates,”
as in designates the general condition of contemporary Western theory, and Lyotard as one who
“means,” as in “he means overarching philosophies of history” are “no longer credible,” is
problematic, most specifically when these designations and meanings are applied to their
postmodern feminism. As Lyotard’s text begins to designate and mean for Nicholson and Fraser,
it also begins to designate and mean from a very specific perspective and one that emanates from
a particularly colonizing modern foundation of knowledge, chiefly the Eurocentric perspective
from which neither they nor Lyotard can remove themselves. Nicholson and Fraser’s text also
speaks when they neglect the qualifier “contemporary Western civilization” to which Lyotard is
attentive in The Postmodern Condition. In other words, how The Postmodern Condition “means”
and “designates” depends upon the “who” that is interpreting the text as well as the “from
where” and “under what conditions” this who is speaking, as Lyotard’s rendering of the
“condition of contemporary Western civilization,” too, depends on these variables.
While Nicholson and Fraser might see their interpretation of The Postmodern Condition
as positive in so much as it delegitimizes white, male, Western accounts of history, other
understandings could vary significantly. In adaptations and rewritings of these accounts history
by previously silenced and/or oppressed voices where grand narratives of legitimacy began to
supply the means for a move toward human equality or where a kind of Marxist hope of
overcoming subordination and oppression has emerged, the portrait of the “postmodern
condition” being drawn by Nicholson and Fraser might be viewed as one that is very bleak and
one without much prospect for resistance and change. Exacting a philosophical position that
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conceives of itself as being wholly applicable is a risky endeavor in this respect, one that, though
perhaps unconsciously, institutes a global, totalizing socio-philosophical narrative schema that
orders and explains knowledge and experience.
The potential, possibly unintended effect of suggesting that a theoretical position is
altogether practical for all individuals, without limitations to the possible places and times that
such application might not be sufficient or at least a recognition that in some cases it may not be
adequate, is that this statement begins to echo Nicholson and Fraser’s description of the
“privileged discourse capable of situating, characterizing, and evaluating all other discourse” that
Lyotard regards as illegitimate. It seems paradoxical that they would deviate from Lyotard’s
denunciation of the power implicit in metanarrative discourses at the same time they all but fully
validate their own overarching metatheory. Nevertheless, suggesting that Lyotard’s categorical
rejection of metanarratives does not apply to them allows Nicholson and Fraser to broaden and
extend their own entitlement to the power-ridden position that they take when defining the
paradigmatic structure of postmodern feminism and privileging it over the feminist
methodologies that call its utility and relevance into question:
A first step is to realize, contra Lyotard, that postmodern critique need forswear
neither large historical narratives nor analyses of societal macrostructures. This
point is important for feminists, since sexism has a long history and is deeply and
pervasively embedded in contemporary societies. Thus, postmodern feminists
need not abandon the large theoretical tools needed to address large political
problems. There is nothing self-contradictory in the idea of postmodern theory.
(34)
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I agree with Nicholson and Fraser that these “large historical narratives” and “analyses of
macrostructures” most certainly are important to critiquing long-existing, perpetually modified
histories of sexism, racism, ethnocentrism, and other forms of tyranny. But Nicholson and
Fraser’s sanctioning of metanarrative discourses is, at the same time, that which gives
authorization to their own construction of a postmodern feminist metatheory within their essay
and one of the reasons the “idea” of postmodern theories (an idea that at least becomes the
vanguard of their postmodern feminism, if not explicitly offered as such) is “contradictory.”
Nothing but their own claim to the absence of self-contradiction washes out this antipodal
positioning of their postmodern feminist perspective as one placed firmly within the narrative of
The Postmodern Condition and as one exempt from its critique. Its irreconcilability, like the
essentialist essence of any critique that involves the mention of gender or sexed terminology, is
the philosophical subterrane that provides definition for this postmodern condition, and its
modern, foundationalist substructure or underpinning is not dislodged simply by Nicholson and
Fraser’s invocation of feminism’s maturation to some kind of postmodern status. Similarly,
Lyotard’s description of a “condition” is much different from Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to
propel feminisms into the structures of that condition, and this crucial distinction to draw. But I
would like to return momentarily to the idea of postmodern theory presented in “Social
Criticism” and the way that it is employed by Nicholson and Fraser not as a promising subjective
position to which they should aspire but as a means of justifying what seems to emerge as their
own metatheory.
By situating the term “postmodernism” in “Social Criticism without Philosophy” as an
idea that “can, in principle, be conceived in ways that do not take us back to foundationalism,”
Nicholson and Fraser construct their interpretation and implementation of postmodernism as an
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anti-theoretical theory (23). As follows, they assign value to postmodernism by framing it as
having the “right pragmatics” and thus the “right practices.” Hence the theoretical tools that
Nicholson and Fraser use to argue for a “multiplicity of theoretical standpoints,” and also to
facilitate the legitimation of their postmodern feminist theory, generates a distended
substantiation of what has already become the remarkably powerful metatheory of their
postmodern feminism specifically because of the authority they assume to have in making this
value judgment regarding “right” and “wrong” pragmatics and practices.
Moreover, they stage this encounter and present their postmodern feminism as the
original postmodern feminist Theory when they claim within the first paragraph of their essay:
“So far, however, they [feminism and postmodernism] have kept an uneasy distance from one
another. Indeed, so great has been their mutual wariness that there have been remarkably few
extended discussions of the relations between them” (19). Consequentially, Nicholson and Fraser
discard the already postmodern aspects of feminist philosophy in a number of feminist
theoretical texts, texts that not only have been recognized as postmodern in their own right but
also have been accepted as similarly valuable and none capable of representing “all” experiences
and social conditions. Nicholson and Fraser’s appeal to postmodernism, particularly the
“exemplary” Lyotard, raises the form of postmodernism offered by Lyotard to this metanarrative
position, and their authority and power to do so resides in the process of framing (not to mention
defending) their postmodern feminism in such a way that it too becomes a metatheory. The
qualifiers they offer regarding their appropriation of postmodernism seem of no substance when
placed into the context of their essay and when situated alongside Nicholson and Fraser’s
consistent rebuttals of other feminist theorists’ critiques, such as those of Judith Butler, Seyla
Benhabib, Susan Bordo, and others.
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Voices of Dissent: The Structure of Nicholson’s Edited Collections Feminism/Postmodernism
and Feminist Contentions and Subsequent Responses
Not unlike the tone of voice of other feminist theorists that Nicholson and Fraser claim
has “hinder[ed] alliances with other progressive movements” from the 1980s to the present,
Nicholson and Fraser’s argumentative and derisive tone of voice (as well as their sometimes
blatant dismissiveness of other stances in the debate) seems to undermine the “cross-cultural,”
“transepochal,” “comparativist” theory that they attempt to justify (34-35). Although their call
for a multifaceted feminist commonality is justified and, as well, they may be correct in
attributing the current stall to contentions between metanarratives and narratives which
interweave race, sexuality, class, and/or ethnicity, the simple union of feminism and
postmodernism into what they term “postmodern feminism” is still absent of certain facets that
other feminist theorists regard as essential in analyzing or dismantling marginalizing hierarchies.
For instance, the postmodern feminism they conceive is deficient of “clear definitions and
political aims for feminists and feminisms” that, as hooks claims in “Feminism: A Movement to
End Sexist Oppression,” have been necessary throughout history and are still of critical
importance (23). In spite of the need for the analytical tools and philosophical foundations that
have been and continue to be indispensable, Nicholson and Fraser univocally reject any concept
that retains modern theoretical underpinnings.
Furthermore, Nicholson and Fraser rarely provide explanations or examples that consider
the ways in which any form of social, political, or historical narrative “rendered temporally and
culturally specific” might actually manifest if explored through this theoretical paradigm and, as
well, often discredit and sometimes silence other voices who attempt to weigh the missing social
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and political components and consider the significance of their absence. At the point at which the
voices that attempt to do so are subordinated or stifled for the sake of legitimizing Nicholson and
Fraser’s postmodern feminism, it seems that “social criticism,” rather than “philosophy,”
undergoes an explicit devaluation, one that parallels the disavowal of social critique in Lyotard’s
The Postmodern Condition that Nicholson and Fraser outrightly reject. Moreover, this theoretical
position, to a rather extensive degree, removes the very tools that have been and continue to be
pragmatically useful in resisting subordination and oppression, particularly to those individuals
who Nicholson and Fraser reassert as “occluded from axes of domination other than gender”
(“Social Criticism” 33). It becomes important, then, to consider whether this would have been
the result if this “encounter” had not been as one-sided as Nicholson and Fraser cause it to be.
Time and time again in Nicholson and Fraser’s facilitation of this dialogue between
feminism and postmodernism, the ideas of other feminist intellectuals are displaced,
reinterpreted, and dismissed. As a result, Nicholson and Fraser have been able to instruct these
feminist theorists (as well as their readers) as to how their differing conceptions of and
oppositions to this feminism/postmodernism encounter can fit neatly and uniformly within the
postmodern feminism that Nicholson and Fraser have instituted. Each time this occurs, the
qualifiers that are offered – local, fallibilistic, plural, etc. – disappear into a void of increasing
silence(ing) as if only placed within “Social Criticism” to deny its metanarrative (or
metatheoretical) constitution. This nears the philosophical equivalent of statements made to
maintain the subjective figments of political correctness in American society today, whereby:
homophobics deny their homophobia, sexists deny their sexism, anti-feminists deny their antifeminist practices, racists deny their racism, and so too ethnocentrists deny their ethnocentrism.
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One might ask, then, is it possible, in trying to avoid the stratifying and universalizing
critiques that second wave feminist theorists tend toward, that Nicholson and Fraser go too far in
the other direction, where the already legitimized critiques, interpretations, and narratives of
marginalized groups are delegitimized under the grand narrative of postmodernism, as it has in
some ways come to exist? Is it possible that the structure of their collections
Feminism/Postmodernism and Feminist Contentions, as well as their responses to the critiques
other feminists offer regarding their postmodern feminisms, categorically positions “Social
Criticism without Philosophy,” too, as a secondary master narrative? And what do Nicholson and
Fraser mean to suggest in describing the changing roles of intellectuals during the postmodern
era in the following explication:
When no longer anchored philosophically the very shape of criticism changes. It
becomes more pragmatic, ad hoc, contextual, and local. With this comes a
corresponding change in the special role and political function of intellectuals[?]
(“Social Criticism” 21)
“Social Criticism” raises more concerns regarding the relationship between postmodernisms and
feminisms than it can explain away in the numerous publications produced to defend their
position. Raising these questions might have been beneficial to an understanding of how
feminisms are implicated in and compounded by a set of postmodern conditions as well as how
feminist theories might begin responding to or analyzing a set of postmodern sociopolitical
circumstances. But the explication, in the above quotation, of the role of intellectuals in a time of
postmodernity, first of all, assumes that the progression “towards” postmodernity is complete
and, as a result, limits the role of feminist intellectuals to a very restricted view of their
sociopolitical locale. In other words, if postmodern feminist social criticisms are only pragmatic,
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thus only deal with factual or tangible occurrences, the intellectual or feminist critic cannot begin
to concretely analyze invisible forms of domination and subordination or the structural
foundations of systems that create, reinforce, and perpetuate both (35). If postmodern feminisms
are more “ad hoc,” meaning that postmodern feminist critiques are confined to “a” specific
purpose, it becomes even more difficult to investigate complex systems of oppression identified
across historically and socially contingent channels and different directions of flow and
synthesis. Moreover, it becomes more difficult, if not unfeasible, for this critique to also be
contextual. Finally, the application of this methodology becomes even less likely to transpire if
one were examining multiple or split subjectivities or interstitial spaces as opposed to a singular
event occurring in an isolated space and time.
Granted, a theoretical interpretation can be focused on a localized event that takes place
within the larger context of its immediate time and place. But to make judgments about the
theoretical imperative or correctness of any of the above is to invoke the very Philosophy with a
capital P that Nicholson and Fraser intend to avoid when they stress: “in the postmodern
reflection on the relationship between philosophy and social criticism, the term ‘philosophy’
undergoes an explicit devaluation; it is cut down to size if not eliminated altogether” (“Social
Criticism” 21). In fact, the theoretical position they describe here, when planted in the social
realm as opposed to the theoretical space it enjoys in their essay, becomes both one from which a
voice speaks that assumes the authority to have conclusive knowledge about a particular event
and one from which that voice affects an implicit authority in defining the contextual
surroundings of that particular event. In practice, this postmodern feminist theory requires the
imposition of one’s interpretation of an experience(s) on another whose experience(s) may differ,
no matter how singular the event or experience under consideration.
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Nicholson and Fraser seem to acknowledge this set of circumstances within their attempt
to reveal postmodernism as a “restricted,” androcentric theoretical position, saying:
The term philosophy maintains an implicit structural privilege. In the new
postmodern equation, then, philosophy is the independent variable while social
criticism and political practice are dependent variables. The view of theory which
emerges is not determined by considering the needs of contemporary criticism
and engagement. It is determined, rather, by considering the contemporary status
of philosophy. This way of proceeding has important consequences, not all of
which are positive. (“Social Criticism” 21)
This is perhaps one of the few times that I find myself agreeing with Nicholson and Fraser
without needing to qualify that consensus. Yet even as they take into account the limitations of
the version of postmodernism considered in their essay and recognize the possible consequences
of the “contemporary status of philosophy” in relation to their reading of postmodern philosophy,
the postmodern feminism that emerges appears as one that is invested only in its current
philosophical status in relation to the philosophies that it deems credible (postmodernism) or
lacking (seemingly all theory under the signifier feminism). Moreover, it suggests a second
potential effect wherein their denial of “Social Criticism” or postmodern feminism as a
metatheory begins to resound what Nicholson and Fraser see as Lyotard’s indispensable
observation regarding first-order metanarrative. In other words, “Social Criticism” becomes a
metanarrative that contends “not itself to be inflected by the historicity and contingency which
render first-order discourses potentially distorted and in need of legitimation” (“Social Criticism”
22).
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The Embeddedness of Assumption within a Specific Historical Context
Nicholson and Fraser claim that whether it was academic feminism or Marxist feminist
scholarship, feminist theory has from the beginning “failed to recognize the embeddedness of its
own assumptions within a specific historical context,” a problem they hope to resolve by
redefining feminism according to the abovementioned terms (1-2, 34-35). Their argument is
problematic, first and foremost, because it fails to recognize the necessity of historically
progressive events. In other words, that feminisms began with a formation of alliances built
around a “universally shared interest or identity” is historically important, as one could not
imagine, for example, movements of this caliber (women’s suffrage and the Women’s Rights
Movement) being founded upon a multitude of “specific institutional categories” (Nicholson and
Fraser 34-35). Without this initial commonality, women such as bell hooks and Adrienne Rich,
both of whom are mentioned within a single paragraph of “Social Criticism,” might have never
gained the voice that, as Nicholson and Fraser note, “unmasked the implicit reference to white
Anglo women” and “exposed the heterosexual bias of much mainstream feminist theory”
(“Social Criticism” 33).
However, the conceptual basis upon which Nicholson and Fraser found their postmodern
feminist philosophy as part of an attempt to become “[sufficiently] attentive to theoretical
prerequisites of dealing with diversity” is one that insufficiently attends to the way these
concepts are based upon and entwined with sociopolitical and cultural “realities” (“Social
Criticism” 33). The way these diverse bodies experience their own sociopolitical and cultural
worlds is devalued if not altogether ignored in “Social Criticism.” To put it a different way,
Nicholson and Fraser do not consider the degree to which these experiences cannot be separated
from what they see as the falsehoods and failings of modernist theories/philosophies simply by
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“criticizing lingering essentialism in contemporary feminist theory” (“Social Criticism” 33, my
emphasis). Nicholson and Fraser, in effect, deny that these experiences have been and are still at
least partially embedded in a modernist historical context wherein the essentialist paradigms that
they want to altogether abandon in feminist criticisms operate as tools of subordination. In
addition, “Social Criticism” itself “fails to recognize the embeddedness of its own assumptions
within a specific historical context.” In other words, it fails to recognize it is implanted between
modern and postmodern eras and is itself subject to being impinged upon by the conditions of
both. Conceivably, one of the most telling failures, here, is that Nicholson and Fraser do not
consider that arrival of postmodernity is not a foregone conclusion but rather a moment of
redefinition, already taking place, and simultaneously defining its own constitution.
If a postmodern metanarrative is coming into existence, whether called to this position by
“outsiders” like Nicholson and Fraser or by postmodern theorists themselves, then by all means,
we must be witnessing a critique, interpretation, and (re)definition of “marginalized” discourses,
signs, identities, and knowledges by that very metanarrative, though through which particular
postmodern metanarrative no one can be sure. However, one can be certain, as Kumkum Sangari
has noted, that various versions of this postmodern condition have been accepted by speakers of
dominant discourses on a global scale and often imposed on people and in places not
experiencing the same postmodern condition, if they are experiencing such at all. Understanding
postmodernism as a “condition,” rather than a philosophical “position,” might have allowed for
the silenced critiques of oppression both within and outside of these postmodern contexts to
speak about their experiences within what has to be acknowledged as an interstitial subjective
space. But instead of looking from the inside out, as in examining the potentially beneficial
concepts of postmodernisms from distinct feminist perspectives, “Social Criticism” and its
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authors continue to place the emphasis on a male gaze that stands outside staring in
(postmodernism), scrutinizing individual qualities of feminist theories, instilling its own logic,
and continuing to refuse any agency to the possessor.
Though Nicholson and Fraser describe this as “a postmodernist reflection on feminist
theory [that] reveals the disabling vestiges of essentialism,” at times it becomes difficult to
discern whether the gaze is that of the postmodernism described in their essay or another that
emanates from the authors’ unconscious sociopolitical, cultural, philosophical, and/or alternative
subjective assemblage, although the gaze rarely seems to become self-interested. In other words,
while Nicholson and Fraser often assess other feminist theories through their own understanding
of their postmodern temporal and spatial locale, they disallow that appraisal when it is returned
upon their own theoretical interpretation.
Nonetheless, it is in placing feminism under the subterfuge of postmodernism and
defining feminism according to the terms of Lyotardian postmodern theory that Nicholson and
Fraser seem to think that they can remove themselves, as well as feminist theories, from the gaze
being imposed upon them. But their postmodern feminism does not emerge as the “robust
postmodern feminist paradigm of social criticism” that they describe as “possible” (35) Rather, it
becomes, itself, positioned outside that postmodern feminist paradigm due to its own failure to
fulfill its particular paradigmatic requirements. More importantly, because Nicholson and Fraser
“fail [sic] to recognize the embeddedness of its own assumptions within a specific historical
context,” they fail to see that their institution of this self-imposed introspection of feminism
according to postmodern theory seems to place feminism firmly within the postfeminist and
postmodern discourses gaining recognition in America’s social realm. This possibility is
explored in the chapters that follow in this thesis.
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By asserting that feminist theories have already articulated postmodernism’s central
tenets, Tania Modleski makes a move similar to Seyla Benhabib and bell hooks, asking: Why
does feminism need “a male authority figure to speak on its behalf and certify its legitimacy as
well as its sanity?” (3). Modleski’s Feminism Without Women, then, whether intentionally or not,
solicits a critical question: Does the possibility exist, at this critical juncture where the identity
crisis faced by feminist theorists and the emergence of postmodernisms meet, that feminism itself
felt the effects of a postfeminist backlash and was convinced to some degree not simply of a
perceived equality (between postmodern and feminist discourses) but also an underlying feminist
misery with its own philosophical history? To some extent, the answer to this question appears to
be “yes,” and to the extent that it is, Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism” can be read as
what Modleski identifies as a postfeminist text. Comparing Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social
Criticism” to a reading of the film What Women Want in Chapter Two, I suggest the
feminism/postmodernism debate that Nicholson and Fraser both capture and regulate can be read
as a “battle of the sexes” text wherein a gendered male theory (Lyotard’s The Postmodern
Condition) is locked in a full scale battle with a gendered female set of feminist theories.
Reading “Social Criticism” as a postfeminist text, I suggest that the feminization of patriarchal
discourses, as postmodernisms must be considered if their central theses resemble and postdate
ones articulated in feminist theories, has succeeded in “bringing men back to the center state and
diverting feminist from [their own] tasks” (Modleski 6).
The rebuttals within and outside of Nicholson and Fraser’s collections situate their
“Social Criticism without Philosophy” as the “locus classicus” against which others speaking
from differing feminist perspectives have (dis)engaged with the postmodernism that Nicholson
and Fraser’s article both depicts and executes, while at the same time remaining critically
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engaged with postmodern theories. Looking at the alliance of “feminism and postmodernism”
with a skeptical eye, as I did here in terms of Fraser and Nicholson’s essay, uncovers the
emergence of a substantially different relationship between postmodernisms and feminisms than
either Nicholson or Fraser suggested or anticipated. But, rather than fault them or call their
theory an error because of unforeseen manifestations, feminists could benefit more by
understanding what went awry and by learning from it. Just as Diana Fuss suggests in
Essentially Speaking (1989) that the “risk of essence” might be vital to feminisms because of
feminisms’ need to critique essentialism itself, feminisms might, by examining this debate, find
the risk of not forming an alliance between feminism and postmodernism essential. Critiquing
and learning from postmodernisms’ own failing objectives might be the crucial shift out of the
debate taking place behind the walls of academia and into the sociopolitical space from which it
is initiated.
Some of Nicholson and Fraser’s conceptualizations are very useful and have already been
used in the work of many feminist theorists (Robyn Wiegman, Jane Flax) not to mention other
intellectual work and sociopolitical and cultural activism. However, their framing of these
noteworthy goals within the structures of the version of postmodernism offered in their reading
of Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition is problematic in the least harmful of cases in terms of
both philosophy and social criticism, if not also symptomatic, regressive, and sometimes
oppressive. They violate their own rules, and in doing so, bolster the already existing systems of
oppression as well as variations of previously existing repressive structures that emerge within
postmodernist and other male-headed approaches to and interpretations of society and culture.
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CHAPTER TWO: WRITING POSTMODERN FEMINISM INTO POSTFEMINIST
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE: A CONSIDERATION OF “SOCIAL CRITICISM’S”
DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH POSTFEMINIST DISCOURSES THROUGH A
COMPARISON TO THE FILM WHAT WOMEN WANT

Nicholson and Fraser’s essay “Social Criticism” and the debate regarding the merger of
feminist and postmodern theories that it initiates occur during a time of political upheaval,
philosophical change, and feminist backlash, three conditions marked by their striking similarity
to another period in American history– the 1920s. Both of these periods witnessed a shift toward
political conservatism, the emergence of new philosophical standpoints that gained consensus
within the mainstream (i.e. Freudian psychoanalysis and postmodernisms), a decline in feminist
activism following considerable gains in women’s rights, and the rise of a rhetoric of
“postfeminism” proclaiming that equality between the sexes has been achieved. Moreover, the
winning of women’s right to vote in 1920 and the failure to ratify the ERA in 1982 both
ironically led the general public to the conclusion that gender equality had been realized and thus
helped to reinforce a complacency in regard to women’s rights already taking hold within
mainstream America. One of the most arresting aspects of these synchronized dynamics (from a
theoretical perspective), however, is the way in which the interstitial relationships between
Freudian psychoanalysis and feminisms in the 1920s1 and postmodernisms and feminisms in the
1980s have contributed to these cultural and social retreats from feminisms and the tangled
discourses of postfeminisms that have coincided.2 This has occurred, some have maintained,

1

Though this would not emerge as a potential theoretical merger until the 1960s, Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis
was assessed and disputed in relation to its construction and maintenance of gender roles by women in the 1920s as
well.
2
I choose to place emphasis on the emergence of Freudian psychoanalytic theory in the 1920s, as opposed to
Marxist theories for example, because its reception within the American mainstream retains some important
comparative elements in relation to the reception of postmodernisms around the turn of the 20th century. In
particular, I’m referring to the vulgarization by the public of Freudian psychoanalytic and postmodernist theoretical
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because feminist theorists have positioned feminisms within the phallologic discourses of
Freudian psychoanalysis and postmodernisms as a means of overcoming an identity crisis in
feminisms, an identity crisis that resulted partly from mediated declarations of feminism’s dotage
or death and a waning of feminist activism.
The similarities between these two historical periods creates an interesting lens through
which Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism might be explored, one that is useful to
briefly call attention to here to historicize the reason a merger between feminist and postmodern
theories might have seemed promising to Nicholson and Fraser as well as to frame the
ramifications that, perhaps, should have been considered when “Social Criticism” was first
drafted. Feminist interest with theoretical mergers of this caliber has been historicized as being
conceived by their progenitors as a philosophically innovative move, insomuch as emerging
theoretical perspectives – Freudian psychoanalysis and postmodernisms, for example – could
proffer new ways of developing feminisms and feminist inquiry. Yet, even as these theoretical
discoveries undisputedly opened up new avenues of inquiry within feminist theories, feminist
theorists have insisted on the importance of reflecting on the implications of phallogocentric
discourses like Freudian psychoanalysis as much as they have demanded self-reflexive
investigations of the theoretical underpinnings of feminist discourses and theories.

concepts, wherein each mode of analysis was redefined and rewritten for and by the general public in ways
substantially different from their original conception. It is also interesting to note, though I do not plan to include
this in my analysis, that Freudian psychoanalysis continues to be referenced within the mass culture texts that I
examine here and is used exclusively to critique the “feminist psychoses” of the female characters within these texts
– Darcy in What Women Want and Carrie in Sex and the City in particular.
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Feminist theorists in the 1960s, for example, documented the circumscription of women
to gender-specific roles and behaviors within the boundaries of psychoanalytic thought.3 While
some feminists were considering psychoanalysis as a tool in exploring the internalization of the
male/female gender dichotomy and the social construction of each respective role, these other
feminist intellectuals were pointing to the peculiar role psychoanalytic theory played in
delimiting those social constructions as well as in helping to foment them within the social
unconscious. Within psychoanalytic theory, Woman becomes “nothing but an effect of a phallic
fantasy,” feminist theorists contended, and in placing themselves within the psychoanalytic
dialect, feminists cannot generate any comprehension of Woman outside of that phallic fantasy
(Wright xv).
Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to create a new feminist Theory that would fit (rather)
neatly within the boundaries of Jean-François Lyotard’s theory of postmodernity is subject to the
same critique, especially as postmodernism(s) becomes démodé within mainstream American
media, or rather, especially as the term “postmodernism” begins to signify according to popular
definition of the term. On one hand, as noted in Chapter One, Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to
erect a postmodern feminism that might help resolve some of the theoretical dilemmas
developing within feminist theoretical circles during the 1970s and 1980s suggests that
postmodernism, as a theoretical speaking and significatory position, might be intrinsically
revolutionary. What becomes clear, though, if a more thorough examination of the paradigmatic
shifts occurring around the 1920s and 1980s was rendered, is that, despite the personal
implementation of radical political perspectives at these junctures by feminists, feminist

3

Feminist reflections on psychoanalysis that were articulated in the 1920s includes what Elizabeth Wright calls the
“most articulate and sophisticated of Freud’s ‘feminist’ colleagues” Karen Horney, who in 1926 “challenges Freud’s
characterization of femininity,” claiming that “it is partial and value-laden, representing men’s interests” (132)
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discourses that emerged during these two historical moments were not unsusceptible to the
power structures that remained intact within psychoanalytic and postmodernist discourses and, as
follows, were subject to the relegation of the female voice to the margins by these implicitly
patriarchal discourses.
The particular problem with placing feminisms within a Lyotardian discursive field lies
within the construction of his postmodern discourse as one absent of hierarchal distinctions
between race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender. As Judith Butler suggests, the
postmodernist claim to an absence of power in regard to sociopolitical designations like race and
gender situates postmodernism as a “forceful conceptual practice which subliminates, disguises,
and extends its own power through recourse to the tropes of normative universality” (39). What
this suggests in regard to Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism is that the “question of
postmodernisms” being asked in relation to feminist theories (and sometimes being asked as if
feminism and postmodernism were already inseparable terms) cannot be answered adequately by
Nicholson and Fraser because they do not have the tools to discern how the inherent powers of
postmodernisms have been “subliminated” and “disguised.” The unavailability of these tools
might be attributable to the fact that theories of postmodernity, as well as the individuals writing
postmodernity into being, are situated in a sociopolitical space that remains in limbo, somewhere
beyond modernist hegemonies, yet not quite postmodernist. As Laura Kipnis notes in an essay
published one year after “Social Criticism” first received publication: “What is crucially lacking
is a postmodern political discourse. I want to attempt to trace this symptomatic gap as it is
manifested in first-world feminist theory, which seems to be suspended between an emergent
postmodern political logic and a residual modernism” (“Feminism: The Political Conscience of
Postmodernism?” 158).
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To begin speaking of a postmodern feminism without attending to the very foundational
concepts of feminist theories – the power to oppress women, female voices, and feminist
discourses – is a risky if not disadvantageous endeavor. The particular risks involved include
problematically abandoning modernist feminist epistemologies that are not completely
antiquated, ones that have investigated and revealed the various sites of power under conditions
of modernity, for a postmodernist method of critique far from being fleshed out. Furthermore, in
neglecting questions regarding the site(s) of power within conditions of postmodernity and
within theories that attend to those conditions, it is possible for the postmodern feminism that
Nicholson and Fraser advocate to become entangled in the very postmodern conditions that it
attempts to disrupt, neither able to critique the structural aspects of postmodernity (and with that
the positioning of the female subject within postmodern sociopolitical structures) nor able to
reflect upon the paradoxes of its own theoretical underpinnings. Without this dual consideration
of what is lost in abandoning modernist feminist theories and what remains to be investigated in
postmodern theories, it is also possible that the resulting effect would be the production of a
feminist epistemology that is comparatively irrelevant to both past and present spatial locales
precisely because the feminist critique erected is dependent upon (mostly male-initiated)
speculations as to what conditions of postmodernity might entail. This consequence might be
better understood by identifying the underlying presumption of Nicholson and Fraser’s
postmodern feminism – that the era of postmodernity has reached maturation – as one that
propels feminisms from an indeterminate state where both exploration and reflection are possible
into a rather unpleasant and authoritatively determined postmodern condition.
But more important than what seems to be a disappointing neglect of the question of
power in relation to Lyotardian postmodernism within their essay is the way that Nicholson and
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Fraser regard their “discussion” of feminisms and postmodernisms as if it were taking place in a
vacuum, exempt from the sociopolitical conditions and other discursive powers that frame their
temporal locale. This chapter is an exercise in considering this so-called discussion outside of
that vacuum by asking how it might emerge within and become informed by a postfeminist
discourse.4 While reading “Social Criticism” through or in conjunction with other leading
discourses around the time of its publication would produce a rather different set of insights –
postcolonial, poststructuralist, and anti-feminist discourses, for example – interpreting “Social
Criticism” and Nicholson and Fraser’s facilitation the postmodernism/feminism debate as being
complicit with and constituted by postfeminist discursive structures allows me to bridge
academic and mass cultures momentarily to suggest that, together, they say something very
important about the limitations of postmodern theories as well as the beneficial modes of inquiry
that can be derived from a feminist critical engagement with postmodern theories. Inasmuch as
this critique is instructive, I suggest that it is possible to argue that Nicholson and Fraser write
postmodernism and themselves into a postfeminist narrative because postmodernism operates for
them as a feminized male discourse that can repair the errors of a whole historical category of
feminist thought. It is worth playing with the boundaries of the genre of theory by reading
“Social Criticism” as a postfeminist narrative and Nicholson, Fraser, and Lyotard as postfeminist
characters if such a reading produces insight into the construction of gendered identity and
4

It’s important to note here that Nicholson and Fraser’s essay does not claim itself to be a product or example of a
postfeminist discourse, text, or subject position, although it is attended to as such in Modleski’s Feminism Without
Women. It is, rather, the structure of their essay and their theoretical work regarding the postmodernism/feminism
debate, their reading and representation of feminisms, and their positioning of and need for Lyotardian
postmodernism that makes Nicholson and Fraser a good theoretical example of Tania Modleski’s understanding of a
postfeminist moment. My reading of Nicholson and Fraser’s work as a postfeminist text or postfeminist
metanarrative is more of a symbolic claim rather than a literal one, one that attempts to provide insight into the
contextualization of feminisms and female agency within my own sociopolitical milieu. It is also one that suggests
that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminist epistemology is limited because of its inability to anticipate a
moment in which a similar postmodern feminism might be used to critique feminism, or rather feminist subjective
positions, into extinction within the realm of mass culture.
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gender hierarchies in a moment approaching postmodernity, as I suggest it does in the chapter
that follows. This is not to suggest, however, that such a reading is not problematic, especially in
its reliance upon the male/female gender binary in the categorization of “Social Criticism” and
the feminism/postmodernism debate as structurally postfeminist.5
In this chapter, I historicize the uses and meanings of the term “postfeminist” from its
inception in 1919 to Tania Modleski’s documentation of the term 1991, suggesting the term
signifies the consequences that arise from premature assumptions of gender equality when its use
over the course of nearly a century is analyzed historically. Next, I contextualize the most recent
shift toward a postmodern rendering of female subjectivity through a reading of gender in the
film What Women Want, using the film first to clarify and illustrate Modleski’s conception of
postfeminism in Feminism Without Women and then to show, by way of comparison, how
“Social Criticism” and the debate it inspires could be read as implicated within a postfeminist
moment. I then to draw parallels between the film and “Social Criticism” to point toward a
change in postfeminist narrative structure wherein an emergent form of female agency is written
into female subjectivity. However, rather than being an agency enacted to dissolve gender
hierarchies and normative femininity, I argue, this agency more precisely represents the capacity
to write feminisms into extinction and return women into positions of marginality. As I propose

5

Modleski’s reliance upon a masculine/feminine gender binary is perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of
her work, and thus, it is important to call attention to this in this thesis, especially since Nicholson and Fraser’s
postmodern feminism would likely rule out essentialist categories like masculinity and femininity. The use of these
gendered terms in this chapter, however, is based upon the construction of gender within What Women Want and not
on some categorical distinction that I think can or should be drawn between masculinity and femininity. Rather,
within the examinations of mass culture that take place in this thesis, I attempt to call attention to the way femininity
and masculinity are constructed on differently sexed bodies as well. While seeming to suggest a dispersal of the
gender binary within the American mainstream, thus bringing mass culture more into alignment with postmodernist
feminist theories, I argue that a gender binary and gender hierarchy are maintained within the American mainstream
because of the way multiply signifying gender identifications (feminized masculinity and masculinized femininity
for example) are regulated to the singular domain of “proper” gender signification within each text.
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in the conclusion, Nicholson and Fraser’s revisionist account of feminist history in “Social
Criticism” constitutes, symbolically, this emergent postfeminist structure.
The construction of female subjectivity in What Women Want can be compared to
Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism in that it is both defined by the multiplicity of
feminisms written on a gendered female body and ridden with irresolvable contradictions and
conflicts regarding the errors of those feminist standpoints. The film, like Nicholson and Fraser’s
essay, also seems stranded somewhere between modern and postmodern frameworks, and similar
to the “postmodern feminists” imagined in “Social Criticism,” What Women Want’s female
protagonist Darcy is mired in the phallic fantasies of the vulgarized forms of Freudian
psychoanalysis and postmodernity that the text creates.6
What Women Want is an important text as it represents something of an apex for
postfeminist texts. At first glance, the emergent “postmodern” ideological conflicts represented
in the film appear not far removed from those of the postfeminist texts analyzed by Tania
Modleski in Feminism Without Women. In fact, the reading of What Women Want that follows in
this chapter could suggest that every aspect of the film is systematically and exhaustively
illustrative of Modleski’s theoretical perspective. However, while the film becomes
representative of a postfeminist text through the male protagonist’s (Nick) feminization of
himself, it becomes something more as Nick’s ability to overhear women’s thoughts reveals
Darcy’s dependency upon a specter of the “male gaze,” an invisible onlooker who determines
how she interprets her actions (especially actions that could be identified as products of the
Women’s Rights Movement such as her decision to become a high-powered executive), despite

6

Though I do not pursue the latter line of investigation, I think this point should be at least be mentioned as a more
thorough investigation of the historical junctures mentioned in the introduction of this chapter would likely involve
looking at the prevalence of Freud in these postfeminist texts.
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the fact that she thinks these thoughts are a product of her own consciousness and agency.7
Moreover, this all-but-absent onlooker (both Nick and the specter of the “male gaze” embodied
in Darcy’s voiceover) simultaneously reveals Darcy’s subjective crisis in regard to her “feminist”
decisions and allows her to both overcome that crisis and reoccupy her “appropriate” position in
the gender hierarchy. It is this very moment in the film, when the “male gaze” becomes a
recognizable component of the female voice (as it is in Darcy’s voiceover), that the comparison
between What Women Want and Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism” becomes most
instructive.
Through an understanding of Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism as it is
revealed through its juxtaposition to these discursive shifts within the theoretical and massmediated realms of the same temporal space, their “postmodern feminism” can be shown to be a
thoroughly postfeminist discourse, at least in regard to its semantic structure, one that, at its
inception, is far from being postmodern. Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to thrust feminisms into
their postmodern form, as a result, can be shown to produce a deficient method of analyzing or
subverting this emergent postmodern form of female subjectivity and female subjugation.
Rather, it can be used to reveal the construction of female subjectivity within postmodern
locales. As Laura Kipnis suggests in regard to theoretical mergers of this caliber, Nicholson and
Fraser’s postmodern feminism is not simply entrenched in postfeminist backlash culture, it is by
definition a postfeminist narrative, one that participates in invalidating a large portion of the
history of feminist critical thought

7

One interesting line of further investigation might consider the moments in What Women Want when Darcy
becomes confused as to whether her thoughts are, in fact, her own
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Postfeminism: The Historicity of the Term
The first documentation of the term “postfeminist” in women-centered communities
occurred after women gained the right to vote in 1919 and began to enter the labor force. In June
1919, a group of grassroots, female literary radicals based in Greenwich Village introduced their
new “postfeminist” perspective in their inaugural publication of Judy, a journal initiated to
portray their newly defined theoretical position (Cott 282, 365 footnote 23). These Greenwich
Village “radicals” proclaimed that “moral, social, economic, and political standards ‘should not
have anything to do with sex,’” assumedly believing that equality was on the horizon if not
already realized (Cott 282). Their claim to abandon ‘sex’ as a factor for consideration, however,
was embedded in a society that increasingly described feminism as attempting to at once “make
women over into men” and “set women against men in deadly sex antagonism.” Advancing this
position alongside women’s efforts to define themselves in the workplace not as women but as
equals, these writers vowed to be “’pro-woman’ without being ‘anti-man’” and declared
themselves and their position “post-feminist” (Cott 282).
This theoretical position, nonetheless, was enfolded in a time of profound antagonism
toward feminisms and a moment in which women participating in or joining the movement
stumbled upon variegated ideas regarding “feminism” as a categorical term. These factors
complicated the creation of an environment that might cultivate cooperative unanimity between
women who identified themselves as feminists and would be experienced repeatedly throughout
the future of feminist activism. In short, as Nancy Cott concludes, feminists were informed of
“the liabilities of making reductive generalizations about women as a group” (278). The
fundamental principle that might have served as the groundwork in furthering feminist aegis, as
Cott explains, was obscured if not in every respect misplaced (275). Within the context of the
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1920s, the term “postfeminism” signified a general disdain for feminism and an attitude toward
feminism as obsolete, while at the same suggesting that women had achieved equality to the
extent they desired and in some cases more so than they had wished.
Bordering on similarity in relation to the feminist literary radicals’ presumption of
equality but proportionally antithetical, aggregated non-feminist voices in the 1920s inched
toward specifying varying bases for and dissimilar understandings of feminism. These included
not only the abovementioned sex-based distortions in which women were presumed to desire
becoming men even as they hated men but also media-based commemorations of women’s
emancipation that “coopted” and “diluted” feminist bravado, juxtaposed by denunciations of
feminism such as those denoted by: article titles like “Feminism Destructive of Women’s
Happiness,” “What More Do Women Want,” and “Still a Man’s Game: Reflections of a Slightly
Tired Feminist”; surveys that “consign[ed] Feminism to oblivion”; and a relinquishment of
feminists to the field of self-absorption through claims that pronounced that feminists were “only
concerned with their individual problems and welfare” and lacked awareness to “the great new
issues [of war]” (Cott 271-80, my emphasis). These sentiments would all be revived again in the
1980s after the culmination of a second seemingly unitary moment of feminist activism and
democratic gains in the attempt to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.
In 1982, the term “postfeminist” was reintroduced into American media in a New York
Times article entitled “Voices from a Post-Feminist Generation,” another article that sought to
prove women’s overall displeasure with and lack of need for feminism in general. Shortly after
this article was published in the Times, some feminist critics such as Ann Brooks attempted to
imbue the term “postfeminist” during its second emergence with more positive connotations,
claiming it to be representative of the “intersection of feminism with [. . .] postmodernism, post-
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structuralism, and post-colonialism,” representing ultimately “feminism’s ‘coming of age’”8
(Brooks 1, my emphases). Disregarding the utilization of the term in the 1920s, though she
documents this usage in her book, Brooks understands the term “postfeminism” as being
“appropriated” by the media rather than initiated by voices within the media. At the same time,
however, she acknowledges that “the widespread ‘popular’ conception” of the term, as
explicated by Lynn Alice in “What is Postfeminism? or Having it Both ways” (1995), “has new
currency, which is often hostile and directed towards feminists in particular” (Brooks 2).
Brooks’ attempt to redefine the term “postfeminism” in 1997, virtually 15 years after one
of the term’s first reemergences in the 1982 New York Times article, has the potential to be as
effective as Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism in which postmodernisms will
supposedly retain a distinctive feminist-based definition as opposed the variety of other
meanings that have and might become attached to it.9 How the term “postfeminism” signifies

8

It should be noted that feminism’s coming of age is a good thing for Brooks
Interestingly, Brooks applies a definition to reclaim the term “postfeminist” that is so similar to the description that
Nicholson and Fraser offer for their postmodern feminism that one could allege that Brooks changed the sentence
structure of the chapter section “Towards a Postmodern Feminism,” using a thesaurus (at times), and placed
Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism under the new signifier “postfeminism”: “Postfeminism as understood
from this perspective is about the conceptual shift within feminism from debates around equality to a focus on
debates around difference. It is fundamentally about, not a depoliticisation of feminism, but a political shift in
feminism’s conceptual and theoretical agenda. Postfeminism is about a critical engagement with earlier feminist
political and theoretical concepts and strategies as a result of its engagement with other social movements for
change. Postfeminism expresses the intersection of feminism with postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism, and as such represents a dynamic movement capable of challenging modernist, patriarchal, and
imperialist frameworks. In the process postfeminism facilitates a broad-based, pluralistic conception of the
application of feminism, and addresses the demands of marginalized, diasporic and colonized cultures for a nonhegemonic feminism capable of giving voice to local, indigenous and postcolonial feminisms. Postfeminism [. . .]is
about the challenges posed to what has been identified as ‘hegemonic’ feminism [. . .] with its roots clearly located
in the Anglo-American influences so powerful in the conceptualization of second wave feminism (4, my emphases).
Though I will eventually allege that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism to an extent does belong under the
signifier “postfeminism,” Brooks’ use of the term here, for me at least, is quite indicative of the line of reasoning I
will later employ to show that while Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism is not necessarily postmodern at
conception, it in fact seems to become postmodern. Counter to Brooks’ reading of postfeminist discourses, however,
I will argue that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism begins to signify as a postfeminist text according to
the “widespread ‘popular’ conception.” It is also interesting to note here the theorists that Brooks documents as
“theoretical, conceptual, and disciplinary influences of what she refers to as postfeminism as some of these names
have either been propagators of postmodern feminism – Linda Nicholson and Nancy Fraser – or have explicitly

9
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within what Brooks calls the “widespread ‘popular’ conception” suggests, nonetheless, that
during the 1980s and 1990s the term came to inhabit the identical dialectic space that it occupied
in the 1920s and began to effect a hostility toward feminisms as the term “postfeminism”
continued to carry baneful significations.
The definition of the “widespread ‘popular’ conception” of the term is encapsulated, for
all intents and purposes here, in Tania Modleski’s Feminism without Women: Culture and
Criticism in a ‘Postfeminist’ Age (1991). Unlike Brooks who believes that the term
“postfeminist” has been appropriated by the media, Modleski locates the use of this term in
media-based and theoretical declarations of a “postfeminist moment.” Attempting to articulate an
explanation of postfeminism as it is constructed within and by American society, as opposed to
rendering a definition of the term for that society, Modleski turns her examinations toward mass
culture (mostly film) and often situates her critiques of those texts within the proximities of
critical theoretical debates occurring around that time. Unlike Brooks, Modleski discerns
postfeminism as one thread of what Faludi identifies as the sociopolitical and cultural backlash
against feminisms that gained momentum the 1980s and attempts to distinguish how women
(feminists in particular) are further entrenched in that backlash by this postfeminist rhetoric.
As Modleski notes in her preface, the explication of the various components of this
“postfeminist moment’ in The Female Gaze10 reveals that when cultural criticism emerges from
an assumption that “the goals of feminism have been attained,” what Modleski calls “an
assumption that seems premature at least,” cultural criticism can be shown to be complicit with
questioned and challenged it by some means – bell hooks, Judith Butler, Anna Yeatman and Rosi Braidotti. Some of
the others intriguingly include: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Meaghan Morris, Chandra Talpade
Mohanty, Sneja Gunew, and Teresa de Lauretis (4).
10
It is interesting to not that an Amazon.com search for this book offered the following suggestion for further
reading in relation to what “customers who bought this item also bought”: Christina Hoff Sommers’ Who Stole
Feminism: How Women Have Betrayed Women
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mass culture (ix, my emphases). What Modleski means here, as she explains, is that “the critic is
never wholly outside the culture she analyzes, or completely resistant to its forces, retrograde as
these may often be,” a fundamental concept that becomes particularly important in relation to the
hierarchal gender struggles and male-triumph that she locates in “postfeminist texts”11 (ix). Thus
insomuch as women speak from a feminist inflected discourse (or any discourse for that matter),
they are necessarily implicated in the discourses that surround them – including Marxist,
psychoanalytic, postmodern, and postfeminist discourses as well as other mainstream hegemonic
discourses.
The context in which Modleski’s conceptualization of postfeminism is located echoes the
situatedness of postfeminism within the 1920s with a profound resonance. Most notably, the
sociopolitical locale of postfeminism in the 1980s and 1990s is similar to the position that
postfeminism occupies in the 1920s in that both “mark a major conservative shift in the cultural
climate” and a shift in philosophical discourses and because both are rooted deeply within antifeminist sentiments (x). However, according to Modleski, the route and site of power of
postfeminist discourses (excluding those such as Brooks’) in the 1980s seem to proceed from a
fundamentally disparate direction. Unlike the postfeminist constituent of the backlash against
feminist activism in the 1920s, the intersections between mass culture and existing theoretical
debates in the 1980s reveal, as Modleski infers, that “what distinguishes this moment from other
moments of backlash is the extent to which it has been carried out not against feminism[s] but in
its very name” (x). Providing an article written about Elaine Showalter as a case in point,
Modleski illustrates this particular strand of feminist criticism that emerges as ostensibly

11

This concept is also important in understanding how “Social Criticism” maintains a dialectical relationship to
postfeminisms as will be explained in the last section of this chapter.

72

“against” feminisms by illustrating the way in which Showalter’s flagrant denunciation of a
“lunatic fringe of radical feminism” propounds the article toward a conclusion that “literary
feminism has not only come of age, but passed its prime and entered its dotage,” a conclusion
rather disparate from Brooks’ claim (4, my emphasis).
This sentiment certainly hinges upon the “biological clock” aspect of the backlashes
against feminisms in both the 1920s and 1980s. But Modleski is more concerned with what she
calls a “process of ‘male feminization” wherein men “appropriate femininity” as both an
instrument and method of “dealing with the threat of female power,” while this appropriation
becomes, in the same moment, both an instrument and method in a process of oppressing women
(6-7). Deriving this concept from readings of filmic and theoretical texts, Modleski offers the
following depiction of those texts, categorizing them under the signifier “postfeminist”:
An even more telling sign of the times, however, has been the advent in the 1980s
of a new form of anthology organized around debates between men and women
who read one another’s texts and take each other to task for their positions on a
whole array of issues relating to male feminism and sexual difference. [. . .] While
these books, in staging the perennially fascinating “battle of the sexes,” make for
very compelling reading, they can be considered “postfeminist” in several
respects. First, insofar as they focus on the question of male feminism as a ‘topic”
for men and women to engage (as the first one did), these books are bringing men
back to center stage and diverting feminists from tasks more pressing than
deciding the appropriateness of the label “feminist” for men. Second, the books in
their very format betray a kind of heterosexual presumption [. . .] Third, the
anthologies tacitly assume and promote a liberal notion of the formal equality of

73

men and women, whose viewpoints are structurally accorded equal weight. Thus,
while terms like “dialogism” (drawn from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin) are
commonly invoked in the rationale for these volumes, it is hard to see how such a
term functions as anything other than a euphemism for “dialogue” – a concept
that in eliding the question of power asymmetry has rather conservative
implications.12 (6, my emphases)
Like feminist theorists who fail to consider the power inherent in male-centered discourses,
Modleski suggests here that a kind of “fair and balanced” approach to feminisms, in which men
and women attempt to effect a harmony in regard to what the term “feminism” should and/or
does mean, extirpates the fundamental basis of feminist thought as always predicated upon the
question of power, the authority of that power, the position from which it originates, and the
subject upon whom its ire strikes. As much as I do not subscribe to the idea that all men
consciously attempt to maintain an elevated hierarchal position in relation to women, neither do I
believe that some kind of flagrant, malicious, and underhanded appropriation of the feminine is
consciously underway in the minds of men across America. But this is also not to say, as
suggested by Modleski in her preface, that these dynamics are not mired in the venerable systems
of oppression that exist within unconsciously perpetuated American hegemonies. It is with this
“fair and balanced” approach to feminisms that Nicholson and Fraser investigate the interstices
of postmodernisms and feminisms and formulate their postmodern feminism, presupposing, as
they claim, that their dramatic encounter between “feminism and postmodernism will initially be
a trading of criticisms” (“Social Criticism” 20, my emphases).

12

A more complete explanation is given in Chapter One
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Restructured Hierarchies and Postmodern Flux
The motion picture and television industries, with their tendency to both create and (often
distortedly) mirror society, have produced many texts that could be examined to determine how
the phallogocentrically cocked pistol of mass media now aims toward its target. However, one
film released in 2000, What Women Want, constructs a dichotomy by which the capitalistic
society, with all of its phallogocentric and ethnocentric “wonders,” can be dissected to expose
core components of sociopolitical systems during the last decade. The film constructs its own
analysis of male hegemony and power through a gender struggle set, fittingly, in the advertising
world and exposes the need for “hegemonic patriarchy” to undertake what Modleski describes as
“an exemplary process of ‘male feminization’ that is empowering to men and disempowering to
women” (7). Thus, the film creates not only a context for critiques of how and why images of
femininity are both scripted and produced by the American advertising of the 1990s but also a
site for a contextual analysis of how gendered relations, rendered through the ordinary
heterosexual constructs of dominant American melodrama, have been reconstructed and
(re)conformed in what is sometimes described, not necessarily simultaneously, as both a
postmodern and postfeminist era. The following reading of What Women Want is offered, thus,
to both illustrate the composition of what Tania Modleski calls “battle of the sexes” texts and
reveal the hierarchal positioning of the feminized male within them, highlighting along the way
one significant modification to postfeminist narrative structure – the invocation of the “male
gaze” within the female voice13 (Modleski 6).

13

This could also be read as an internalization of the postfeminist narrative structure within the female voice, where
the female subject is seen writing her own postfeminist narrative into being.
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What Women Want, in terms of genre and choice of lead role, clearly shoots towards the
female audience, appearing to be the next Mel Gibson dime novel turned romantic comedy. Nick
Marshall, the “ultimate man’s man” (as identified by his ex-wife Gigi), finds himself locked in a
full scale battle with the self-announced “man-eating bitch, Darth Vader of the ad world,” Darcy
McGuire, who has just “stolen” his promotion as creative director at Sloan-Curtis. Though the
film is primarily designed to appeal to the sentimentality of women, the text clearly addresses the
structural, binary opposition of men and women in America’s “postmodern” capitalistic society.
While the audience presumably ignores the man/woman conflict because the film is structured to
serve both sexes’ aspiration to become “the” dominant gender, in the end, one sex clearly wins.
However, closer examination renders an ambiguous and somewhat contrary conclusion,
especially after taking into account the implausible method, or male fantasy (being able to hear
what women think), by which Nick (the “masculine”) regains leverage against Darcy (the
“feminine”). The looming ambiguity blurs lines of gender domination considerably, but a clearer
demarcation of gender difference and dominance seems to appear when looking beyond the
positions Darcy and Nick occupy within the film to the way the text effectively dissects and
recircumscribes its own construction of female/male gender binary. While in the film, this
process is rendered through Nick’s ability to hear women’s thoughts, it is more accurately what
he hears Darcy thinking – her own narrative – the reinscribes her to a position of subordination.
Darcy’s narration of her own subordinate repositioning, as will be explored in the conclusion of
this chapter, is one through which comparisons can be drawn to reveal the ways in which
Nicholson and Fraser’s voices participate in a theoretical dissection and recircumscription of the
female voice within the female/male binaries of academia.
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Nick’s boss, Dan Wanamaker, explaining to Nick that he would not be promoted to
creative director, rather despondently declares that their male “glory days” in the eighties, when
the ad world was all about “alcohol, tobacco, and cars,” are over. Highlighting the reason that
Darcy would be hired, Dan tells Nick that “in the nineties, men simply stopped dominating how
the dollars were spent,” and that while they [men] were out shooting “beer commercials with the
Swedish bikini team, the industry has been transformed.” Dan goes on to point out that if they
(men) do not “evolve and think beyond our [man’s] natural ability,” the industry is going to go
down, insinuating that previously men simply had to sell to their own sexual
desires.Undoubtedly because Dan has yet to conceive of a way for men to transcend the
simplicity of this “natural” ability and answer the elusive question of “what women want,” he
sees no way to regain control or compete in the consumer sphere of advertising without a woman
who knows how to appeal to the consumer majority (“women between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-four”). Nick resists both the challenge to his manhood that such a change in the industry
would represent and the female domination on the horizon that he fears will marginalize him
within the realm of mass media (as both “ad king” and remote operator), apparent in his
subsequent claim that “there’s too much estrogen on TV these days.” As a result, Nick refuses to
accept his own incapacity, the powerlessness being suggested by Dan, to function and rule the ad
world.
From this point on, the text embodies, metaphorically, the changes in the
advertising/consumer world outside of the film, suggesting, as well, transformations in the
sociopolitical system at large (ostensibly the materialization of a postfeminist society), while
focusing within the text on a long, drawn out struggle between man and woman in dealing with
this very transformation. The semi-ambiguous rendering of gender domination throughout the
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film allows for criticism to traverse the many facets of the production industry’s “revolutionized”
system, as it is described by Dan, by exploring a host of binary opponents (among them:
masculinity and femininity, the formerly blinded “man’s man” and the new informed feminized
man, domination and subordination, strength and weakness, hidden and overt sexuality,
feminized man and homosexual man, acceptance and rejection of the female image). But as Nick
recuperates the authority that his masculinity once signified, the film begins to suggest that male
dominance can be established even in a postfeminist society, and what is more, its return can
appear to be the product of female desire. This line of thought provides a jumping point for an
analysis of Nicholson and Fraser’s participation in the reconstitution of gendered hierarchies
within American academia in the last section of this chapter.
Moreover, the textual play of a repetitive inversion of hegemonic gender dichotomies that
hierarchically arrange male and female bodies generates a transitory, destabilized foundation that
becomes emblematic of certain theoretical interpretations of postmodern territories. Within this
destabilized terrain, however, gender roles within America’s capitalist society can be legislated
and controlled to bolster male hegemony, even though the power to do so is rendered either
invisible or ambiguously defined. The power only remains this way, of course, to the extent that
Nick’s ability to perceive and use women’s thoughts to resecure his position remains within the
extradiegetic realm of sound within the film, invisible to the characters that surround him. Even
still, the power continues to be locatable and local, especially for the viewer, not to mention the
near exposures and “close calls” that Nick fears he might be facing. But nonetheless, the power
has yet to be located, a fact of which Nick must be reassured often throughout the film as every
“close call” is made to appear only a result of his own psychoses. Only at the point that Nick’s
perceived superiority to Darcy allows him to become recognized by those authorized to this grant
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this type of legitimation (Dan) is the power rendered discernible again, although his method of
attaining it remains hidden until his confession at the end of the film. Though Nick manipulates
these women’s thoughts to his advantage, his necessarily gendered supremacy is reestablished as
both “natural” and thus innately and perpetually present, even when called into question by Dan
at the film’s commencement and by Nick himself during the film’s denouement. I would like to
suggest, here, that these structural aspects of the film – a male-initiated denunciation of power
and an elusive form of power that remains despite that denunciation – markedly resemble Judith
Butler’s analysis, provided in Chapter One, of the structural aspects of postmodern theories.
The masculinized “god’s eye view” that Nick personifies and the feminized susceptibility
to manipulation and inferior intellectual capacity that Darcy embodies effectively reinscribes the
preexisting gender hierarchy upon which Nick (and the advertising world) depends. However, it
does so by redefining the hierarchies’ components as always sexed, regardless of the particular
gender(s) that their bodies appear to signify.14 Thus even though gender is to an extent
deessentialized and the binary construct seemingly dismantled, the male/female sexed binary (in
addition to the heterosexual/homosexual binary) remains firmly and epistemologically intact,
allowing the purposes behind and the reasons for “legitimate” gendered embodiments (or rather
the gender performances legitimized by the film) to be defined accordingly. In other words, the
“masculinized female” (Darcy) working within the public and thus masculine sphere of a large
corporation signifies weaknesses (first in her thoughts and then through verbal confessions) that
14

It is also important to note, here, that the questioning of Nick’s masculinity, which occurs many times throughout
the film, is often done so by also calling into question his heterosexuality. The film thus relegates the signifying
terms of the feminized male body to the domain of heterosexuality, allowing it to signify in close proximity to a
subject position that gained legitimacy in the 1990s – the “metrosexual.” As a result, such feminization not only
excludes the possibility of non-heterosexual masculinities while legitimizing the cooptation of the “feminine” as a
tool for male dominance but also delegitimizes the same “feminine” qualities when present in bodies historically
excluded from the mainstream delimitation of the category of masculinity. As the subtitle of Mark Simpson’s
Salon.com article makes clear: “He’s well-dressed, narcissistic, and obsessed with butts. But don’t call him gay.”
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are revealed as being effectively concealed through her display of fabricated forms of
masculinity, a miserable state of existence under which she ultimately breaks down. “Feminized
females” (Nick’s two “secretaries”) signify essentialist forms of femininity,15 having no thoughts
beyond that which is socially accepted and occupying submissive and subordinate positions
willingly and happily, a fact that catches Nick by surprise as he waits to hear their belittling
thoughts of him only to be stunned by the silence that follows.16 “Feminized males” signify
strength to endure femininity as a now necessary component of their superiority, control,
strength, endurance of pain, and power and one necessary in returning order to disrupted gender
hierarchies.17 And “masculinized males” signify an appropriate masculinity that must maintain a
constant vigilance to the forces of a chaotic postfeminist world that might threaten to disrupt that
masculinity, and when necessary, the “masculinized male” becomes protean, metamorphosing to
whatever form is needed for the purpose of maintaining hegemonic order in the face of utter
chaos.18 Representing the last of these four configurations, the “protean masculinity” personified
by Nick in this “battle of the sexes” text is aligned with the type of backlash culture that

15

These females (Nick’s assistants) signify a version of televisual femininity present in shows that directly predate
“postfeminist” backlash culture.
16
His shock materializes when he asks his two secretaries in a disbelieving tone of voice if they had any other
thoughts to offer.
17
“The typical metrosexual is a young man with money to spend, living in or within easy reach of a metropolis -because that's where all the best shops, clubs, gyms and hairdressers are. He might be officially gay, straight or
bisexual, but this is utterly immaterial because he has clearly taken himself as his own love object and pleasure as
his sexual preference. Particular professions, such as modeling, waiting tables, media, pop music and, nowadays,
sport, seem to attract them but, truth be told, like male vanity products and herpes, they're pretty much
everywhere.For some time now, old-fashioned (re)productive, repressed, unmoisturized heterosexuality has been
given the pink slip by consumer capitalism. The stoic, self-denying, modest straight male didn't shop enough (his
role was to earn money for his wife to spend), and so he had to be replaced by a new kind of man, one less certain of
his identity and much more interested in his image -- that's to say, one who was much more interested in being
looked at (because that's the only way you can be certain you actually exist). A man, in other words, who is an
advertiser's walking wet dream” (Simpson).
18
The film, of course, leaves very few variations of these four categorical definitions of gender and in providing
these limited definitions minimalizes any disruption of gender in the process of creating a new means for gender
bifurcation, stratification, and eventual rehierarchization. Under this purportedly more inclusive organization, other
configurations and definitions are inevitably excluded to maintain hegemonic order.
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Modleski terms “postfeminism.” It is through Nick’s ability to perform as though he has
succumbed to his feminized position (necessarily a position of inferiority) that he is also able to
appear as if he exists to help the women around him secure their subjective stability at the
expense of his own. While this is, in part, true (though none of the other female characters
represent a real threat to his masculinity), his subjective performance is more precisely an
attempt to resecure his own subjective and necessarily masculine subjectivity at Darcy’s
expense, the one woman capable of rendering Nick to a subordinate position within gender
hierarchies for the foreseeable future.

Postfeminism and Male Subjective Crises
Within the boundaries of Modleski’s analytic structure, which itself problematically
depends on hegemonic definitions of masculinity and femininity, Nick’s method of regaining
control, superiority, and order becomes the symbolic embodiment of the postfeminist form of
male power that Modleski seeks to expose and dissect. This male power is one that might make
claims similar to an argument made by Christopher Newfield that Modleski uses as one of the
bases of her critique:
Hegemonic patriarchy can survive [. . .] without male assertion, but not without
feminization: only feminization enables men to evade the one-directional
dominations of stereotypical masculinity, to master the non-conflictual, and to
occupy both sides of a question. Whereas tyranny depends on male supremacy,
liberal hegemony or “consensus” depends on male femininity.” (Modleski 7)
While this meticulous statement by Newfield could be quite perplexing given the many facets up
for exploration, each of which enjoys some form of attention within Feminism Without Women,
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it indicates what Modleski has identified as the crisis of male subjectivity19 currently underway
and the degree to which the male subjectivity sustains power and gender dominance “through
cycles of crisis and resolution [by incorporating] the threat of female power” (Modleski 7). In
shedding a little more light onto Modleski’s interpretation of Newfield’s statement: To the extent
that that the “cultural imperative to be men” requires a perpetual submissiveness to masculinity,
male power and gender dominance are sustained precisely because male subjectivity is always
approaching and impeding crisis, unendingly testing and proving his manhood.20
In What Women Want, for example, Nick’s attempt to become a woman – before he is
able to hear their thoughts – includes trying on and trying out every product in the little pink box
that Darcy distributes during her introductory meeting, each of which becomes a test of his
manhood. Standing in front of the bathroom mirror with finger and toenails painted red, mascara
applied, and hair substantially moussed, Nick stares at a glass container of hot wax in the sink
and then applies it to a large, hairy section of his leg. Jumping around the room yelling “hot, hot,
hot,” Nick exclaims in a deepened voice: “test of manhood . . . Okay passed.” After commenting
on how nice and warm it feels and questioning why any woman might complain about waxing
their legs, Nick rips off the paper, finds himself thrown backwards against a wall, and in a tone
of a much higher pitch, he cries out: “Women are insane. Who would do that more than once? I
don’t know. Why would anyone ever do the other leg?” Instances like these pervade the film,
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This supposed “crisis of masculinity” is not only attended to in Modleski’s Feminism Without Women but is also
one of the principal subjects of investigation in a number of anti-feminist texts, such as Christina Hoff Sommers The
War Against Boys: How Misguided Feminism is Harming Our Young Men. Hoff Sommers book, for example,
claims that girls, by and large, are experiencing more freedom and gaining more constructive knowledge than their
male peers because girls are favored in education materials and modes of teaching, while boys are falling behind
academically because education renders boys “less competitive, more emotionally expressive, and more nurturing.”
(NYT review http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/sommers-war.html)
20
It’s interesting to note here that Newfield seems to suggest that the performance of masculinity is in essence a
feminized position in that men must continue to “submit” to it, suggesting, in turn, that the feminization of
masculinity symbolically represents a truer form of power and dominance (at least subjectively).
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and throughout Nick’s process of feminization, nearly every single task or hurdle that needs
tending is imbued with an ultimate test of his manhood and the underlying threat of insanity
should he fail. Thus, as Nick’s statement above renders explicit, insanity is equivalent to
womanhood and is identified as “the” site of the “feminine,” and the only way for Nick to
appropriately inhabit a feminized position is to inhabit it in a very masculine manner. No space
exists between these disparate gender extremes.
The male subjectivity in fear of and attentive to impending crisis in What Women Want’s
delineation of the “feminized man” parallels Modleski’s explication of the subjectivity of the
“feminized man” in Feminism Without Women, one that appears to be steeping in an intensified
state of crisis, whether it is one involving self-loathing, loss, inexpressivity in terms of that loss
that includes an accompanying pity-ridden disparagement of women’s lack as “expressible,” or
in the case of Christopher Newfield, an attempt to recuperate lost masculinity and “man power”
(11, 9, 9, 7). Throughout What Women Want, Nick in one way or another embodies each of these
forms of male subjective crises. Often, as Modleski conjectures from her examples, his recovery
occurs either at the expense of the women who surround him or, more importantly, the women
who threaten to consign him ineradicably to this state of instability and crises21 and thus bound
him to a “feminine” domain indefinitely. As no point exists between or beyond extreme
subjective crisis and full subjective recovery in regard to What Women Want’s construction of
the “feminized man” and “masculine man,” the subjective differentiation between genders is
dichotomized further, and the vacuum between masculinity and femininity distends.22 To prevent
himself from truly becoming a woman, Nick’s masculinity must return, at least momentarily, to a
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One might note that only then would feminization be complete.
In other words, Nick’s character is only emasculated within the film in the time after his rejection as creative
director and before he acquires the ability to hear what women think.
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stable, masculine subjective field. In this case, this stability is secured through Nick’s power to
create and control his feminine side, while demonstrating that his masculinity needs no
validation and is no longer threatened by the “feminine.” A more thorough examination of
Nick’s character will clarify some of the parameters of the male subjectivity in crisis outlined
here.
The first moment of subjective crisis begins when, in the process of telling Nick that he is
not being promoted, Dan Wanamaker tries to reaffirm Nick’s masculinity, telling Nick:
You know I love you Nick. But it’s a woman’s world out there, and getting into a
woman’s psyche is not exactly your strong suit. You can get into their pants better
than anybody on earth, but their psyche is a whole other ballgame.
Nick, who has been mostly looking at his watch throughout the meeting, acts profoundly
confused, though whether he is faking this confusion or whether it results from his tendency to
tune out to this kind of discourse about women is not totally clear. What is clear, however, as
Nick realizes, is that he has depended too much on his status as a “masculinized man” and that
his lack of attending to and proving his masculinity, as well as defending himself against
emasculation, has put both his male dominance and masculinity at risk, and on a rather large
scale: Nick often seems held responsible for maintaining the superiority of the whole male
population.23 Once Nick realizes that Darcy has been hired for a position that he expected to
seize and almost prematurely celebrates,24 he sets out to locate a method by which he can
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He is also responsible for bringing men into this postfeminist moment and helping them regain gender dominance.
The viewer witnesses a moment of simulatory ejaculation as his secretaries ironically let the cork fly out of the
champagne bottle before Nick’s success is realized. This figurative ejaculation is quite different from the other two
that follow in that it more accurately represents premature ejaculation and sexual impotence, corroborated by Lola in
the semi-explicit sex scene that follows. (This scene is semi-explicit considering the visual images brought to mind
by Lola’s overheard narration of the sex act itself.)
24
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“become a woman,”25 proceeding without any indication of doubt that he, in fact, can become a
woman. Nick so firmly believes in his own superiority that he echoes Modleski’s critique of
Donald Pease’s comments as Nick’s behavior and assuredness suggest: “Insofar as men are men,
they are women” (Modleski 11). Nick’s outright objection to female domination, explicit here,
denies a subordinate or even equal role of man in terms of woman. Female domination is
unthinkable, especially within corporate advertising territory; hitherto, Nick has not even
considered the possibility. A woman is non-potential to Nick, and as such, Nick can be both
woman and man and can do so, he assumes, without becoming any less of a man. In the
beginning of the film, then, Nick’s fundamental failure – not realizing he is living in a
postfeminist world – becomes clear.
Similar to Modleski’s assessment of Valentine in Kiss of the Spider Woman which links
work and production to a masculine role in comparison to a feminized role which is equated with
consumption and passivity, Nick will reject Darcy’s post as creative director because, unlike
Nick himself, Darcy cannot occupy the positions of both man and woman (26-27). He and his
male cohort will even attempt to visibly affirm that masculinity, most notably in two simulations
of masturbatory ejaculation during the meeting in which Darcy is introduced and first addresses
the “team.” Though when Nick acquires the ability to perceive Darcy and other women’s
thoughts – mainly Darcy’s recognition that Nick needs his masculinity corroborated, followed by
another woman’s demand for him to “grow up already” – he realizes that the masculinity that
previously secured his superior position has been detected and dissected. Moreover, he becomes
conscious of the fact that most female validation of that masculinity, affirmation that he very
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Quote: “Ok, I’m a broad; I’m a broad,” followed by Nick turning to his large window, staring and pointing and his
reflection, and telling himself: “You go girl!”
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much needs to secure his subjective stability, is now being compensated with a meaningless and
irritated form of acknowledgment that occurs as a means of quelling his own anxiety regarding
his manhood. This perhaps becomes most explicitly clear to Nick when he hears Darcy’s
response to his tardiness to the second meeting, exposing both her hollow affirmation of his
masculinity that occurs in the films diegesis and the emasculation her overheard thoughts
represent: “Last one to arrive, wants me to know I’m not his boss. Okay. You’re a star. I get the
message.”
To give himself the ability to maneuver professional and personal endeavors according to
woman’s terms, Nick tries to replicate a feminized psyche on “his” terms and “think like a
broad.” Failing at his first attempt in producing a campaign idea that might appeal to women, he
reiterates an idea underway in the mind of his female colleague – reflecting on the many times
she has faked a headache to avoid sex with her husband – as his own advertising pitch for Advil
pain medication. Darcy offers another seemingly empty compliment about his attempt to “think
like a woman,” but follows by telling him that every woman will hate his idea. At the same time,
the woman who he subsequently interrogates about the “truth” behind “his” idea (pilfered from
her own mind) grinds his foot with her heel, as Nick hears her inner-voice exclaim: “What an
asshole!” Taking into account the empty compliments regarding Nick’s masculinity that now
extend outside the limits of the screen to the film’s intended audience and Nick’s failure to
comprehend the feminine psyche, Nick, at this point, has entered into a mass culture version of a
postfeminist world. Moreover, he realizes it. Within this commodified postfeminist world, Nick
is overwhelmed by the obsessive introspection of the women that surround him, suggesting again
feminine neurosis, and his colleague has to advise him to “pull it together and [let’s] go to our
sorority meeting.” In a subsequent scene, trapped amidst a mob of women in a cosmetics
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department where he goes to test his success in electrocuting himself out of the surrounding
feminine pandemonium, Nick’s facial expression suggests a realization that, in feminist-run
world, he faces utter doom if not total loss of sanity.
In the beginning, he sees his new femininity as a sign of insanity, as do the men around
him who revere his credibility as the “ultimate man’s man.” Furthermore, he, as well as the men
around him, connects his newborn femininity to weakness. He feels both confused and displaced
in his new subjectivity. But while his first response to Darcy as creative director is a rejection of
his subjective crisis altogether and his second is blind defeatism, Nick begins to realize that, as
discerned by Newfield, “hegemonic patriarchy [. . . cannot] survive without feminization,” and
thus he dives into the process himself and does so with abandon (Modleski 7). But Nick will also
reject the femininity he sees developing in himself as he attempts to use his ability to hear what
women think to reestablish his phallogocratic dominance over woman.
As a result, Nick seeks professional psychiatric advice from a woman (Dr. Perkins) who
he previously visited for marital counseling, confessing to her: “I’m afraid to go to work, afraid
of my doorwoman, afraid to get a cup of coffee.” Nick’s phobic relationship with this pseudo
postfeminist world, expressed here, results from the expressions of women regarding his own
body and mind, as becomes apparent when Nick tries to describe to Dr. Perkins the horror he
perceives in the world around him. Dr. Perkins’ initial refusal to listen to Nick or attribute any
veracity to what Nick is saying places Nick more deeply into alignment with Modleski’s
depiction of the feminized male subject in that Nick’s fears come to represent what Modleski
calls a “cunning ruse of male power [that] masquerades as inexpressivity” or “melancholy
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inexpressiveness”26 (9). But when Nick finally convinces Dr. Perkins that he is telling the truth –
unsurprisingly by tapping into her thoughts while she mentally deliberates fibbing about her age
– Nick gains some ground in his subjective instability, which he has in many ways himself
prompted.
In the events that follow in this scene with Dr. Perkins, what Modleski describes as the
proclamation of male “‘losses’ at the expense of the female subject” becomes perceptible (9).
Though Dr. Perkins first tries to turn Nick away because she is repulsed by him, when she finally
realizes that he can, in fact, hear what women think, she encourages Nick to realize that his
power is a gift, telling him:
“Freud died at eighty-three still asking the question: ‘What do women want?’
Wouldn’t it be strange and wonderful if you were the one man on Earth able to
answer that question? You must learn from this. The world can be yours. You
could be the luckiest man on Earth. If you know what women want, you can
rule!”
Dr. Perkins is perhaps the only female representation of a consciously postfeminist persona
within the film, if she is not something beyond postfeminist. Seemingly unconcerned with the
shift in gender relations that made her entrance into the medical profession possible, she is the
only woman aware of Nick’s ability and the only one who would convince him to use his ability
to skew the amount of gender equality that has been gained in her favor, as is evident in light of
Nick’s comment toward the film’s conclusion explaining that a woman would not have used his
ability in such a way against another woman. Accordingly, Nick is not only granted the gift of
hearing what women think and thus also what women desire but also is rewarded (and by a
26

Nick’s paranoia is framed by Dr. Perkins as melancholia as opposed to psychosis.
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woman whom he disgusts) with a woman’s comprehension of what this gift means and how it
can be used, 27 suggesting, importantly, that Dr. Perkins is implicated in facilitating the
restructuring of gender hierarchies in the film that allows Nick “to rule.” In fact, it is through the
knowledge that Dr. Perkins supplies to Nick that he does, in some ways, achieve his goal of
“becoming a woman,” which he must do to become a believable character. Interestingly, at times
Nick loses his more masculine self in the abandon of his own performance of femininity.
In a supplementary rendering of what Modleski describes as the assimilation of femalederived knowledge, Nick leaves Dr. Perkins office as if he has finally authored a philosophical
logic through which men might realize that the newly evolved capitalistic world (in which Nick
wants to be primary figure and of which he is attempting to rule) requires a certain amount of
feminine insight in order to manipulate a strengthening, no longer marginal, female consumer
circle. In other words, within the parameters of his own branded system of truth and knowledge,
Nick recognizes man’s lack of and need for a vagina, or at least the ability to figure out what one
wants. In doing so, he discovers that the image of the female figure, particularly the female
sexual organ used as the vehicle for the transport of need and desire in modern advertisement,
has become an increasingly erotic and supreme focal point, but one that needs to be carefully
navigated as opposed to being randomly and inconsistently poked and prodded like a science
specimen.
Nick completely nails the shift in the producer/consumer system that places the focus
more so on fulfilling the desires and needs of the “woman’s psyche” rather than paying heed to
the phallus (almost insinuating that this was the desired effect of the Women’s Rights Movement
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This construction of knowledge, moreover, resonates Modleski’s account of the way “female subjectivity and
feminism itself are assimilated to the ‘feminine’ mind of the male philosopher” (9, my emphasis). See also
Modleski’s critique of Nicholson and Fraser (14-22) and Baudrillard (p. 30-34) in Feminism Without Women
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and therefore the true definition of gender equality). As Nick explains quite fervently to his
always present colleague Morgan, “men are stupider it’s true,” suggesting both the simplicity of
the male intellect in its inability to understand a woman’s psyche without assistance as well as
his own ignorance in not perceiving the transformation within consumer sphere and thus
perpetuating his false assumption that all women should desire what men desire. In yet another
challenge to Nick’s masculinity, Morgan asks Nick in a half disturbed, half frustrated tone of
voice: “They? What are you officially a woman now?” In response, and representing of Nick’s
few moments of subjective abandon in relation to masculinity, Nick places every ounce of blame
momentarily on man being obsessed with his own equipment:
Oh I wish [I were a woman]. A woman wouldn’t have screwed over the woman
she loved. They don’t think that way. And another thing, you know this whole
thing about penis envy? Not true. They don’t envy; half of them don’t even like it!
[a statement expressed with an element of surprise] You know who has penis
envy. We do. That’s why we cheat and screw up and lie, because we’re all
obsessed with our own equipment. That’s why.
His colleague stares at Nick as if he were crazy, refusing to accept Nick’s newfound reading of
“reality.” However, Nick’s ability to both determine and accept the new role that alterations in
the advertising/capitalistic sphere has forced him to occupy allows him to surreptitiously regain
the dominant position (even if his newfound femininity will ultimately result in ruin in the
resolution of the film, presuming it does). In yet another phase of male crises outlined within
Feminism Without Women wherein “the problem of misogyny becomes [. . .] a problem of selfloathing,” Nick eventually begins to be repulsed by his former phallogocentric self, thus entering
with ease the subjective signifier that would later be identified as the “metrosexual.”
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The flip side, delineating the position women hold in postmodern capitalistic society, is
construed in a different and somewhat oblique manner in What Women Want. Woman, in the
beginning and ending of the film, reigns in a sphere previously dominated by patriarchal rule, but
she is not exempt from male-executed oppression. Darcy is limited in a world where the male
body and mind still overpower the female. Though Dan places Darcy in the position of creative
director instead of Nick, claiming, basically, that she has the vagina and operative skills to work
it, she is, nevertheless, hired by a man and easily dismissed once man learns to operate the
vagina himself. Conversely, this poses an interesting question about women’s ability to operate
and dominate the phallus, a phallus seemingly requiring nothing in the way of improvement.
While Nick must answer the long-standing question of what women want and figure out how to
give it to them, both emotionally and sexually, Darcy is displaced as a female figure influenced
by the Women’s Rights Movement’s struggle toward equality, who, instead of working to satisfy
her own needs, is still attempting to operate the phallus and still searching, as a member of the
consumer majority, to have her needs satisfied by an outside source. As a result, when Nick
certifies a newly transformed system of knowledge and logic wherein the vagina is viewed as
being in desperate need of special focus and a careful hand and the phallus is deemed irrelevant,
Darcy’s undertaking – her attempt to operate and dominate the phallus – and her masculine
performance are not only superfluous but also will never generate any capital within the
modified terrain of consumer advertising.
The film remains hazy in terms of absolute dominance, but as it epitomizes society and
women’s role in the capitalistic system, male dominance is safely reestablished. Darcy, hired to
“lead us [Dan and Nick] into the twenty first century,” is continually put in her place throughout
the film, beginning with the opening description of her character and continuing throughout with:
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Nick’s ability to see her “feminine” weakness, Dan’s compliment to her on the décor (rendering
her merely able to fulfill a feminine role after Nick’s first underhanded triumph), her claim that
she has paid the price as a successful woman (which has caused, after all, the disintegration of
her marriage due to her success at work and which she sullenly seems to find not worth the cost),
and her dismissal from her position because Nick has stolen credit for her ideas without Darcy
becoming even suspicious. Darcy enlarges her already established lack by identifying the misery
that ensues as “the” price of equality, and at the same time, she concedes to her desire to be
rescued from this presumably postfeminist state of being. Nick’s last moment of crisis, then,
when he confesses his crime to Darcy, is situated as both a moment in which Darcy is rescued
and one in which the postfeminist schema of the film is reversed. Darcy becomes the figure who
needs her masculinity to be substantiated, and Nick is at hand to provide her with the same
meaningless affirmation that she once offered him, as he tells her that he feels embarrassed that
he told her that he needed to be rescued. In a clichéd fairytale kiss, Darcy, self-confessed “knight
in shining armor” rescues Nick, and as she kisses him, he calls her his “hero” and “prince,” only
to be followed by Nick’s repositioning of Darcy below him in a long, drawn out kiss in which he
creepily hovers above her almost mauling her into obliteration from the camera’s gaze.
In the cessation of Nick’s subjective crises, then, he does in fact resecure his power and
subjective stability at the expense of many of the women who surround him. The postfeminist
presumption of equality under which both Darcy and Dr. Perkins function, coupled with Nick’s
complicity in perpetuating that presumption by presenting himself as inferiorized and in crisis
and his conscious circumvention of any dialogue that might reveal a very concrete inequality
between himself and Darcy, together become representative, at least within the film, of what
Modleski identifies as postfeminist processes that are “engaged in negating the critiques and
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undermining the goals of feminism” (3, my emphasis). What the resulting injuries entail for the
women being undermined is as difficult to locate and/or isolate within the film as the broadspectrum of subjugation is within American society, not to mention that the film attends less to
the consequences that result from Nick’s use of his ability than it does to what women think
about Nick and how much they think about how men perceive their own performances, Nick in
particular. But in mapping the injuries that are at least implicitly revealed within the film’s
extradiegetic dialogue – those that Darcy’s thoughts attest to – it becomes evident that What
Women Want is the kind of postfeminist text in which, as Modleski fears, women are
“[delivered] back into a prefeminist world” (Modleski 3). But, quite different from Modleski’s
assessment of the feminized male’s role in this time warp, it is notably in the name of women’s
advancement and through their own words that this occurs.

Writing Feminisms into Gendered Subordination
What Women Want is not only a text that gyrates around the tactics and targets of
contemporary mass media but is also one that demonstrates both the structure of what Modleski
refers to as postfeminist texts and, within that, what she has identified as a feminized form of
male power and hegemony that has pervaded many sociopolitical and cultural spheres during the
continuing backlash against feminisms. In addition, the film grapples with a number of important
paradigms (and paradigm shifts) within America’s perpetually evolving cultural realm, each of
which seem potentially interesting to feminists. Though I have my suspicions that the title of the
film was more an advertising ploy than a “question of the ages,” the organization of the narrative
as one that answers the question it raises – “What do women want?” – is such that the film’s
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resolution of its own inquiry becomes both a question and answer for certain feminist (st)ages –
What do women want in terms of feminism(s)?
This second, implicit question asked in What Women Want constitutes one of the
fundamental underlying questions of this thesis, neither because it is a question that I want to ask
nor because it is one that I think I can answer. Rather, the question of what women want in terms
of feminisms is important because this question is the driving force of what Modleski refers to as
the current postfeminist moment. While Modleski’s places her emphasis in Feminism Without
Women on documenting and calling into question a process of male feminization occurring on
both page and screen (and this emphasis seems to be the aspect that is troubling for most of her
critics), Modleski’s underlying concern seems to lie, instead, in the way this question of
feminisms is being answered within these postfeminist texts through dialogues between women
and men. This is why Modleski’s title Feminism Without Women does not have to be read only
as a conspiratorial case regarding the displacement of women to the margins of feminisms by
feminized men. It also could be interpreted as suggesting that the answers being provided within
postfeminist contexts in response to this fundamental question might leave feminisms with no
women to invest in their import.
Providing tangential critical analyses of What Women Want, “Social Criticism,” and the
texts analyzed in the following chapter is critical because each text exists as what could be called
the last instance in mass-mediated and theoretical terrains where women engage in answering the
question of what women want in terms of feminisms on such a large scale and within presumably
postfeminist contexts. While I more closely examine what those answers comprise in the
following chapter, I will focus within the remainder of this chapter on the potential political
implications that arise when female subjects formulate these answers within a postfeminist
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narrative structure, especially when a specter of the male gaze can be located within the female
voice articulating those answers. In doing so, I will outline some of the key points of comparison
between the role of Darcy in What Women Want and that of Nicholson and Fraser in “Social
Criticism,” using that comparison to establish the dialectical relationship between “Social
Criticism” and postfeminist discourses.
Similar to the theoretical weakness couched within Modleski’s presumably exclusive
emphasis on a process of male feminization that erupts as a means of “dealing with the threat of
female power,” the reading of Nick’s character in the previous section of this chapter as one that
illustrates the structure of postfeminist texts and the composition of the feminized male subject is
limited in its lack of attendance to what Nick hears Darcy thinking. While Modleski, more or
less, infers that women are no longer necessary in her interpretation of the current “postfeminist
moment,” both on the home front and in carrying on the projects of feminisms (at least in the
texts under investigation in Feminism Without Women), Darcy’s character emerges as one of
importance in What Women Want, one who seems to be attempting to prove her value in a
postfeminist milieu and often by illustrating how her feminist perspectives can be articulated
within and alongside an emerging postfeminist patriarchy. This can be most explicitly
ascertained in the voiceover that follows Darcy’s acknowledgment to Nick that she is presumed
to be the “man-eating bitch, Darth Vader of the ad world” after which she almost pleadingly
exclaims: “But that’s not who I am at all.”
As Darcy’s voiceover constitutes this trajectory of legitimation (and validation) within
the film, Darcy is overheard writing the narrative of what women want in relation to feminisms,
thus providing the answer to the film’s implicit question. Her answer is dually composed. The
first part of her answer can be ascertained in her attempt remove the bitter, power-hungry and
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inhuman connotations of feminisms that are attached to her subjectivity (especially in the
abovementioned label that constructs her as half praying mantis, or sexual cannibal, and half scifi alien monstrosity), and she does so through a process of disavowal in which she professes that
the benefits of her position of power (necessarily feminist gains) have not been worth the
consequences (namely the loss of male companions who cannot deal with her success as a
woman). The second portion of her answer is rendered through the form of escapism offered in
the Nike campaign that originates in Darcy’s mind, where the image of a woman running on the
road by herself represents the opportunity to escape the pressure and stress of the workplace and
enjoy “the one place she can be herself,” suggesting, as Darcy’s comment above also implies, the
inauthenticity of female subjectivity in the public sphere.28 Looking at the image on the page of
the Nike advertisement, Darcy exclaims: “Look at her. God, I want to be her. She looks so free”
(my emphasis).
If Darcy’s voiceover indicates that the only feminism worthy of engaging in is one that
grants freedom from the “so-called” achievements of feminisms past, then it is Darcy’s own
narrative that writes the male/female binary into this postfeminist narrative and women into a
position of subordination. Male dominance, hence, can appear to be a product of female desire.
But it is important to draw attention to what seems to give rise to Darcy’s need for escape,
namely the fact that her perception of both herself and her decidedly feminist actions are
measured according to the (phallogocentric) standards of the men who surround her. Because
Darcy’s thoughts rarely stray from Nick and Dan’s assessment of her work and her character, the
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This is another instance in which gendered roles are reinscribed in the film.
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delineation of any form of feminism within Darcy’s voiceover occurs by summonsing a specter
of the “male gaze” who helps her map out a feminism according to its terms.29
The structure of “Social Criticism” can be interpreted as embedded within and informed
by the same kind of postfeminist narrative structure outlined in the above analysis of What
Women Want, where Lyotardian postmodernism is set up by Nicholson and Fraser as a feminized
male discourse within both their essay and the debate it inspires. “Social Criticism” certainly
does not emerge as the same kind of postfeminist text as What Women Want in that there is no
displaced male subject overtly attempting to reassert his dominance through a process of
feminization and in that Nicholson and Fraser do not proceed to write feminisms unequivocally
into extinction as Darcy’s character seems to do. However, a few key elemental components
remain that are disconcerting in the potential they have to write feminisms into a subordinate
gendered position in relation to postmodern theories: the feminization of a decentered male
subject (postmodernisms), the critique of feminisms through phallogocentric norms (primarily
the anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist tenets of postmodernisms) and the female authorship
of a feminism for the present moment (postmodern feminism) in which a specter of the “male
gaze” can be located as a defining force within that authorship. While I would not dare to suggest
that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism represents the same kind of backlash against
feminisms “carried out in its [sic] very name” that constitutes Modleski’s understanding of a
current postfeminist moment, it does, on the other hand, emerge within the same historical
intersection and as a response to the same theoretical fissures and sociopolitical shifts.30
Consequently, “Social Criticism” cannot escape the influence of other discourses within its

29

It should also be noted here that this internalization of the “male gaze” satisfies the heteronormative male fantasy
of being the object of women’s thoughts and desires.
30
The complex dynamics of this historical juncture is outlined in the introductions of Chapters One and Two.
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social setting – postmodernist, postfeminist, or otherwise. But as will be exhibited below, its
authors do not anticipate the regulation of their own voices within the power structures of those
discourses, and this lack of reflexivity is the utmost reason, I would suggest, that “Social
Criticism” is susceptible to being impinged upon and relegated by postfeminist discourses.
Additionally, just as “Social Criticism” can be demonstrated to maintain a rather close
dialectical relationship with a postfeminist narrative discourse, it can also be shown to produce a
chillingly similar set of consequences, specifically in the way gender hierarchies of postfeminist
narrative discourses are carried over through the process of authorship into their postmodern
feminism. Within “Social Criticism,” to be more specific, Nicholson and Fraser suggest that
feminisms “need” postmodernisms because, alone, feminisms have been incapable of
overcoming or escaping the binding impediments of foundationalism and essentialism,
seemingly suggesting that, with postmodernisms as a scrutinizing partner (husband), feminisms
will be complete. But as Laura Kipnis suggests in “Feminism: The Political Conscience of
Postmodernism,” though she is referring to the “unhappy marriage[s]” of Marxism and feminism
and psychoanalysis and feminism, the feminist denial of male-authored master theories as “a
prescription for patriarchy” and of their creators as “patriarch personified” “yielded to what
might be called a homeopathic approach – poison in small doses as a temporary remedy, one
whose curative powers, however, run the risk of producing in the healthy the symptoms of the
disease” (149). Thus while critiquing feminisms through discourses of postmodernisms may
lessen the underlying essentialist and foundationalist tendencies of second wave feminisms, a
different set of theoretical encumbrances typical to postmodernisms, as exemplified in Chapter
One, develop into obstacles also for feminist theories, one of those being postmodernisms
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predisposition towards the phallogocentric discursive structure of the metanarrative (discussed in
greater detail below). As Kipnis goes on to say:
The narrative of the mésalliance turned true love is, of course, a powerful one in
our culture. […] (And it hardly needs pointing out that the tale of the feminist
romance with Lacan itself strongly suggests the Harlequin formula: the hero may
be, on the surface, rude, sexist, and self-absorbed, but it is he alone who knows
the truth of the heroine’s desire.) (150)
Disregarding others’ analyses regarding how postmodernisms function as male-headed,
overarching discourses, Nicholson and Fraser erect the precise relationship that Kipnis describes
above with Lyotard and postmodernisms in “Social Criticism,” and it is their lack of
retrospectiveness regarding this question of power in employing postmodernism as a remedy for
feminisms (also explained in Chapter One) that seems to harvest “in the healthy the symptoms of
the disease.”
When Nicholson and Fraser trumpet Lyotard as postmodernism’s archetype, they situate
him (and postmodernisms) within the same subjective space that Nick receives in What Women
Want. Lyotard not only maintains the masculinized position of a “god’s eye view” in relation to
the shortcomings of a whole category of feminist theories, as Nick does in relation to Darcy’s
thoughts about her feminist actions, but Lyotard also inhabits a feminized subject position in
relation to philosophy, one in which “Philosophy with a capital P,” as Nicholson and Fraser
argue, “is no longer a credible enterprise” but “undergoes an explicit devaluation,” “is cut down
to size, if not eliminated altogether” (21).31 With the proviso that Modleski is correct in her
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The emasculating rhetoric here regarding philosophy bears resemblance to the emasculation of Nick that occurs in
the beginning of What Women Want in both his demotion and the premature ejaculation represented by the untimely
popping of the champagne cork.
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conjecture that the desired product of male feminization is a recognition by the margin of the
expertise and authority of the feminized male subject, then it becomes possible to speculate, first,
that the Nicholson and Fraser grant that recognition in their authorization of postmodernisms as a
remedy and prosthesis for second wave feminisms and, subsequently, that this authorization
transpires because of the feminized position that Lyotard and postmodernisms seem to inhabit as
a result of this philosophical self-devaluation (Kipnis 165).
Outside of the positioning that postmodernisms receive in Nicholson and Fraser’s
“encounter,” postmodernisms encompass a few other characteristics that allow for a more
thorough connection to Nick’s feminized subjectivity and his ability to hear what women think,
dynamics that are necessarily brought into the feminism/postmodernism debate and Nicholson
and Fraser’s essay through this reliance on postmodernisms. In speaking generally here of
postmodernisms, I am referring to the collection of postmodern discourses postdating 1968,
namely those of Rorty, Jameson, Baudrillard, and Lyotard, and I choose to classify
postmodernisms this way because the overlap of the central theses of these theorists appears to
represent the "idea" of postmodern theory presented in Nicholson and Fraser’s "Social
Criticism," though the only two postmodern theorists mentioned in their essay are Rorty and
Lyotard.
When categorized in relation to this collection of theorists, the postmodernism invoked in
“Social Criticism” can be read as a discourse arising from an “intensified state of [male] crisis,”
particularly a theoretical and subjective crisis that occurs as a reaction to the failed antiestablishment movements of the 1960s. It is in response to this theoretical and subjective crisis
(explored more fully in the introduction of Chapter Three) that postmodernists began to surmise
that the project of Enlightenment has failed and that the Marxist metanarrative is either
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outmoded or implicated within fascistic tendencies of the modern era, ultimately disavowing
metanarrative all together as a totalizing (and tyrannical) discourse of oppression. The
postmodernist recognition of metanarratives as despotic and repressive thus parallels Nick’s
recognition of the focus on the phallus within advertising as one that is not best suited to sell to a
presumably feminist consumer majority given the accompanying impetus to objectify and debase
women and render them utterly defective.32 But like Nick’s character who is less interested in the
power-ridden construction of his own subjecthood than how his own objectives and authority are
undermined within the larger system of advertising that he once “ruled,” it seems possible to
suggest that the postmodernist responses to the failure of anti-establishment movements of the
1960s might also be identified as being invested in their own subjective displacement and/or
collapse rather than in the marginalization of non-white, non-male, non-heterosexual
subjectivities traditionally displaced within and by hegemonic discourses. In either case, the
postmodernist revulsion to the fascistic tendencies of the male subject within modern discourses
parallels Nick’s disgust with his former masculine self and his (quite homophobic) repulsion to
his obsession with the male sexual organ.
Notwithstanding any hypothetical motives behind this kind of postmodernist response to
crisis and/or defeat, the postmodernist abandonment of metanarrative and occupation of a
peripheral space within philosophy becomes a symbolic desertion of the power inherent within
modern discourses, discourses that seem to be constructed within this equation as necessarily
gendered male. It would appear, therefore, that Nicholson and Fraser’s almost unqualified
implementation of postmodern theory as a non-hegemonic discourse could suggest an underlying
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One might also conjecture here that the similarity between Nick’s realization of a need to acquire the operative
skills to appeal to the vagina and to women’s psyche and the postmodernist appeal to and occupation of a
theoretically marginal space might warrant further investigation.
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reliance upon essentialist paradigms in “Social Criticism”: that if postmodern theories reject
phallogocentric discourses, then postmodern discourses must be gendered female and, as
follows, must be non-hegemonic discourses as well.33 But similar to the unlocatable (all-butabsent) power that Nick acquires in What Women Want through his ability to hear women’s
thoughts and construct a new set of norms regarding female desire, the erection of a set of norms
within the limits of postmodern theories that deem themselves to be without power, as Judith
Butler argues, also creates a “powerful, forceful conceptual practice which subliminates,
disguises, and extends its own power through recourse to the tropes of normative universality”
(39).34
Despite the postmodernist claim to abandon metanarrative structure, however, it seems
that this collection of postmodern theories, together, construct their own metatheory –
representing what Kipnis describes as a “neomodernist desire” – by demarcating the conditions
of postmodernity and the interpretation of a postmodern reality through the loss of distinction
between appearance and reality (165). Thus, postmodernisms can be said to map out a
reorganization of knowledge and logic - i.e. signification is rendered to a state of indeterminacy,
transcendental reason is decentered, etc. – similar to the restructuring of the logic of advertising
that Nick’s persona simultaneously initiates and signifies within the film. By this, I mean that the
term "postmodern theory" represents a restructuring of modern logic in the same way that
Aristotle’s Poetics represents a restructuring of Platonic logic in that there is a change in the way
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This is important in illustrating that Nicholson and Fraser’s implementation of postmodern theories as a
theoretical savior for feminisms does not produce the desired result and is significant, as well, in reinforcing Diana
Fuss’ argument that to avoid essentialism is fundamentally impossible.
34
Another interesting line of investigation would question what is done to the revolutionary power of gender
bending and/or the dissolution of gender binaries. One might suggest in conducting this kind of analyses that these
mediated texts rupture gender binaries as both an admonition and as a means of reinforcing prescribed gender roles.
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subjects, objects, societies, and concepts like 'truth' and 'reason' are either interpreted or, in the
case of postmodernisms, deemed indecipherable.
Together, the characteristics of postmodern theories that can be read into the postfeminist
narrative structure of Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism” represent what Kipnis calls a
“hysterical blindness to the fact that the periphery has forced itself upon the attention of the
center, ” and it “maintains this blindness [by] reinvent[ing] and reinvest[ing] in the centrality of
that center” (165). This is true to the extent that postmodern theories can be said to maintain a
level of authority and legitimizing power over habitually marginalized discourses while using
those discourses to historicize and regulate the altered sociopolitical environment that those
voices helped to call into being. This statement is verified further when postmodern theories can
be said to leave those marginalized voices out of its historical narrative if not, in fact, silence
them altogether, as Seyla Benhabib implies in making the case that the central theses of
postmodernisms actually undermine their corresponding feminist endeavors.35 If Lyotard’s
Postmodern Condition reiterates some of the central theses of already articulated feminist
theories, and if Modleski is correct in her assessment of the emergence of a postfeminist
moment, then the postmodern theories that Lyotard is called upon to epitomize in “Social
Criticism” could be interpreted as one of the first theoretical examples of the male appropriation
of feminisms that Modleski sees as a defining aspect of postfeminist texts. This appropriation is
substantiated in more general terms in Kipnis’ supposition that the postmodern critique of
Enlightenment is, indeed, “the margin, the absence, the periphery, writing the rules from it’s own
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See the section entitled “Already Postmodern Feminisms: A Rejection of NIcholson and Fraser’s categorical
assessment of feminism in “Social Criticism” in Chapter One of this thesis (pp. 16-18).
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interest.”36 Under the stipulation that postmodernisms represent a crisis in what has otherwise
been the phallogocentric cannon of philosophy, it follows that Nicholson and Fraser, like
Darcy’s character, are right there to rescue it and help return it to that centered position,
relegating feminisms again to the periphery.
Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism” and the merger between feminist and
postmodern theories that becomes their postmodern feminism, then, can be compared to What
Women Want because “Social Criticism” can be interpreted as an attempt to reassert the value of
feminist theories within the phallogocentrically defined parameters of postmodern theories. This
becomes clear when postmodernisms are understood as discourses that, to an extent, render a
large number of feminist theories illegitimate, as Nicholson and Fraser indicate in their essay,
through critiques of social criticism, grand narratives of legitimation, essentialism,
foundationalism, and the list goes on. Nicholson and Fraser’s effort to legitimize a feminism
within and through postmodern theories transpires much in the same way that Darcy attempts to
demonstrate that her feminist perspectives can be expressed in correspondence with (and not
contradictory to) an emerging postfeminist patriarchy. In fact, Nicholson and Fraser could be
said to almost suggest as much in claiming that there is “self-contradictory in the idea of a
postmodern theory” or in the idea of a postmodern feminism that emerges when critiquing
feminisms according to a set of postmodern theoretical norms. Moreover, when taking into
consideration their attempt to elaborate on what feminism and postmodernism have to offer to
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I believe what Kipnis is suggesting here is two fold: First, that what has come to be known as the postmodernist
critique of Enlightenment was originally articulated by “the margin, the absence, the periphery, rewriting the rules
from its own interest” as a colonized subject. And secondly, that the Western, autonomous, bourgeois subject (or
rather, the postmodern theorist) has come to inhabit the this colonized subjective position (and he sees himself
because of the decentering that occurs as a result of the failed anti-establishment movements at this historical
juncture), and within this subjective space, the postmodern theorist also can be said to be “rewriting the rules from
its own interest.”
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each other, it becomes difficult to decipher whether Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to justify
feminisms and postmodernisms as conciliatory discourses might be an appeal to postmodern
theorists rather than feminist theorists. What remains problematic here, nonetheless, is that
Nicholson and Fraser’s answer to the question of what women want in terms of feminisms
consists of writing postmodernisms into a superior discursive position and resurrecting the
male/female binary within the walls of academia, though they perhaps do both inadvertently. But
it is precisely their insistence upon the legitimizing power of postmodernisms and their
suggestion that, without postmodernisms, feminisms of the future would be not simply
retrogressive but unviable that positions “Social Criticism” as a postfeminist narrative.
In reading “Social Criticism” and Nicholson and Fraser’s facilitation of the
postmodernism/feminism debate as implicated within and informed by a postfeminist discursive
structure, one element yet to be mentioned remains perplexing: If Nick is imposing his own ideas
upon Darcy and hypothetically maintaining ownership of her thoughts through his ability to
“overhear” them, who or what is imposing postmodernisms on Nicholson and Fraser in “Social
Criticism”? I would like to suggest, here, that this question can be answered (though not
completely) by comparing their own lack of attendance to the power and phallogocentricism that
remains intact in postmodern theories to Darcy’s ignorance to the skewed power relations in the
presumably postfeminist world that surrounds her. In Darcy’s attempt to remove the negative
connotations that have been imposed upon her subjectivity by the men who surround her – the
label of man-eating bitch, most specifically – she assumes that the anger directed towards her
results from her acquisition of a position of gender superiority (a classic backlash feminist
argument). Therefore, she imagines that the process of removing those negative connotations
involves proving herself as the equal she is supposed to be. Most importantly, Darcy fails to
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recognize that this self-initiated critique does not occur on her own terms but according to the
normalizing standards prescribed by the men and culture that surrounds her, standards that do not
appear far removed from those of the immediately preceding history.
Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to critique feminisms through postmodern theories and
define feminist theories through a new set of phallogocentrically determined theoretical norms
also involves an assumption that the negative consequences of essentialism and foundationalism
must be removed entirely from feminist theories and necessarily through a process in which
feminisms can be shown to be equally “postmodern.” But Nicholson and Fraser, too, fall short of
realizing that their own self-initiated critique of feminisms does not occur with any consideration
of gendered relations, and not because they do not intend to do so because they claim to do as
much in the section on postmodernisms in their essay.37 Rather, similar to the way Darcy’s
disavowal of feminisms leaves her with only the specter of the male gaze as a point of reference
in her assessment of her feminist subjectivity, Nicholson and Fraser’s critique of feminisms
neglects a consideration of postmodernisms with respect to gendered relations because they
abandon the only modes of feminist critique available to them due to the essentialist and
foundationalist tendencies of those methodologies. Consequently, in thoughtlessly discarding
feminist theories with essentialist and foundationalist underpinnings, which for Diana Fuss
means abandoning all feminist theories, Nicholson and Fraser, like Darcy, incorporate instead
the specter of the male gaze (because it is necessarily the specter of Lyotard and postmodern
theories that is developed within their essay) who seems to perform their critique of feminisms
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Despite this claim, as explained in Chapter One, Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to reveal the limitations of
postmodernisms is not only insufficient in their failure to explain why those limitations do not need to be applied to
a postmodern feminist critique but also in their incapacity to prevent those limitations from impeding upon their
postmodern feminism.
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for them. Because of this, the male gaze becomes a central component in Nicholson and Fraser’s
voices too.
Exploring the ways in which Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism” and their
facilitation of the feminism/postmodernism debate seems to be complicit with a postfeminist
discursive structure furnishes an opportunity to examine both sets of texts outside the comforts of
an isolated academic terrain and in relation to the sociopolitical locale for which it purports to
supply a mode of postmodern feminist critique. Such an analysis helps to understand their
postmodern feminism from a different perspective and thus reveals some rather different
limitations than those attended to in Chapter One. It also points toward a shift within
postfeminist narrative structure in the way the female subject emerges as one adorned with the
agency and autonomy to reject feminisms as a flawed aspect of her subjectivity, whether this
rejection is a categorical rejection of feminisms, as it appears to be in What Women Want, or a
(supposedly) partial rejection as it could be described in “Social Criticism.” But the reason that
these self-initiated, introspective critiques of feminisms that seem to occur at this historical
juncture without the reflexivity to make them valuable remains, like Nicks’ power in What
Women Want, somewhat unlocatable. This is perhaps one of the reasons that Nicholson and
Fraser’s postmodern feminism never materializes as one sufficient to the present moment.
Nonetheless, analyzing Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism and the essay that
provides definition for it as shaped by and susceptible to impinging postfeminist discourses
seems to suggest that there is something deeper at this historical juncture that neither
postmodernisms nor postmodern feminisms have completed excavated or are able to fully
articulate. Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that, as Sandra Lee Bartky astutely observes,
the power that institutes the requirements in terms of the female image has done an about face
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(79). The power that prescribes both continual and changing female images, Bartky contends, no
longer remains in complete control of external entities; rather, the control now resides inside the
individual, as she sees herself. Certainly, Bartky maintains, the source of this preoccupation with
the self is anonymous. “The power is everywhere and nowhere” (Bartky 79). Inasmuch as this
comparison between “Social Criticism” and What Women Want points towards a unconscious
submission to anonymous forms of power within postfeminist texts and more specifically to an
unconscious capitulation to the normative structures of phallogocentric discourses, it suggests the
importance of returning to previously articulated feminist theories to ask when and how this
occurs and what the aftershock entails. This is why I understand this project as an attempt to be
reflexive about what seem to be valuable concepts in feminist theories that deal with the
conditions of and theorizations regarding postmodernity when temporal and spatial distance
allows for that reflexivity. What the reflection comprised by this chapter seems to reveal in
relation to the postmodern feminism proffered in “Social Criticism,” as Kipnis surmises in the
final statement of “Feminism: The Political Conscience of Postmodernism?,” is that:
To the extent that a feminist theory discovers these crucial spaces in textual rather
than in political practice, it indicates the resistance of first-world feminists to the
dangerous knowledge that in a world system of patriarchy, […] we first-world
feminists too are also the beneficiaries. (165)
In the next chapter, I turn again to a similar set of mediated texts that could be identified,
structurally, as postmodern, postfeminist texts in order to consider how Nicholson and Fraser’s
postmodern feminism might manifest as a realistic subject position within these postmodern,
postfeminist discursive structures. The female characters within these fictional texts – primarily
Sex and the City, Desperate Housewives, and The Devil Wears Prada – are also allocated the
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agency to reject feminisms, almost unequivocally, as defective aspects of their subjectivities.
One of the most compelling aspects of these mediated texts, and the one that generates the
impetus to analyze them in relation to “Social Criticism,” is the way these female subjects
partake in the skewed historical revision of the history of feminisms and author the answer to the
question of what women want in terms of feminisms through a fictionalized mode of postmodern
feminist critique that is not far removed from the one demarcated in “Social Criticism.” While
the version of postmodern feminist critique enacted by these characters constructs a similarly
constrictive definition of a viable feminism for the present moment, allowing the comparison
being drawn between “Social Criticism” and these texts to become more plausible, they reveal,
more importantly, the way the beneficiaries of second wave feminisms – the white bourgeois
female subject – can employ feminist theories articulated from the margins to unconsciously
write themselves again as the central subject of interest within both feminist theories and the
camera’s gaze.
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CHAPTER THREE: FORGETTING LYOTARD1: INVESTIGATING POSTMODERN
FEMINISM IN PRACTICE IN POSTMODERN, POSTFEMINIST AUDIOVISUAL TEXTS
What matters is the form. What matters is that the operative
word can’t, and that virtually no aspect of everyday life is
not subject to relegation and review, and that in modern
love acceding to a mate’s commands is what constitutes
intimacy, and that the “better” the couple the more the
inhabitants have successfully internalized the operative
local interdictions. What were once commands are now
second nature. But once again, it’s your choice. Or would
be if any of us could really choose not to desire love. [. . .]
And thus you have the psychological signature of the
modern self: defined by love, an empty vessel without it,
the threat of love’s withdrawal shriveling even the most
independent spirits into complacency (and, of course,
ressentiment).
-Laura Kipnis, Against Love

The emergence of feminist discourses engaged in discerning the importances of
postmodernisms, postfeminisms, and resistances to both that have been outlined in the preceding
chapters suggest that the position the female subject occupies within the late twentieth century is,
to an extent, a fundamentally different position from that of the 1960s and 1970s. Situated
alongside shifting political environments, emergent media forms and media alterations, and an
increasingly “globalized” economy, critical theoretical perspectives emerging in the 1990s have
produced a number of increasingly fine-tuned assessments that gauge the beneficial and
debilitating aspects of postmodernity and postmodern theories. Only with the imperative
temporal distance that has allowed for this theoretical tweaking can an evaluation of the
postmodern feminism advocated by Linda Nicholson and Nancy Fraser from 1988 to at least
19992 be produced with such a wide-ranging understanding of its motion and aftereffects.3 In
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Nicholson has done the majority of the advocating here, but I include Fraser because I am primarily attending to
the endorsement that occurs through the reprinting and defense of “Social Criticism without Philosophy.”
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fact, many of the extensive critical analyses that point toward the critical naïveté and the flawed
aspects specific to this theoretically intricate postmodern feminism that were outlined in Chapters
One and Two have been intermittently catalogued by a variety of feminist thinkers during the
nearly twenty years that have transpired since the original publication of “Social Criticism.”4
This is not to say, however, that Nicholson and Fraser’s seeming thirst for theoretical
intimacy and companionship with postmodernism cannot be identified as something of “second
nature” in feminist theory, as it was in Chapter Two, noting what feminist theorists have
indicated as the complacency demanded in other theoretical “marriages” and the “ressentiment”
produced in relation to some feminist appropriations of psychoanalytic and Marxist theories. Nor
is this to absolve Nicholson and Fraser’s silencing of other feminist perspectives, their rewriting
of those perspectives neatly within the paradigmatic structure of postmodern feminism, and their
tendency to use their own theoretical work as evidence against arguments that bring its
shortcomings into view. The most compelling example is Nicholson’s essay “Feminism and the
Politics of Postmodernism” (1992), which footnotes only six outside references (two of which
are references to Lyotard) as opposed to the eleven footnotes that either cite or explain hers and
Fraser’s work on their postmodern feminism.5 But as Kipnis’ suggests in the above epigraph,
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Even with this nearly twenty-year distance, the evaluations offered in Chapter One cannot be conceived of as
complete. In addition to noting the (in)adequacy (or rather, the lack of ability to reach completion) within my own
examination of their work, as well as my indebtedness to feminist thinkers who have made that analysis possible, I
would also note the importance of Nicholson and Fraser’s work. Their steadfast commitment to what they have
viewed as a valuable project, together with my long-term engagement with that work, has only added to the
production of thought within this project.
4
It is important to note here that most of Nicholson and Fraser’s critics have published work dealing with “Social
Criticism” or their postmodern feminism within collections edited by Nicholson.
5
Nicholson’s “Feminism and the Politics of Postmodernism” appeared in a 1992 issue of Duke’s boundary 2 (19:2).
In this article, Nicholson claims to “try to uncover some of the reasons behind this passion [in the relationship
between feminism and postmodernism/poststructuralism]” and to “attempt to resolve some of the conflicts.” Within
the first two footnotes, she cites Lyotard in her attempt to “elucidat[e] the meaning I give to postmodernism.” This is
followed by seven footnotes that reference hers or Fraser’s articles (four of which are “Social Criticism Without
Philosophy), two explanatory footnotes, two footnote references to an essay in her Feminism/Postmodernism
collection, and four citations of outside texts. Though Nicholson’s tendency (thus not simply in this essay) to
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such a pact is “the psychological signature of the modern self” (94). As I have indicated
previously, the essays Nicholson and Fraser compose regarding their postmodern feminism and
its theoretical paradigm are together symptomatic of the modern theoretical structure that they
reject in “Social Criticism.” But this paradigm, in fact, does appear to become postmodern after
the fact, manifesting in mediated postmodern texts in a relatively similar form that signifies in a
diametrically opposed manner. This chapter looks at the way a number of these audiovisual texts
– Sex and the City, Desperate Housewives, and The Devil Wears Prada primarily – construct
their own postmodern feminisms in a way that is strikingly similar to the postmodern feminism
put forward in Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism.” This comparison, I propose,
underscores the possibility that Nicholson and Fraser may have instituted a postmodern feminist
methodology in which it is possible that feminisms might emerge not as discourses essential for
“overcoming the oppression of women” but rather as discourses that can be written into oblivion.
It is what Kipnis refers to as the “psychological signature” of modern knowledge and
logic structures that seems to mark the importance of returning to Nicholson and Fraser’s
initiation and command of this precise “encounter between feminism and postmodernism.” As
feminist theories approach more thorough understandings of the female subject and her
subjectivity within modified contexts that are ostensibly evocative of an interstitial space that
straddles modern and postmodern structures, conditions, and commodity forms, it remains
fundamentally important to ask what might be valuable within critical feminist theories that
reference hers and Fraser’s work and “Social Criticism” specifically is indeed troubling given the purpose of this
essay, what becomes odd is the way in which there is little reflection on work spanning back to the original
publication of “Social Criticism.” This becomes clear not only in this essay but also in a fairly representative 1997
collection edited by Nicholson The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, through which much of her own
perceptions of Second Wave feminisms carry over from “Social Criticism” and in which she frames the last section
of the collection “The Question of Essentialism” with another notion that follows from “Social Criticism” by using
Linda Alcoff’s essay that is cited in footnote number eight and Fraser’s “Structuralism or Pragmatics,” taken from
Nancy Fraser and Sandra Bartky’s edited collection Revaluing French Feminism (1992) that is cited in footnote
eleven.
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attend to postmodern specificities and particularly female representations within the postmodern
recesses of mainstream American mass media. To assess the limitations and adverse aspects of
Nicholson and Fraser’s theoretical position is not to eclipse the importance of a feminist
understanding of postmodernity. Rather such extensive reflection suggests that feminist
questions regarding postmodernity and postmodernisms are imperative to feminist theories. As
Angela McRobbie writes in Postmodernism and Popular Culture (1994): “In short, the strength
of feminism lies in its ability to create discourse, to dispute, to negotiate the boundaries and the
barriers, and also to take issue with the various feminisms which have sprung into being” (73,
my emphasis).
In addition to the insights produced in analyzing “Social Criticism” discursively, the
transferal of their conception of postmodern feminism from modern to postmodern signification
becomes a distinct source for exploration in two respects. First, it allows for an inquiry into what
feminist questions regarding postmodernity might entail, and second, it answers the question of
what the “postmodern” version of feminism put forward by Nicholson and Fraser might look like
when viewed through a mediated and popularized postmodern lens. Looking at their theoretical
paradigm outside of academia seems an important move to make if one is to gauge what their
postmodern feminism represents in practice rather than what it entails as philosophy.6 This
chapter’s investment in such an exploration is, foremost, an attempt to nuance the so-called
“feminist” subtexts of mediated, women-centered romantic comedies and dramas from the 1990s

6

This seems especially important in regard to Nicholson and Fraser’s positive outlook on the reduced import of
philosophy that Lyotardian postmodernism seems to supply. As Nicholson claims in “A Response to My Critics”
(Hypatia 2001): “But the point I would like to make here is that we should stop thinking about this issue (with
Nicholson and Fraser’s reading of Lyotard) as a philosophical one” (86). “I reiterate my belief that we best approach
the issue of consensus and dissension in second-order justifications of social and political claims not philosophically
but sociologically, politically, historically. I suggest similar approaches for dealing with the question of meaning.
This move signals an endorsement not of indifference but rather of commitment and humility” (86).
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to the present, “feminist” subtexts whose function seems to become buried below the texts’
postmodern overtones. But in analyzing some of the similarities between Nicholson and Fraser’s
theoretical position and this emerging mainstream audiovisual construct, it becomes possible to
also make apparent Nicholson and Fraser’s inability to project how postmodernism or
postmodern-feminism would later signify. As a result and constituting the secondary claim of this
chapter, Nicholson and Fraser’s seemingly modernist presumption of and dependence upon the
determinability of meaning in “Social Criticism” (and specifically the meaning of
postmodernism and postmodernity) signals a negligent consideration of the appropriation and
redefinition of these theoretical terms by the mainstream. In other words, Nicholson and Fraser
overlook the possible (mis)appropriation and (mis)classification of the term “postmodernism”
within and by the American realm of mass media, wherein the conditions of postmodernity
might be manipulated to operate as tools for the relegitimation of hegemonic discursive and
sociopolitical structures that postmodernisms hope to dissolve. Before initiating my
examinations of these mediated texts, it is important to consider the shifting significations of the
term “postmodernism” since the 1960s both within and outside of academia and how this
variability insinuates the impossibility of assigning a static meaning to the term.
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An Enigmatic Term: The Vulgarization of the Term “Postmodernism” within Popular American
Consciousness and Its Consequences
In a 1993 October article, Hal Foster inquires as to how postmodernism has become the
“darling of journalism” while at the same time the “Baby Jane of criticism” (3). For Foster,
postmodern theories like those of Lyotard and Jameson once seemed to offer a revolutionary if
not Utopian potential for “lower classes” and “inferior peoples” and the promise of being a “new
barbarism” to be “shunned [. . .] at all costs” by the American mainstream (3). But instead,
postmodernism encountered what Foster calls the “worst” of all possible consequences, as the
meaning of the term became “not only banal but incorrect” (4). “Treated as a fashion,” Foster
laments, “postmodernism became démodé” (3). Its meaning “emptied by the media,” its politic
“critiqued within the left,” and its massacre of master narratives deemed “the latest proper name
of the West” (Foster 4). The revolutionary potential that postmodernism seemed to acquire in the
1960s, Foster despondently suggests, became instead a revolutionary loss in the 1980s,
paralleling the passing of the feminist intensity and force also on the wane during that decade.
Despite his disappointment and even facing his own suspicion over the current
signification of the term, Foster concludes as a final remark in his essay that the postmodern
frameworks of specific events occurring in the 1990s reveal the potential for “moments when
impossible identifications become possible,” offering the Clarence Thomas hearings and Rodney
King ruling as opportunities for white, middle-class, heterosexual men to come to terms with
their sexism and racism (20). Foster’s allusion towards what might be postmodernisms’ new
revolutionary power here is certainly curious. But his desire to remove the “Baby Jane” aspects
of postmodernism within academia points toward what have been the continual attempts of
intellectuals to more fully grasp the locale, structure, authority, and enigmatic significations of
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both the term “postmodernism” and the conditions of postmodernity, proving the longevity of
determined interests in and curiosities toward postmodernisms within academia.
Foster’s subjective appeal to the uses of postmodern theories and the complexities of
postmodern sociopolitical milieus is not far removed from Nicholson and Fraser’s conception of
creating a diversity-friendly postmodern feminism, outlined in Chapter One, as signaled through
his appeal to reforming America’s hegemonic social conscience through postmodern mediated
representations of race- and gender-discriminatory events. Although his acknowledgement is
much more suggestive of the consequences of these events (and the consequences of their
mediated framing) than Nicholson and Fraser’s,7 Foster still seems to privilege these events
without fully addressing the continuous detrimental effects that these events inflict upon
culturally inferiorized subjects and subjectivities. However, notwithstanding this final comment
that he offers in an attempt to somewhat resuscitate postmodernism for the white hetero-male
members of the American Left, Foster does offer an interesting understanding as to how
postmodernism has been differentially defined since the 1960s in opposition to those minoritized
voices and bodies.8
Borrowing from the Lacanian understanding of “the mirror stage” wherein subject
formation depends upon an “armour of an alienating identity” and Freud’s notion of “deferred
action” as a method of subject formation, Foster reads the constitution of modernism and
postmodernism as being similar to the process of creating a universal and unified subject by
defining that subject in opposition to a marginalized subject that is deemed lacking and dissolute.
7

Nicholson and Fraser merely lump together, in one paragraph, a selection of women’s voices who they interpret as
being excluded in essentialist and foundationalist feminist discourses, while Foster actually explains these events
with more detail and subjective reflection.
8
Foster does not necessarily altogether fail to address these consequences, but the way he approaches the effects of
these situations seems to eclipse the importance of those consequences, as the consequences are only addressed as
an element of his own subjective anguish.
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In other words, like Nicholson and Fraser’s attempt to marshal a postmodern feminism by
renouncing modes of feminism previously identified as inattentive to other forms of
marginalization (those with essentialist and foundationalist underpinnings to be specific), Foster
suggests that attempts to theorize the postmodern (before the postmodern has become itself
overwritten by yet another structure of feeling or a historic alteration of sociopolitical and social
spaces) engage in a “continual process of anticipation and reconstitution.” Moreover, Foster
explains, this process relies upon the same fascistic colonizer/colonized dichotomy that posits a
self-identificatory practice (postmodernism) against a cultural other (modernism):
Every epoch dreams the next, as Walter Benjamin once remarked, but by the
same token it also (re)constructs the one before it. There is no simple Now: every
present is nonsynchronous, a mix of different times. Thus there never is a timely
transition, say, between the modern and the postmodern: our consciousness of a
period not only comes after the fact; it is also always in parallax. (5-6)
This process of “anticipation” and “reconstitution” seems, as well, a symptom of what Kipnis
describes as the “psychological signature of the modern self,” a symptom that underlies
Nicholson and Fraser’s development of their postmodern feminism and also the alternately
signifying postmodern feminism found in the mediated texts examined in this chapter (94). The
construction of each postmodern feminist paradigm within these differently motivated texts
hinges on a revisionist account of feminist histories that predate these texts and foretells a
feminism of the present moment in contradistinction to that history.9
Moreover, each of these attempts to define postmodern feminisms seems to suppress
these feminist histories instead of probing how current modes of feminisms might interact with
9

It is undoubtedly present in this thesis as well.
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and inform those histories. As an exploration of previous attempts to fill moments of crises in
feminist theories would reveal, there is an evident tendency within feminist histories to avoid the
difficulty of theorizing the subject in extreme “parallax,” where parallax signifies an intricate
connection of overlapping and contradictory modes of being, social systems, discursive
formations, and what Raymond Williams calls “structures of feeling.” The difficulty that appears
to linger within these attempts to theorize the postmodern, then, is a dependency upon what
Foster recognizes as a “subjective armour” that obliges a definition of the present self through an
absolute severance with past selves and through a self-declared adherence to a projected mode of
subjectivity that has yet to be made “real.” If this tendency within feminist theories corroborates
Foster’s speculation here, and I am suggesting that it does, then the subjective armament
indicative to Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism is promptly a rejection of the notion
multiple or split subjectivity that has seemed invaluable to feminist theories, to their own
theoretical paradigm, and to postmodernisms more generally. This rejection of multiple/split
subjectivity can also be located within these mediated texts as well.
Like the understanding of masculinity offered in relation to What Women Want where
masculinity is always somewhere between crises and restoration, threatened by a constantly
impeding femininity, Foster understands American social and discursive arenas as situated in a
perpetual move towards the postmodern. Foster is correct in suggesting that a “subjective
armour” is employed as a means of surmounting extreme parallax inasmuch as new theories
regarding postmodernity like Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism seem to procure the
ability to locate subjective agency in a distinctively postmodern framework and accurately define
its parameters. For Foster, perceived insights into postmodern subjective interpretation and
definition claim to provide a new line of penetration into the cultural logics and knowledges of
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the surrounding postmodern world. Each change contained in those spatial locales (such as the
move toward the inclusion of Othered voices within Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminist
theory) seems to demarcate a seemingly absolute understanding of both postmodern
subjectivities and theorizations regarding the conditions of postmodernity as those changes
become recognizable, more evidently connected, and fathomable. Moreover, to the extent that
postmodernisms are conceived as revolutionary terrain, these theorists assign a certain potential
to these new theoretical positions as a means of envisioning new methods in the great move
toward social equality, at least to the extent that one can understand how subjecthood is being
“affirmed in the destruction of other bodies.” This important qualification offered by Foster is
illuminating in regard to the propensity of Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism to
marginalize other feminist theories and feminist voices for the sake of becoming thoroughly
postmodern (even the white heterocentric voices of feminisms’ second wave). It is important,
then, to ask whose subjecthood is being affirmed in “Social Criticism” and whose bodies are
being destroyed, and I address these questions in relation to centered and marginalized female
voices in both sets of texts analyzed in this chapter (20).
I would like to suggest, here, that it is not coincidental that Foster locates “significant
shift[s] in discourses on the subject, the cultural other, and technology” around the same
historical junctures that are mentioned suggestively in Chapter Two during which postfeminist
discourses and discussions of theoretical mergers within feminisms were also emerging: the mid1930s taking Lacan, Lévi-Strauss, and Benjamin as examples of the “end of great modernisms”;
the 1960s offering Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Barthes, Fanon, Debord, and McLuhan
as illustrations of the dramatic shift to the “full advent of postmodernisms”; and the 1990s as the
moment in which the theories of both the 1930s and 1960s can be better understood as only
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tangentially speaking about each respective “present” (6-7).10 Likened to the postmodern
feminist and postfeminist projections of future forms of feminist critique and identificatory
practices, Foster examines the move beyond modernism within these theoretical shifts as a
“reconstruction of past moments (when these changes are said to have begun)” and an
“anticipation of future moments (when these changes are projected to be complete)” (7). Foster’s
attention to these historical junctures demonstrates the breadth of this theoretical resistance to
states of parallax, thus extending the predisposition to resist moments of parallax beyond
feminist theories. It also reveals that any theorization that specifies itself as postmodern might
benefit from both a concurrent investigation and subsequent reinvestigations in relation to what
causes this resistance to parallax in the first place: What, for example, causes Nicholson and
Fraser to project a future essentialist-free feminist discourse without examining the complexities
of the present moment, and what causes them to both override investigations of those
complexities carried out by other theorists and continue to insist upon the manifestation of this
future postmodern feminist discursive structure?
For Foster, these theoretical shifts, likewise, indicate that each “reconstruction” and
“anticipation” is embedded within the sociopolitical environments of their contextual
surroundings – the rootedness of Lacanian subject formation in the 1930s understanding of the
fascistic subject, a shift toward a subject with revolutionary potential in the 1960s, and a shift
toward a subject in the 1990s who is attempting to deal with the revolutionary loss that her or his

10

Though my consideration of feminist mergers in the 1960s was abbreviated in Chapter Two, the 1960s are very
important in relation to the historical junctures (1920s and 1980s) that Chapter Two calls attention to because of the
many attempts made during that decade to understand how other theoretical interpretations and modes of analyses
such as Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis, and Lacanian psychoanalysis might be beneficial to deepening and
expanding feminist critique. I suggest the similarity between postmodernisms and feminisms to these historical
junctures because both postmodernisms and feminisms have much to lose within the sociopolitical climate and are
both searching for a theoretical perspective that might remove them from the bind in which they find themselves.
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own body simultaneously inhabits and disavows (8-11). The embodiment within the field of
feminist theories of these larger surrounding crises in the 1980s, crises that occur as a result the
sociopolitical landscape, suggests that one potential motivating factor for “Social Criticism” (as
Nicholson and Fraser suggest within this essay as well) might be a response to what Toril Moi
describes as a waning interest in or a dissociation from feminisms within the American social
conscious that occurs during this historical moment. But at the same time, “Social Criticism,” as
previously illustrated, uses this motivating factor to procure a free-willed abandon of this crisis,
an abstention that necessarily entails relinquishing the contributing factors (second wave
feminisms) that appear to constrain them to that dilemma.
Accordingly, Nicholson and Fraser’s response in “Social Criticism” could be read into
the historical narrative that Foster offers here, and they too become the objects of the questions
he raises in relation to the fascist subject of the 1930s, noting as Foster does that “suggesting
such a historical referent [. . .] is no doubt offensive”: “Has this fascistic reaction not in part
returned? Did it ever go away? Does it not rest potentially within us all? Or is to generalize it in
this way to normalize it over much?” (8-9, fn 10).11 Understanding this return or the potential
presence of this kind of “fascistic reaction” is important because it is also tied into the question
of what might cause a resistance to parallax within feminist theories at this juncture. The
tendency to not acknowledge this latent motivating factor, or perhaps more accurately to simply
not be aware of it, seems to imply that one of the underlying causes of the loss of revolutionary
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The question and location of the residual fascistic elements of subject formation and reformation, even in part,
seems a question to be always and repeatedly asked in theories that undertake the project of social equality, given:
Nicholson and Fraser’s derision regarding authoritatively and exclusionary modern feminisms, their own
exclusionary model and appeal to diversity in establishing the necessity of their postmodern feminism, and Foster’s
suggestion that racist and sexist events allow white, heterosexual males to recognize their own discriminatory
practices. I would be sure that similar tendencies to exclude can be located somewhere within my own discourse
(despite all attempts to prevent such),
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power and resistance among postmodernisms (and by default Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern
feminism) can be located within the attempt to constrain the term “postmodernism” to
exceedingly one dimensional definitions. This seems roughly the dilemma of this historical
impasse in feminist theories, as well, given the simultaneous challenge to feminist theories by
feminist speakers and by feminist backlash advocates and the attempts by both sides to regulate
the definition of the term “feminism” within its sociopolitical present. The stakes are too high,
for radical theorists and their presumed adversaries in the mainstream. To not render these terms
determinate is to lose control over their meaning altogether.
Foster’s reading of the 1990s appears to indicate that beginning in the 1970s academics
attempted to hold on to the radicality and resistance that postmodernism seemed to possess in the
1960s, even as the term lost that power and gained new meaning. Though Nicholson and Fraser
have been quite adamant in their assertion of postmodernism’s revolutionary potential, Foster,
while certainly trying to recover the displaced meaning of the term, implies that the now lacking
revolutionary potential must perpetually be recuperated from sectors that repeatedly appropriate,
popularize, and redefine the term. This chapter is, in part, an attempt to reveal how this term has
been appropriated, popularized, and redefined as a tool of oppression rather than one of revolt.
But it is, as well, an attempt to reveal how the lack upon which Nicholson and Fraser’s
postmodern feminism is founded seems to also manifest in these commodified forms of
postmodern feminisms. This lack is threefold: a lack within second wave feminisms that
Nicholson and Fraser inevitably cannot fully purge from their postmodern feminism, a lack that
is carried over from postmodernisms into their postmodern feminist paradigm, and a lack that is
created in placing feminisms within a subordinate gendered position in relation to
postmodernisms. Correspondingly in these mediated texts, women dissociate themselves from
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second wave feminisms by engaging in a process that defines a so-called feminist mode of
female subjectivity for the present moment by imposing a male-defined and thus acceptable
mode of agency on the female subject as a means of removing the female subject from the
feminist crisis that surrounds her.
In the same way that feminist questions of subjectivity are displaced by filling the just
opened theoretical void with the patriarchal orders of psychoanalytic and Marxist theories in the
1960s, for Foster, theoretical attempts to move beyond the modern within these then present
moments are likewise complicated by their bold assumptions and rashly marshaled remedies.
These theoretical impediments rest primarily upon a declaration of the “full advent of
postmodernisms,” an assertion that becomes a residual factor within “Social Criticism” and other
feminist theories as well. Furthermore and similar to the historical revision of feminist
movements and feminisms by presumably free “postfeminist” subjects both in the 1920s and
from the 1980s into the new millennium, these attempts often are dependent upon and never
defined by anything other than a redefinition of a previous moment by already hegemonic
discursive speakers who rely upon a projection of what they promise will be a more egalitarian
future. The similitude between the construction of a new feminist discourse and mode of feminist
subjectivity within “Social Criticism” and these mediated texts points at once toward the
privilege of these hegemonic discursive speakers and listeners as well as the potential
consequences that result when authorial license underlines these corrective, future-oriented
calculations.12 Yet the purposes behind these discursive shifts and prognoses of anticipated
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I point toward this in reference to Kipnis’ article “Feminism: The Political Conscience of Postmodernism” when I
insinuate at the end of Chapter Two that the beneficiaries of second wave feminisms – the white bourgeois female
subject – can employ feminist theories articulated from the margins to unconsciously write themselves again as the
central subject of interest within both feminist theories and the camera’s gaze. I return to this supposition at the end
of this chapter when exploring the positioning and function of marginalized bodies within these mediated texts.
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cultural logics remain hidden, similar to those Nick inscribes within the diegesis of What Women
Want. Moreover, the answer as to for whom this super-democratic social space will transpire can
never be guaranteed, as I attempt to make evident in my analysis in Chapter One of Nicholson
and Fraser’s facilitation of the feminism/postmodernism debate and the construction of their
postmodern feminism.
Foster too relies heavily upon this past/future theoretical structure when inquiring of the
present moment “whatever happened to postmodernism?” This most specifically occurs at the
end of his essay at which point he gauges the potential complacency that a postmodern terrain
might evoke (through his analysis of “the splittings of the subject that occur with a new
postmodern intensity”) for the purpose of determining a mode of engagement that might “not
render one politically autistic” (20). Foster thus marshals a new mode of subjective engagement
and interpretation that is set against his reading of previous reactions to these “radical splittings,”
one that he proposes would deter political complacency and produce “moments when impossible
identifications become possible” (20). Yet the specificities within his analysis of this
contemporary mode of postmodern subjectivity and the detailed similarities that he identifies as a
reinscription of subjective armor within American hegemonies occurring after the 1960s (that
also had been documented in the 1930s in relation to Lacan’s “mirror stage”) become useful in
investigating the present moment (3). Outlining residual theoretical frameworks that necessarily
impede any attempt to make a “clean break” from the modern, Foster marks, here, not only the
lingering of psychoanalytic discourses even in what he suggests are postmodern theories but also
the presence of the Marxian notion of history’s importunate undercurrent of repetition. This
suggests that, as Chapter One surmises, Nicholson and Fraser cannot simply avoid the theoretical
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traps of essentialism and foundationalism through the invocation of postmodernisms, or rather,
through a self-avowed conformity to an anticipated mode of postmodern subjectivity that has
hitherto not been made “real.”
These two indications thus complicate understandings of postmodernity in which
subjectivities, contemporary contexts, sociopolitical structures, or cultural strictures are rendered
through ahistorical analyses in attempts to move into a “thoroughly postmodern feminism.” The
use of the term “ahistorical” in relation to these theoretical positions is not intended to suggest a
lack of historical memory or a lack of attention to historical events. “Ahistorical,” especially in
relation to Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism,” implies rather that these historical points
of orientation are little more than historical markers referenced principally for the purpose of
moving beyond problematic moments in knowledge formation, as suggested by Kipnis, and not
for the purpose of dealing with or altering the oppressive structures and processes within that
history. In other words, Nicholson and Fraser call into question the bulk of second wave
feminisms and document critiques of marginalization within those discourses only for the
purpose of defining a postmodern feminism as second wave feminisms’ anti-thesis. In doing so,
they reveal their tendency toward ahistorical analysis and perpetuate this past/future theoretical
structure. It seems unsurprising that this use of ahistorical reference and this past/future
dichotomy are present also within mediated representations of postmodern feminism, texts that
could also be identified as second wave feminisms’ anti-thesis.
Contradistinctively, from his suggestion of the historical connectivity between these
junctures and his marking of the significances of these shifts, Foster puts forward an undertaking
that at least requires dealing with the notion of postmodern subjectivity historically and with few
attempts to foretell a future of the postmodern subject. Even though he suggests the possibility of
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specific types of future engagements within and in relation to postmodern territories, he
emphasizes the impossibility of moving into a “fully postmodern” moment and marks the
existence of disproportionately developed spatial and temporal locales. In the understanding of
postmodern subjectivity that he offers, the postmodern aspects and dynamics that Foster outlines
function as points of measurement and potential foundations for analysis, none of which
prescribes a unitary understanding of postmodern subject formation and all of which signify
modernity and postmodernity simultaneously.
In his reading of contexts that both signify and manufacture postmodernity within these
three historical periods, suggesting that the sociopolitical sphere in America has been engaged
throughout the twentieth century in a process of always approaching but never reaching a
“postmodern” state, Foster points toward an amplified and deepened “splitting at the level of
body-image” that has been “in process” from the 1930s to the 1990s (20). During this most
recent historical point in time, Foster explains, this increased “dis/connection” that had been “in
process” consummated in the 1990s a “new level of oxymoronic pain-and-pleasure” that
“connects and disconnects us simultaneously,” situating one “both psychotechnologically
immediate to events and geopolitically remote from them” (19). This simultaneous connection
and disconnection could be likened to attempts within feminist theories to explore and
understand women’s experiences across the globe by reading, watching, and interpreting nonAnglo writing, film, television, or even experiencing another spatial local. While potentially
valuable and certainly forward moving, however, any such exploration that does not
acknowledge the lack of understanding that is necessarily intrinsic to its own historical and
spatial localities blurs the distinction between the distance in space, knowledge, and experience
that inevitably exists. “Social Criticism” and the mediated texts in this chapter also blur this
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distinction in their reductive accounts of feminisms past and present. The obscuring of these
spatial and temporal distances and of cultural differences in “Social Criticism” thus becomes
problematic when voices begin to speak from within the abyss that has been created, curtailed,
and enclosed within Nicholson and Fraser’s facilitation of the feminism/postmodernism debate.
This abyss is a product of their insistence on the validity of their postmodern feminism and the
invalidity of feminist theories that have not adequately divested themselves of essentialist and
foundationalist underpinnings.
It follows that postmodern subjectivity is accordingly socially constructed, at least for
Foster, by these manufactured splittings between body and image. The sociopolitical
consequences of subject formation that occurs through this body/image rift within the early
1990s seem to offer some insight into what Sandra Bartky describes as an unlocatable source of
power (a power that is everywhere and nowhere). Foster’s differentiation between subjective
agency and the source of control and authority procured by these radical subjective splittings on
screen supplies one potential site for analyses of new or evolving ideological constructs that are
at once technologically produced and transpire with what he calls “a new postmodern intensity,”
or rather:
a spatiotemporal splitting, the paradox of great immediacy produced through
extraordinary mediation; a moral splitting, the paradox of disgust undercut by
fascination, or of sympathy undercut by sadism; and a splitting at the level of
body-image, the ecstasy of imaginary dispersal rescued by the confirmation of
ego armour. (20)
These splittings, Foster concludes, contain the potential to trigger a voluntary surrender and
sometimes even a renouncement of subjective agency. Before rendering a perhaps less obvious
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reading of this “imaginary dispersal” and body/image splitting within mediated texts that proceed
Foster’s essay by more than ten years, it might be beneficial to take Foster’s case in point – “the
real CNN Effect of the [first] Gulf War” – as he explains that he “can only develop this notion of
postmodern dis/connection anecdotally from his spatial and temporal locale” (19).
Noting his disgust toward the politics behind the images on the screen, Foster admits to
being enthralled, perhaps even mesmerized, by the “psycho-techno-thrill that locked [him] in, as
smart bomb and spectator locked in as one”:
A thrill of technomastery (my mere human perception become a super machine
vision, able to see what it destroys and destroy what it sees), but also a thrill of an
imaginary dispersal of my own body, of my own subjecthood. Of course when the
screens of the smart bombs went dark, my body did not explode. In fact, it was
bolstered: in a classic fascistic trope, my body, my subjecthood, was affirmed in
the destruction of other bodies. And again, I do not think I was alone in this awful
affirmation. [. . .] Is it any wonder that this subject is often so dysfunctional? Is it
any wonder that when it is able to function it often does so on automatic, given
over to fetishistic responses, to partial recognitions syncopated with complete
disavowals? (I know about AIDS, but I cannot get it; I know racists, but I am not
one; I know what The New World Order is, but my paranoia embraces it anyway .
. .) (19-20)
Though finding this kind of self-reflexive consciousness in most of those who joined Foster in
this thrill might be unlikely, Foster offers quite a compelling account here (focusing on the
disordered and untenable present-day terrain of the United States) as to how understandings of
postmodernity must depend upon deepened understandings of mediated representations
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surrounding a subject who inhabits a chaotic postmodern world. Under the proviso that Foster is
correct in understanding agency at this juncture as being affirmed in the destruction of other
bodies, then agency is established by the postmodern feminisms presented in both Nicholson and
Fraser’s “Social Criticism” and these mediated texts through the destruction of feminisms and
feminist personas that occurs on page and screen.
By subjecting the body to representations of extreme or seemingly infinite subjective
dispersal and representations that signify a hyperbolized version of the disarray that fully
surrounds the all but dismembered subject, the viewers’ subjectivities, Foster suggests, remain
intact or “forever cut off” from these representations through the subjective denial that the very
absurdity of the screen enacts. In other words, the absurdity on screen solicits viewers’
participation in applying mainstream cultural logic in counteracting the absurdity surrounding
the mediated and dismembered body being watched. As Foster suggests, this possibly leads to
both a limiting of agency in the act of viewing and/or the application of the enacted mainstream
cultural logic to the non-mediated world that the viewing subject inhabits. Within these
postmodern, postfeminist mediated texts, that absurdity is feminism itself, a particular form of
feminism, needless to say, delineated by mainstream American media. Of course, an additional
qualifier should be added to Foster’s understanding of this process: the “normality” of the
“intact” subject and the “abnormality” of the images she or he looks upon most certainly are
socially constructed and are perhaps more damaging than any internal or external “chaos.” As
Foster suggests when footnoting a quote from “The Nazi Myth”: “The ideology of the subject . . .
is fascism” (9, fn 10)
For a better understanding of how this “imaginary dispersal” might signify in relation to
postmodern, postfeminist mediated texts in the 1990s and 2000s, one might look at the four
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primary female protagonists of the HBO series Sex and the City. Three of four female
protagonists – Carrie, Miranda, and Samantha – regularly participate in a process of rejecting the
normalized feminine life targets of “marriage, babies, and a house to call one’s own” as a means
of securing individual “sanity” and a form of subjective stability judged appropriate by their
“feminist” peers (“Change of a Dress”). In the episode “Where There’s Smoke,” when Charlotte
tells her three friends that “women really just want to be rescued,” the viewer overhears Carrie’s
thoughts: “There it was – the sentence independent, single women in their thirties are never
supposed to think let alone say out loud.” Despite Carrie’s suggestion to Charlotte that “maybe
we’re the white knights, and we’re the ones who have to save ourselves,” this agency filled
proposal is called into question through Carrie’s voiceover narration of her column: “I couldn’t
help but wonder – inside every confident single woman is there a delicate fragile princess just
waiting to be saved?”13 In the episode’s finale Carrie answers her question quite conclusively –
“So I guess sometimes a woman absolutely has to be rescued and sometimes a woman absolutely
has to rescue a man.”14 Carrie’s voiceover thus simultaneously calls attention to what she
perceives as a mandated conformity to acceptable forms of feminist speech, claiming that women
“are never supposed to think these thoughts,” while insinuating, at the same time, that women are
thrust into the “booby-trapped silence” of feminist discourses and, consequently, their “true”
desires become unspeakable desires (Cixous 234). While these texts appear to construct female
subjectivity as a unified and thus intact “feminist” subjectivity, I propose quite oppositely that a
refusal to participate in normalized heterosexuality, as Kipnis too seems to imply in the epigraph
at the beginning of this chapter, is promptly a rejection of the modern self and thus also of the
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This is echoed in Mary Alice’s voiceover in Desperate Housewives
In this episode, Miranda, to whom the idea of being rescued was an insult, gets saved by her boyfriend Steve after
having eye surgery.
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unified subjectivity that these characters are supposed to espouse. This becomes more obvious
when these varied feminist, postfeminist, and anti-feminist assertions are considered in relation
to each other and the female subjects upon which they are written.
The supposedly “feminist” subjectivities of Carrie, Miranda, and Samantha are further
complicated by their juxtaposition to Charlotte, a character who regularly confesses her desire to
meet the life targets required of normatively feminine subjects. While Charlotte’s subjectivity is
perhaps more intact than the other three female protagonists, it is, nonetheless, also not unified.
As Charlotte’s subjectivity is dependent upon a mediated version of femininity and heterosexual
suburbanhood characteristic of filmic and televisual representations of the 1950s, her subjectivity
is subject to being measured against altered (or contemporary) ideological norms as well.
Although the error, as suggested in Sex and the City, lies in Charlotte’s dependency upon the
other extreme – an idealized femininity of the past.15
Some of the primary male characters within Sex and the City are allowed to inhabit
unified subjectivities (Mr. Big, Harry, and Alexander Petrofsky, each of whom signify previous
mediated representations of appropriate masculinity as opposed to the feminized masculinity that
Nick represents in What Women Want). Yet the four female protagonists remain incapable of
locating a subjectivity that successfully negotiates an appropriate median point between June
Cleaver, Madonna, and Brittany Spears, or rather between representations of 1950s styles of
femininity and supposedly feminist-rooted representations of females who personify “free”
sexual expression that are interspersed throughout 1960s to 2000s mass media. Thus, these
female characters’ subjectivities end up signifying as a mismatched array of conflicting subject
15

As Sex and the City often insinuates, Charlotte is simply not “slutty” enough, a categorization she tries to eschew
later in the series in her attempt to seduce her sexually impotent husband Trey, who can only get aroused by images
in pornographic magazines – images of women over which Charlotte superimposes her face so that she is included
in Trey’s masturbatory fantasies.
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positions. But more than anything else, these female characters end up confused rather than
liberated by their multiply signifying subjectivities, posing questions as to “who” they are
“supposed” to be and most often finding that who they are supposed to be is not really who they
“are.”
Trapped in this dilemma, the intact and internalized ideological constructs built upon
female submission to men that underlie these “feminist” articulations chafes at and erodes the
abjuration of normative femininity that often leads the three sexually “freed” characters to both
declare and question their “cynicism” towards the romance that mass culture for so long has
afforded to women and also toward the romance genre in general. The disavowal of normative
femininity is thus rendered a visible subjective peculiarity. At the same time, the declared
“cynicism” within these texts is always juxtaposed to the cultural disavowal of feminism
(signified by the Charlotte in Sex and the City and Bree in Desperate Housewives) and similar
disavowals made by the so-called “feminist” personas in these texts. In fact, as the female
protagonists in Sex and the City, Desperate Housewives, and The Devil Wears Prada
contentiously affirm, any such fictional female “cynicism” toward the heteronormative
paradigms of this sociocultural romance is in fact only imaginary. As Kipnis surmises, “[w]hat
were once commands are now second nature. But once again, it’s your choice. Or would be if
any of us could really choose not to desire love.”
Rather, in many media portrayals and as suggested in What Women Want, women indeed
do want these to relocate themselves within the field of heteronormative femininity but are
trapped within the plastic contours of a kind of postfeminist Stepford domain. In Bewitched, for
example, the leading female character all but claims to be forced by society to perform this
feminist identity. This assertion is paralleled by two of the main female protagonists in the
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remake of The Stepford Wives, both of whom remove themselves from this feminist “hell” and
one of whom attempts to remove all other women from it as well. In contrast, the more recent
television series Desperate Housewives could be read as a text that parodies the attempts of
feminist women to return to the domestic sphere and the obstacles they encounter due to physical
and psychological impediments – primarily their feminist inclinations – a culturally induced
condition resulting from growing up during or shortly after the Women’s Rights Movement.
What one reading of Foster’s essay might suggest, then, is that by creating an abhorrence
to feminisms within non-fictional mainstream media while culturally exalting the normalized
feminine roles of mother and wife, female viewers might look at the chaos surrounding these
fictional representations of feminists and identify these representations as forms of subjectivity
that they themselves do not want to embody or signify. The “imaginary dispersal” that Foster
illustrates occurs through these female representations as they all but crumble under their own
psychoses and in the face of the repetitive predicaments and impasses they encounter. The
viewers indeed are propositioned by these texts to make sense of this chaos – an evocation of
viewer response similar to the expectation that a female character will fall down while being
pursued by a slaughterer in a horror film and the foreseeable desire for her to not trip or the
groan that acknowledges the fulfillment of this expectation. In Sex and the City, for example,
Miranda - a partner at a law firm and a single mom who tries on lesbianism and biracial dating –
escapes the pandemonium of the city by moving to the suburbs during the show’s sixth season.
The most sexually free character Samantha discovers she has cancer and is forced to reevaluate
her equation of monogamy with monotony. Lynette, in Desperate Housewives, who as a working
mother of four young children forces her husband into the undesired role of “Mr. Mom,”
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becomes afflicted with breast cancer and is forced to relinquish her public role and return to
domesticity.
If Foster is correct, the pleasure of signification (and the agency therein) is thus latently
deferred to the pleasure of viewing this signification,16 and as Foster argues, the subject
relinquishes her or his agency in this process. Undoubtedly, not all women participate in this
process or become subject to the same submission that this body/image splitting solicits,
although not becoming at least implicated within that process is not effortless or failproof, as
Chapter Two attempts to demonstrate. Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism makes this
labor and defeat all too evident in the essentialist underpinnings of “Social Criticism,” its
postfeminist narrative structure, and its construction as a metanarrative. If Foster’s understanding
of the construction of this particular form of postmodern subjectivity is useful, and I propose that
it is for the texts to be addressed here, “the ecstasy of imaginary dispersal” of feminisms into
states of hesitancy, ambiguity, and doubt has the potential to secure a normalized feminine ego
within an “appropriately” feminine body on screen, if not off screen as well. What is a viewer to
make of the final season of Sex and the City in which all four women are either married or
clearly on the verge of becoming fictional wives?
But if and when female subjectivity is constituted in these texts through the disavowal of
feminism (as term, label, and belief system), female agency becomes dependent not upon moving
towards equal gender statuses but rather upon distancing oneself from any such endeavor. As
Foster explains:

16

It seems worthwhile here to draw attention to the “new generation of avowedly feminist critics” that Modleski
documents as “hold[ing] a preceding generation of feminist critics responsible for depriving them of the enjoyment
of much mass culture,” “insisting on the right to the pleasures promised to women by the culture industry” (ix).
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It has become common to refer to such recognition-cum-disavowal as cynical
reason, a state in which agency is not so much cancelled as it is relinquished – as
if agency were a small price to pay for the shield that cynicism might provide, the
immunity that such ambivalence might secure. (20)
The female characters in these texts not only reference their own cynicism toward romance, but
more importantly, some of these characters (the four protagonists in Sex and the City, for
example, and even more explicitly Marin in Something’s Gotta Give (2003)) reveal that while
this cynicism may provide immunity it also prevents them from experiencing all the phenomenal
sensations that heterosexual relationships would otherwise provide them if only they would
allow themselves to submit to normative feminine roles – vulnerability, passivity, and the
abandonment of their own freedom and equality. Within this configuration, then, agency is twice
relinquished, which complicates further Foster’s understanding of the abandonment of agency as
a potential price to be paid for participation in this body/image splitting. The question of what
kind of agency remains within what many are calling their “postmodern” identities or more and
more recurrently the “postmodern era” is precisely the question I explore in the second portion of
this chapter, and sometimes, even, the question of whether agency can exist according to
previous understandings of the term.
Within the remainder of this chapter then, I revisit the terrain of American mainstream
media, particularly the facets aimed toward women viewers, to investigate the similarities
between Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism and the postmodern feminisms that gain
representation in these mediated texts. I locate this signification within these texts at the points in
which “feminist” characters critique a seemingly monolithically signifying feminism against
branded notions of postmodern, postfeminist identities and social structures. This fairly recent
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turn within feminist theories towards theories of postmodernity, as outlined by Fraser and
Nicholson’s call for a thoroughly postmodern-feminism, suggests that postmodern theories
uncover a new line of sight through which feminism and women’s subjectivity can be conceived
theoretically, certainly marking an important move within feminist theories toward examining
female bodies and subjectivities within the rapidly shifting and interminably volatile terrains of
recent history, which are often, in addition, at variance with each other. What remains
problematic is not simply “which” limited aspects of their formulation acquire impromptu
signification within these mass-mediated women-centered texts. The more consequential element
within this nearly mimetic transfer from theory to mass culture is “how” it begins to signify.
Often replicating Fraser and Nicholson’s attempt to move toward (and ultimately establish) a
thoroughly postmodern feminism, these “feminist” characters are embedded in what seems their
own feminist-initiated and introspective analysis of feminism, demarcating the domains and
limitations of femininity, sexuality, race, age, and ethnicity in this process.
So to not confuse this subsequent signification with the self-introspection of feminism in
which Nicholson and Fraser implicate themselves in “Social Criticism” – a scrutiny measured
against an internalized Lyotardian mode of postmodernism – I suggest understanding these all
but the equivalent copies within American mass media as simulacra. These female
representations signify at once ahistorical (if not entirely absent) points of historical reference
and anything but feminism, even taking the term in its most minimal definition as a belief in
social equality and especially considering their interpretations of and allusions toward second
wave feminisms. As simulacra, I am suggesting that simulations of Fraser and Nicholson’s
model of a postmodern feminism within these mass-mediated texts lack existent historical points
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of origin. Certainly no absolute line of connection can be drawn from these simulations back to
“Social Criticism.”
This is not to say, however, that both do not have similar points of origin, that they do not
surface because of their implication in sociopolitical contexts of close proximity, or that they do
not evoke the same consequences. From this historical perspective (circa 2008), these elements
are precisely what allows for this connection to be drawn and what, moreover, enables
postfeminist and of anti-feminist representations of female subjectivities to acquire signification
as feminist representations (as some of my students have been quick to indicate, some noting the
way the characters in Sex and the City and Desperate Housewives embody a seemingly
“complete” spectrum of female personas, others focusing on the texts’ engagement with the
topics of abortion and single motherhood, clitoral pleasure, the female orgasm, and being able to
“have sex like men”). Moreover, the tendency within these texts to rewrite and rearrange the
historical points of origin to which they allude provokes the illusion that 150 years of women’s
progression toward equality17 can be made densely precise and ordered in terms of importance
within the limits of each text. At the same time, these texts, because of their postfeminist
narrative structure, insinuate that complete equality is achieved at the point at which their bodies
enter the framework of the screen. As Laura Kipnis has suggested and as I argue, the postmodern
feminist formulation within Nicholson and Fraser’s work and these mediated texts through which
female subjectivity can be explored (whether or not that subjectivity is identified as feminist)
eclipses the question of subjectivity and subjective agency altogether. As these supposedly
feminist representations participate in introspective critiques of the feminism within themselves
and in self-referential critiques of feminism in others (men and women alike), “the logical
17

See especially Mona Lisa Smile
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terminus proves to be classic patriarchy,” even as these texts suggest that the locus of this
examination is the female subject herself (Stacey 574).
Because non-Anglo, non-upper/middle class, and non-heterosexual representations are
rarely addressed in these texts as feminist characters and often maintain rather different locations
within these questions, I examine those representations briefly in the prologue to this chapter.18
As Bonnie Dow observes:
Television’s representations of feminism are almost exclusively filtered through
white, middle-class, heterosexual, female characters,’ creating ‘a racially,
sexually, and economically privileged version of feminism, that, for the American
public, has come to represent feminism in toto. (quoted in Henry 69, my
emphases)
The prologue therefore provides a limited analysis of how these “Othered” characters are
positioned in these texts to provide assistance in returning Anglo feminist women to the
normative feminine sphere. I also suggest that these “Othered” characters function in a way that
is disconcertingly similar to the placement of “diversity” within Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social
Criticism,” or rather as a tool in creating these postmodern feminisms rather than “the” female
subjects for whom these postmodern feminisms are generated.
After a discussion of how these mediated texts become indicative of postmodern texts, I
initiate an inquiry into the way in which these mostly middle- to upper-class, Anglo-American,
heteronormative female bodies become involved in a process of examining, redefining, and often
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A more thorough examination of the function of these Othered characters in each text is important not simply
because of what they have to say about the signification of diversity within mediated texts aimed toward mostly
white heterosexual female audiences but also what they reveal about the function of diversity within Nicholson and
Fraser’s “Social Criticism.” Though I am not able to investigate this line of thought as comprehensively as I would
like in this thesis, I do intend to pursue this line of thought in future projects
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eradicating their feminist characteristics. This erasure often occurs by way of a female-initiated
introspective routine of examining “feminist” actions by invoking a specter of the “male gaze,”
or rather a lingering set of male-defined standards of femininity and female subjectivity that
seem to have obtained permanence within the female mind. Moreover, the redefinition of
feminisms according to male standards manifests in a characteristically postmodern form that
seems to have become one of the staple visible markers of romantic comedies and dramas aimed
toward female audiences during the late 1990s and early twentieth century – a predominantly hidef intertextuality within singular filmic or televisual units that incorporates a selected mix of
cultural texts and media: standard news and other print media, women’s magazines, soap operas,
fairytales, relationship myths, previous generations of male-authored texts ranging from novels
and films to television series, previously radicalized locales (such as the lesbian art community
and film theory), alternative modes of identity that involve thrift store shopping, modes of
identity based in celebrity culture and elite fashion circles, pornography, and sometimes even the
Internet. I take the television series Sex and the City and Desperate Housewives and the film The
Devil Wears Prada (2004) as the primary texts for my analysis, while some of the supplementary
texts include the television series Ally McBeal and Commander in Chief and the films Down
With Love, The Stepford Wives, Bewitched, Mona Lisa Smile, and Something’s Gotta Give.
As a prominent feature in so many of these texts, female authorship is a primary site in
establishing female agency and feminist identification. This feature provides an almost
continuous signification of agency across both the primary and secondary texts in my analysis,
whether as literal “authors,” symbolic authors, or authors of the future (as in controlling the
outcome of events): Carrie Bradshaw as sex columnist and narrator of other women’s lives in
Sex and the City; Mary Alice as postmortem narrator of the lives, loves, and motivations of the
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residents of Wisteria Lane and Susan as author of children’s literature in Desperate Housewives;
Joanna Eberhart as writer of award winning reality television series in Stepford Wives (2004);
Barbara Novak as author of book and rewriter of feminist history in Down with Love; and Isabel
as author of the future in Bewitched, who as a witch not only has the ability to alter the present
moment but also the ability to rewind real time to a previous point in history, as the triangular
rewind signifiers within the framework of the screen signal time as controlled by audiovisual
machine and Isabel as controller of the remote.19 Yet, while the writing and speaking female
body has long held the potential to disrupt normative prescriptions of femininity and has
continued to maintain a prominent position in feminist inquiries, my examination instead focuses
upon the way these modes of female authorship are framed by the female voiceover. Using Kaja
Silverman’s analyses of gendered voiceovers and voiceoffs in classic cinema, I ask to what
extent these female voices signify a faux-feminist form of female agency while at the same time
inscribing hegemonic definitions of femininity on the site of the female body. To dig deeper into
my analysis of how these variant postmodern feminisms signify through the female voiceover, it
seems important to first examine how these texts can be read as postmodern, postfeminist texts
and how they are constructed, as Foster suggests, to some extent as texts that constrain the
potential to resist or even refuse critical viewership.

19

These rewind signifiers, along with the lack of frame distortion lines specific to VCR technology, together signify
the images’ inscription upon DVD technology and location within a specific historical framework
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Tone, Intertextuality, and Discursive Implosion: The Construction of Women-Centered,
Postmodernist, Postfeminist Texts around the Turn of the 21st Century
One of the foremost elements of these texts that facilitates the establishment of these
women-centered mediated texts as postfeminist rather than anti-feminist or simply
phallogocentric texts is the tone that both underlies the texts’ narrative structure and
intertextuality and helps to anchor these texts rather firmly within a postmodern space. The
particular tone that these texts appear to transmit, as Foster notes, introduces one of the primary
structural impediments that facilitates an abbreviation of if not an eclipsing of critical viewership
in postmodern texts. Yet a clear-cut illustration of that tone is difficult to pin down, especially
given the rather recent emergence of this not yet identified romantic comedy category. Because
some of these texts like Sex and the City and Something’s Gotta Give splice the romantic comedy
and drama audiovisual genres, the prevalence that this tone receives within these texts is more of
an undertone, only locatable in moments and allowing the idyllic seriousness that previously
defined the genre of romantic drama to permeate each text. Contrastingly, within Stepford Wives
(2004), Desperate Housewives, Down With Love, Bewitched, and one of the first texts to engage
strictly in this form of comedy Ally McBeal, this distinct tone is supposedly the element of the
text that creates its humor and establishes its location in the comedy genre rather than the blend
of comedy and drama that the other texts represent.
Though seemingly indefinable at the present moment, there is something riveting in this
tone that makes feminist critics like Kathleen Collins conclude in relation the Stepford Wives 2004
remake: “If it weren’t [a comedy], it would be a documentary” (30). Collins’ commentary leaves
the question of whether it might be a documentary about the symbolic robotinization of women in
recent years through women’s increasing participation in plastic surgeries or the self-
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objectification that occurs when women attire themselves in t-shirts with declarations like “Fit
Chick Unbelievable Knockers.”20 Collins implies, still, that the specificities of comedy and tone
within these texts create a new audiovisual construct that remains unbelievable for some feminist
thinkers, expressly in the way these texts appear to mock the follies of female subjects who cannot
escape the normative feminine paradigms that ultimately trigger their failure as feminist subjects
in the public domain. One consequence of what has become the staple tone of romantic comedies
is that this tone serves to truncate any reference to feminisms within the text and to conceal the
fact that the reality behind these “hyperfeminine” bodies, as Mary Douglas Vavrus explains, is that
they symbolize “really nothing but a male producer’s fantasy of feminism, which manages
simultaneously to exploit and to deplore, to arouse and to moralize” (171, my emphasis).
While this tone could certainly be identified as a “resort to the historical pastiche or
parody” that Tim O’Farrell identifies in relation to the postmodern filmic comedies Wayne’s
World (1992), Austin Powers (1997), Zoolander (2001), Shrek (2001), and one film that could be
included in my analysis Romy and Michele’s High School Reunion (1997), this only begins to
encapsulate the tone in these postmodern, postfeminist texts. If Jonathan Swift’s misunderstanding
of parody as mockery and scorn were applied here, this might bring a depiction of this tone a little
closer to accuracy, particularly in the way these texts seem to mock and show contempt towards
the insinuation of any form of feminism. But the only illustration that seems to come close to
delineating a way of more fully identifying this tone is one that linguist Geoffrey Nunburg offers
in relation to political talk commentaries of Bill O’Reilly and Ann Coulter, calling this discursive
move “the great rhetorical achievement of our time.”
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See especially Rosalind Gill’s “From Sexual Objectification to Sexual Subjectification: The Resexualisation of
Women’s Bodies in the Media in the Spring 2003 issue of Feminist Media Studies.
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As Nunburg explains, “satire and irony seem pretty far from the mark.” Referring to the
labels of satire and irony as “just another sign of the modern triumph of tone over substance,”
Nunburg suggests that the closest one could come to “a name for this rhetorical maneuver is
‘smut.’” Nunburg's description of what the term “smut” signifies in relation to these texts deserves
lengthy quotation here:
In the strict sense, of course, smut is the sort of leering innuendo that veils sexual
aggression. But in a broader sense, you could think of smut as any kind of nastiness
that pretends to be mere naughtiness. It might be a sexual vulgarity, a racial epithet,
or simply a venomous insult. What makes it smut is that its tricked out as humor, so
that if anybody claims to be offended, you can answer indignantly: “Touchy, can’t
you take a joke?” [ . . .] However offensive a remark might sound in the abstract,
it’s all in the spirit of entertainment. And as Coulter and other masters of the genre
understand, the effect is to aggravate the insult, not alleviate it.
Nunburg’s designation of this new discursive exercise in texts that “pretend” to be or are “tricked
out” as comedies evokes an understanding similar to those of feminist critics like Collins in
relation to these texts. Moreover, Nunburg’s attention to the performance of humor by Bill
O’Reilly or Ann Coulter as a means of denying any kind of piqued reaction and to the “triumph of
tone over content” reveals what I am describing here as the way in which these texts resist or
refuse critical reception. Considered in relation to the intertextuality within these texts and the
positioning of the female voice over that intertextuality, this negation of critical reception becomes
more acutely demarcated.
The more basic elements of intertextuality are rather straightforward and more or less
clearly identifiable due to these texts’ self-awareness to their own pilfering of previous mass-
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mediated texts and mediated forms. Isabel’s father (a witch) in Bewitched, for example, speaks to
her during her excursion at the supermarket from the boxes and cans of Gorton, Green Giant, and
Newman’s Own products, his animated face superimposed over the character spokesperson of
each product, appearing in the same style of drawing as the otherwise lifeless images on the boxes
and cans themselves. Stylistically, in its hi-def composition and brightly colored backdrop, Sex
and the City is a film reel that connects a seemingly endless strand of Glamour and Cosmopolitan
cover-image frames. Stepford Wives (2004) intermingles a portion of the storyline from the
original 1975 film but nostalgically looks back upon a popularized version of the 1950s and prods
the cultural memory of this decade during the opening credit sequence through the commerciallike film-within-film in which June Cleaver-esque women are often seen in the kitchen, cooking,
preparing, and inspecting food and of course scrutinizing themselves.
And while the town of Stepford is identified as being founded by George Washington in
the remake, thus recuperating what the film suggests is the “American way” and most specifically
in terms of gender that had been maintained until the Women’s Rights Movement, Desperate
Housewives is a nothing more than a Stepford adaptation of the soap-opera that, like the Stepford
Wives remake, has warped into a perverted comedy. But in as much as the original Stepford Wives
(1975) might come to be identified as a postmodern text – after all Joanna is finally ensnared when
the voices of her children who are calling her are later shown to be the product of a reel to reel
(not to mention the text’s robotinization of women) – the combination of postmodernist
intertextuality and postfeminist discursive structure within the texts identified here suggest that
something more is entrenched in this complex framework of tone, sound, and image.
A few trends within recent women-centered television series and films indicate an
identifiable shift beyond the three televisual modes of female representation that Andrea Press
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distinguishes as “prefeminist family television” such as: I Love Lucy, The Honeymooners, and
Mama; “feminist television” such as The Martha Raye Show, The Loretta Young Show, and Hill
Street Blues; and “postfeminist era television” such as Roseanne, Murphy Brown, L.A. Law, and
Cagney and Lacey (29-42). However, many of the texts central to this project incorporate a
number of the themes and aspects from each of these differently identified forms of womencentered television, pointing toward only one aspect of intertextuality in these 1990s and 2000s
audiovisual texts. This integration can be documented in Miranda’s decision in Sex in the City to
raise a child as a single, working mother (a partner in a law firm), where support from her friends
is represented within this text alongside a repeated derision of her “choice” that replicates similar
extratextual responses to Murphy Brown’s decision to become a single mother (“Coulda, Woulda,
Shoulda”). Not only are Miranda and Murphy similarly depicted as being harsh, but also in
confronting the choice of single motherhood, Miranda is faced with criticism that parallels that
leveled at Murphy Brown by Vice President Dan Quayle in his 1992 “Restoring Basic Values”
speech in which he claimed that Murphy Brown’s character belittled ‘the importance of fathers, by
bearing a child alone, and calling it just another ‘lifestyle choice’” (Fiske 69).21
A rather different fusion of a recent text-within-a-text within one of these previous eras,
also from the series Sex and the City, is one that merges Carrie’s character with the narrative of
Sydney Pollock’s romance and period film The Way We Were (1973) and Barbara Streisand’s
Jewish character Katie Morosky. Sex and the City only references this film to explain Carrie’s
infatuation throughout the six seasons with her love interest “Mr. Big” – like the character Hubbel
Gardiner in The Way We Were, Mr. Big chooses not to marry Carrie because she is “too
complicated.” This realization ostensibly allows Carrie to let Mr. Big go by replicating the 1973
21
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film’s finale where Katie brushes Hubbell’s hair aside and tells him: “Your girl is lovely Hubbel.”
However, upon returning to The Way We Were, the synthesis between Carrie and Katie becomes
more evident. Katie and Carrie are both writers, journalists nonetheless, whose careers and
writings are devalued within prestigious literary circles; they are both involved in longtermrelationships with men who repeatedly criticize these women’s zeal and passion, interspersed
with moments in which these men leave because of these women’s “complexity”; and they must
both, without appearing melancholy, express their happiness towards each man’s incapacity to
deal with what has been declared as Carrie and Katie’s subjective psychoses. Moreover, the
similarities between Carrie’s and Katie’s facial expressions, poses, body language, and tones of
voice are striking to say the least.
The narratives revolving around the characters in both texts are overwhelmingly similar.
However, the political seriousness and underclass status of Katie’s character in The Way We Were
as a female outspoken Jewish anti-war protester against the political events preceding World War
II is not simply lost in Sex and the City but completely disavowed. Whereas Katie overtly declares
her membership to the Young Communist Party, Carrie demands that neither politics nor feminism
are of any value to her, as she declares in the episode “Politically Erect” that politics are a “good
way to meet men” but about as “relevant as a new Erica Jong novel.” Carrie, dressed up like
Jackie Kennedy in this episode, is only willing to play the part, and as abovementioned, this
performance of feminist subjectivity is one that is addressed as an impediment to female
characters within these texts.
In yet a different recasting of previous modes of film, television, and feminist theories, the
films Bewitched (2005), Stepford Wives (2004), and Down With Love represent a complete
overhaul rather than what could be described as coincidental replication and modification of
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1960s, 1970s, and 1980s texts. Based upon the premise of producing a television remake of the
1960s classic, though rarely showing even a clip from the text-within-a-text version of the new
show, Bewitched reimagines the character of Samantha through the character Isabel, the “real life”
witch within the 2005 film who has been cast to play the role of the original Samantha in the
television remake. This cross-over is confirmed at the end of the film when Jack, the actor who
has been cast to play the role of Darren, asks Isabel to marry him, followed by his declaration: “I
love you Samantha.” However, unlike the character Samantha in the 1960s television version
whose husband Darren is always demanding that she stop casting her spells, Isabel is represented
as the only character in the film who desires what she describes as “being normal,” or rather being
able to stop the compulsive habit of using witchcraft for what she describes as “total instant
gratification.” But when Isabel begins narrating her definition to her father of “being normal” – “I
want a man who needs me because he is a completely hopeless mess” – her understanding of
normality becomes clearly representative of normative femininity, and what Isabel describes as the
“total instant gratification” achieved by witchcraft becomes the iconic mainstream representation
of feminism in the 1990s.
Pressing together the female collectivity of the all-woman brunches in Sex and the City,
Desperate Housewives, Stepford Wives, and a number of other recent women-centered texts,
Isabel tells her father that she “want[s] to be like everyone else,” by which she means, as she
explains: “I want to have friends, and go to the Coffee Bean, where we all discuss our problems,
which are absolutely unsolvable.” Reminiscent of a number of fairytales, Isabel sees herself as
“pressed against a glass window” able to “see” but not “touch” or “feel” that which is “right there
on the other side,” suggesting not only that she is Snow White in the glass case waiting for a
prince whose lips she may feel and touch but also that she has been cast in the role of witch (read
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feminist) as required by Hollywood standards and cannot escape the limits placed upon her
literally by the film screen. Later, seated at the coffee bean with her newfound female friends,
Isabel’s desire for normative femininity is confirmed. After rewinding through the timeframe in
which she took her friends’ “feminist” suggestion to demand equality on the television set (and
thus in the public sphere) and used witchcraft to gain that equality by making Jack fall in love with
her, Isabel, distraught that Jack has ended their romantic encounter, rather encouragingly
pronounces: “We’re at the coffee bean and there is no solution.”22 Isabel is pleased.
With a few major exceptions, the narrative of Stepford Wives (2004), on the other hand,
holds largely to the narrative of the 1975 film in which a Joanna, Walter, and their children move
from Manhattan to the town of Stepford, where the scenery and wives are a little too perfect for
Joanna’s taste and where husbands, as Joanna later discovers, turn their wives into robots.
However, while the 1975 version ends with a blank-eyed, robotic Joanna walking through the
supermarket, establishing its categorization within the horror film genre, Stepford Wives (2004)
is streamlined as a form of postmodern comedy, not understood as by Christopher Beach in
Class, Language, and American Film Comedy (2002) as a mode of satire and irony offered in the
works of Woody Allen, Ethan Coen, Hal Hartley, and Jim Jarmusch, but more in the way that
Geoff Nunburg illustrates it when describing the “great rhetorical achievement of our age” as the
tendency to “aggravate the insult not alleviate it.” In the remake, Joanna is the creator of the
“ultimate battle of the sexes” reality television shows Balance of Power and I Can Do Better,
which position wives as the dominant gendered subject in heterosexual marriages. Differing
from the original film, however, Joanna declares her own disorientation, suggests moving out of

22

By the end of the film, she has absolved herself from the harmful aspects of her witchcraft habit, is married to
Jack, and six months later enters into the domain of the 1960s Bewitched and she and Jack move into the suburbs.
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Manhattan, and attempts to fit in with the Stepford “ladies” exercise and book groups. At its
greatest disparity, however, it is the leading lady of Stepford, Claire Wellington, who is changing
both the men and women into robots in her attempt to set the gender divide “straight” again.
In quite a different revisionist project, the film Down With Love creates an imaginary
author of one of the first historically “feminist” books titled Down With Love, a text that seems
thoroughly symbolic of Betty Friedan’s The Feminist Mystique. Down With Love, the film,
represents a recent and more overt preoccupation within women-centered television and film to
rewrite the history of the Women’s Rights Movement in the 1960s, as can also be seen in the
film Mona Lisa Smile, set in the 1950s, during which a feminist art professor attempts but fails to
convince her students that they can have both marriages and jobs. But what is particularly
indicative of the kinds of texts addressed in this chapter is that Barbara Novak’s book in Down
With Love, which convinced women on a global scale to be “down with love,” is revealed toward
the close of the film as only a ploy to get her former boss – “ladies’ man, man’s man, man about
town Catcher Block” – to fall in love with and marry her. While she maintains her faux persona
as Barbara Novak for the sake of the women who see her as their savior, rather than small town
“not a down with love girl” Nancy Brown who she later exposes as her “true” identity, the film
revises feminist history in such a way that confirms the mainstream media assertion that the
Women’s Rights Movement was founded by a horde of unattractive women who became
embittered over their inability to find a man who might marry them.
Tracking within these texts the cross-references to and the undertones of the multitude of
preceding mass culture texts presents an overwhelming task, but focusing simply on the way
feminisms or the oppression of women is amended through the intertextuality within these texts
reveals one way in which disentangling meaning from the convoluted blendings of sound, image,
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and inaccurate historical reference becomes possible. Along this line of analysis, then, what
Roland Barthes depicts as a text’s “stereographic plurality” – “its weave of signifiers” – and the
“unique combination” of hegemonic and thus established discursive codes that “cut across it [the
text] and through and through in its vast stereophony” is both indispensable and yet inadequate
(1472-73).
According to Barthes, the text is an “irreducible (and not merely acceptable) plural” that
“answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a dissemination,” and
its plurality is not dependent upon “the ambiguity of its contents” but upon this “weave of
signifiers”:
The intertextual in which every text is held, it itself being the text-between of
another text, is not to be confused with some origin of the text: to try to find the
‘sources’, the ‘influences’ of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; the
citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already
read: they are quotations without inverted commas. The work has nothing
disturbing for any monistic philosophy (we know that there are opposing
examples of these); for such a philosophy, plural is the Evil. [. . .] The plural
demoniacal texture which opposes text to work can bring with it fundamental
changes in reading, and precisely in areas where monologism appears to be the
Law [. . .] [I]nterpretation of works, so far resolutely monostic, will be able to
materialize itself more by pluralizing itself. (1472-73)
Though this particular observation proposes a valuable idea regarding the kind of radical
readership in relation to expectations within feminist circles of non-hegemonic readership, this
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model seems particular to an attention paid to the plurality of what are otherwise recognized as
monologic discourses and texts.
When contemplated in relation to the postmodern, postfeminist texts under consideration
here, the plurality that Barthes identifies is proliferated, or rather is taken to another level,
through the very self-referential intertextuality that can be distinguished within those texts, as
they are both knowing and unaware of their own ahistorical references. The complexity created
by the broadening of what Barthes calls textual “explosion” or “dissemination” is additionally
disrupted not by what Barthes discerns as the “anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read”
sources (though this element certainly remains) but through an intentional blurring of those
origins by the text itself. In other words, these texts situate their own allusions to these origins
within what Barthes calls “inverted commas,” marking the citation of historical moments for the
viewer/reader. Carrie, for instance, announces that the reason she cannot sustain a relationship
with Mr. Big is for the same reason that Katie cannot sustain her relationship with Hubbel in The
Way We Were.
At the same time, the language of these texts often distorts these histories and the
meanings attached to those histories until the historical origin is no longer recognizable as such.
Histories of 1960s feminisms as referenced in these texts are spoken through 1990s anti-feminist
or postfeminist discourses, for example, where the Women’s Rights Movement is not read as a
break from patriarchal oppression but is read instead, as in the case of Mona Lisa Smile, as an
antipathetical and undesired deterrent of heterosexual relationships and female ecstasy.
Moreover, when the indication of feminism is relocated to the “uncompelling” work of authors
such as Erica Jong, reallocated as simply the right to “choose” in Sex and the City, represented
by one lone woman ostensibly speaking on the behalf of a very slim majority of female voices
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(mostly herself) in Mona Lisa Smile, or rehistoricized as a one woman’s scheme to attain a man
in Down With Love, the historical moment to which these texts allude begin to signify so
differently that actual historical references lose desirability and believability. Thus, in one of the
few instances in which historical film footage is incorporated in the framework of the screen in
Commander in Chief (a speech by Betty Friedan being covered within a television news story on
the Equal Rights Amendment), the footage is positioned alongside the responses of the teenage
son and daughter, the son asking if he can turn the channel and the daughter requesting that the
television be turned off. In addition, the daughter contends that the content of the news is
preventing her from hearing herself think, only to be followed by her declaration: “I mean, I’m
no feminist!”
Finally, the textual facet that seems not simply to complicate Barthes’ understanding of
textual plurality but instead to render it inadequate in relation to these texts is the transcension of
the female voice beyond the text as a means of regulating the chaos that is viewed and listened to
within the intertextuality that lies beneath or behind the screen. Presumably, this interposed
female voice punctuates the text as both author reborn and reader designate, as both origin and
destination of the text, a text both in its proximity and upon which it stares down “from above.”
Like the intrusion of Nicholson and Fraser’s voice in the plurality of feminisms that their
postmodern feminism purports to embody, the plurality of the text is as well singularly
reinscripted by a monolithically speaking voice. The first-person confessional genre of womencentered books that flourished in the 1960s and 1970s and the rather passé notion within feminist
theories of the speaking and writing female voice as “truth-speaking subject” for women’s
experiences is thus revived within mass media, and accordingly, the mere sound of her voice
obscures any of the patriarchal substrata from which her voice might speak (Gunew 115).
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Sneja Gunew’s analysis of the imperialism specific to the reception of women’s writing
as “a chorus of women’s voices blended in undifferentiated sisterhood” is significant in relation
to this contemporary mass-mediated signification of female voice as the maker of meaning and
Truth (115). As Gunew postulates, “the way in which they [female writers] are read is often
derived from familiar and Eurocentric perspectives” and often “consolidate[s] the genre of the
first-person confessional novel” (114-15). Correspondingly, these transcendent female voices
often “read” the experiences of the women within these texts from what Gunew calls a familiar,
Eurocentric, and patriarchal perspective. Following this supposition, Gunew proposes that: “The
more women’s writing there was, the less our claims to being silenced or textually absent rang
true, so that new witnesses to oppression were required” (115). To examine this subsequent
observation through an analysis outside of feminist writings and to somewhat invert the
significance of this line of thought in relation to these popularized female speakers,23 the
transcendent female voice to some extent delegitimizes and silences forms of oppression that do
not correspond to the hegemonic structure of its discourse. Like Nicholson and Fraser’s
overarching command of dialogues, this voice reinterprets those oppressions within its own
framework, suggesting their immaturity, immorality, psychoses, and ultimately their illegitimacy
under a ruse of ironic humor and intertextual satire. Any “new witnesses to oppression” are
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Gunew offers the following statement to reveal the importance of a continued effort to increase the amount of
women’s writing as a means of speaking to and emphasizing the multitude of oppressions being faced by women:
“Woman as Truth has returned in the guise of working-class, black, lesbian and other varieties of minority women,
and has been constructed in opposition to hegemonic women as much as to hegemonic men. The delineations of
oppression and silencing contained in these texts served to reinforce, renew and legitimate the original claims for
promoting women’s writing which were offered in the 1960s and 1970s. The more women’s writing there was, the
less our claims to being silenced or textually absent rang true, so that new witnesses to oppression were required.”
Though I think that my own application of Gunew’s observation somewhat reorders its significance by changing the
locale and purpose of analysis, I believe that what I am suggesting in relation to the hegemonic female voices that
overlie these mass-mediated texts is implicit in Gunew’s observation as well – that these hegemonic women
speakers are delegitimizing claims of oppression and are silencing the voices that can speak to oppressions not
already enunciated.
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essentially silenced through the deference paid to the first-person, confessional female voice that
maintains a position both within and beyond the textual diegesis, though this position is not
without its own complications.

Female Voiceovers, Voiceoffs, and Uncontrollable Speech: The Authoring of Feminisms in
Postmodern, Postfeminist Audiovisual Texts
Female voiceovers and voiceoffs24 are achieved on various levels within these
postmodern, postfeminist audiovisual texts. They simultaneously function to explain the
experiences and thoughts of characters within the texts and create uncertainty in relation to
normative femininity and “appropriate” female actions and reactions (often in regard to
heterosexual relationships). Yet despite the voiceover’s role in calling into question normative
feminine roles and women’s captivity to the domestic sphere, the female voiceovers in these
texts have a subsequent tendency to reconfirm the same established feminine confines they bring
into doubt, almost as if this questioning occurs only to render the questions asked ineffectual.
Thus these texts dichotomize and demarcate the differences between female experience and
female thought. Female thought, constituted concurrently by female voiceovers and female
authoring in many of these texts, signifies rather contiguously with second wave feminist
paradigms, allowing the female subject to investigate and prove that her experiences as a woman
are not limited to prescriptive gender roles. Nonetheless, once this point is proven, those
paradigms can be discarded for a less prescriptive feminism of the present moment. In contrast,
female experiences in these texts are constructed as events occurring within a social domain that
24

The voiceover is a moment in which a character’s voice (sometimes an omniscient onlooker but not always)
speaks beyond the text’s diegetic framework or, rather, beyond the images and sounds captured by the filmic or
televisual apparatus (the camera). A voiceoff consists of a character speaking directly to the camera, although this
speech is not literally present within the film’s diegesis since it is not heard by any of the other characters within the
film.
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is decidedly postfeminist, suggesting that the mode of feminist questioning represented by the
female voiceover is not simply outdated but retrogressive and a waste of time.
The female voiceover is one of the most prominent features in Sex and the City (1998),
What Women Want (2000), Bridget Jones’ Diary (2001), and Desperate Housewives (2004), but
this now standard self-referential/deferential female voiceover can be traced back to the
spontaneous fantasy sequences that occur in perhaps one of the first women-centered,
postmodernist, postfeminist television series Ally McBeal (1997). As this authorial dialogue
erupts from a character within the text (whether alive or dead), it serves both as a thread that
holds the narrative together and as the legitimate source of interpretation for the underlying blend
of sounds and images in relation to these women. But the female voiceover’s foremost
preoccupation in these texts appears to be not an analysis of the female subject’s experiences but
rather the use of such an inquiry to produce a testament to her disavowal of second wave
feminist paradigms. Analogous to the renunciation of second wave feminisms in Nicholson and
Fraser’s “Social Criticism,” the female voiceover defines a feminism of the present moment by
setting it against what it describes as degenerative feminisms of the past. The feminisms that
transpire are also ones seemingly aligned with Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism as
they are individually determined in relation to each character’s spatial and temporal locale and
rendered legitimate by each character because she has exercised feminist agency in “choosing”
her “feminist” subject positions.
Though the female voiceover is one of the most powerful apparatuses within this
emerging facet of women-centered romantic comedies, the female voiceoff is comparatively
frequent within recent contributions to this genre, ascertainable in texts such as Whipped (2000),
Down With Love (2003), and Bewitched (2005). On the other hand, texts such as Lovely and
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Amazing (2001), Something’s Gotta Give (2003), Stepford Wives (2004), and The Swan (2004)
fall somewhere in between, as seemingly uncontrollable speech erupts within the diegetic
soundtrack, often resembling the verbal manifestations of Tourette’s syndrome. On one hand, the
inner subjective language engendered by the female voiceover and voiceoff remains removed
from the space of accepted discourse and thus seems trapped within the female body on account
of its extradiegetic positioning. However, this uncontrollable discourse, similar to the
Foucauldian notion of “mad speech,” erupts instead from within this female-specific discursive
“void” and out onto the screen. Similar to the threat of fissure within the cinematic male body,
examined in Chapter Two, that occurs when the “feminine” is imposed on otherwise masculine
subjectivities, each of these types of “unarticulatable” and yet “overheard” female voices signals
the potential rupture of female thought into some type of discursive real, or a breach of diegetic
casings.25 This discursive void, then, comes to represent a space reserved for female thought
from which the female voice should not be dislocated and establishes the reprehensibility of
moments where female speech punctures the diegetic boundaries, especially when these
articulations contain what could be identified as second wave feminist underpinnings.
Amplifying the dislocation of the female voice from the normative aural site of each
audiovisual diegesis through the voiceover and voiceoff, these internal female voices are often
positioned over (or within some proximity to) silenced female bodies. The juxtaposition of the
female voiceover to the silenced female body suggests the division between female subjectivities
and social reality. In other words, the female voiceover effectively bifurcates the normative
boundaries of female thought and those of actual female articulation. Thoughts that are
antithetical to the female character’s feminist positionality, indicated for example by the question
25

For Kaja Silverman, the film’s diegesis also appears to represent a masculine space.
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in Carrie’s voiceover in the episode “Politically Erect” of whether “women just want to be
rescued,” are described as thoughts that the female subject cannot help but to consider but should
not dare speak aloud. Nonetheless, the female voiceover’s attestation to the imposition of
feminist norms onto the female subject’s subjective consciousness that is indicative to these texts
establishes female thought as a symptomatic consequence of both the Women’s Rights
Movement and the “postfeminist” world that these women inhabit. Within literal female
articulations, on the other hand, in this case Carrie’s column at the end of “Politically Erect” that
suggests that women do want to be rescued, the predisposition of the female subject toward
normative subjective interpretation is not simply preferable but necessitated, if not more
accurately the only authentic verbalization regarding female gender and sexuality. Therefore,
while “thoughts” about normative femininity are inappropriate but tolerated in these texts,
feminist “articulations” are utterly reprehensible, and the female subject is forced to negotiate the
dilemma that is created when female thought and articulation intersect. The renunciation of
second wave feminist paradigms within these audiovisual texts, then, is a response to this
subjective crisis, much in the same way that Nicholson and Fraser’s disavowal of second wave
feminisms in “Social Criticism” is a response to a similar subjective crisis within academia.
As Kaja Silverman contends in her analyses of the female voice within classical cinema,
these female voiceovers and voiceoffs are corporealized through the visible presence on screen
of the female from which this voice originates, most obviously illustrated here within Ally
McBeal, Sex and the City, Bridget Jones’s Diary, and Desperate Housewives. But none of these
voiceovers are “purely embodied” as are those within Silverman’s analyses of female voiceovers
within classical cinema. Notably in Desperate Housewives, Mary Alice’s voiceover is
corporealized either through silent filmic scenes or still photographs of her once living self and
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rarely in relation to her actual living body. Her voiceover is thus both intensely embodied in
relation to a female body that will never speak again and disembodied as it is superimposed over
her visibly lifeless female image. What Women Want is indeed also an interesting case of only
partial embodiment as the embodiment of Darcy’s voiceover is disrupted through Nick’s ability
to overhear and own the thoughts that Darcy is unaware to be already articulated. More often
within these texts, however, female voiceovers remain only partially embodied because they are
rendered visual and become concrete as they manifest in the form of female-authored writings
(for instance, a newspaper column in Sex and the City and a diary in Bridget Jones’ Diary).
Moreover, these text-within-text writings are often read and commented upon by other
characters within these texts, lead methodically to moments of crises for the speaking subject,
and as a result compel a reconsideration or revision of previously articulated thoughts by that
speaking subject. In Bridget Jones’ Diary, Bridget lucidly verbalizes her thoughts about Mark
Darcy in her diary, who subsequently reads a passage about himself, causing Bridget to run out
into a snow covered street in her underwear to find Mark and tell him that her words were
“rubbish.” It is Mary Alice’s voiceover in Desperate Housewives that offers a reconsideration
and correction of each female character’s thoughts and actions and usually when those actions
and thoughts are “in progress” within the show itself. But this compulsion towards the female
subject’s renunciation of her own thoughts that is typical to these texts is rendered to an
exponential degree in Sex and the City in relation to Carrie, whose voiceover often supplies the
text for her “Sex and the City” column in The New York Post.
After the publication of her book Sex and the City, a collection of her New York Post
articles, Carrie’s entire oeuvre is called into question in Michiko Kakutani review of her book in
The New York Times (“Critical Condition”). But more consequential than Kakutani’s review of
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Carrie’s work is Kakutani’s review of Carrie’s subjectivity that occurs when Kakutani suggests
that Carrie’s book ultimately deems men “disposable,” and throughout “Critical Condition,”
Carrie is forced to confront this subjective censure on a number of levels. It is when feminist
thoughts escape into the diegesis of these texts that they are considered by the female speaking
subject in relation to men in their proximity, and it is often at this point that the female subject
judges her own thoughts as categorically “wrong.” Thus, female thoughts within these texts are
not simply rendered inappropriate through their location within the extradiegetic space of the
female voiceover but are twice delegitimized in their disavowal by the female speaking subject
herself.
This corporealization of the female voice that would otherwise emerge from an
unlocatable source outside the audiovisual diegesis, Silverman argues, positions this voice within
a secondary, recessed space that radiates not from some omniscient “outside” but from “the
center of the story” (53). But within these texts, this secondary, recessed space appears to be not
simply the center of the “story,” as Silverman suggests, but rather the inside and center of the
female body itself. In representing female thought as that which is in need of remedy or that
which should not be “heard,” these texts provoke an association between psychoses and female
thought and indicate the need for a kind remedial modification of those thoughts according to
normative social paradigms by the self-disciplining female subject. Bridget Jones’ diary or
Carrie’s sex column, for example, center upon female thoughts that contradict social norms, but
the locus of their subjective investigation attends to amending rather than coming to terms with
that contradiction. As the feminist substrata of female voiceovers are prohibited from or
“repaired” in relation to the hegemonic aural space in which they become “textualized” or
“articulated,” “feminist” thoughts and “feminist” articulations are thus also inscribed into the
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psychosis of the female mind. The signification of second wave feminisms within these female
voiceovers, therefore, can be said to be invoked “in order to install a whole repertoire of new
meanings which emphasize that it [feminisms] are no longer needed, it is a spent force” in
relation to the contemporary female subject (“Postfeminism and Popular Culture” 255).
The remedial modification that occurs within these texts, then, is one that originates
within the female mind and one that results in the mending of multiple or split female
subjectivities written upon the female subject into a more perfect, singularly signifying feminine
form by removing their second wave feminist underpinnings. But because this reparation results
from a moment of subjective crisis, where the female subject is forced to reconcile the
disconnect between her feminist thoughts and her postfeminist experiences and articulations, the
locus of this transformation can be identified as one that occurs only in relation to the “listening”
male subject. It is important to note also that this “tuned in” male subject appears to cause this
crisis in the first place. As Silverman suggests, the “autobiographical” and “self-revealing”
nature of the embodied female voiceover “turns the body ‘inside-out,’” “anchors it to the order of
the spectacle of the gaze,” and becomes “a precarious hook on which to hang the phallus” (5253). Like Nicholson and Fraser’s initiation and execution of a critique of feminisms according to
a set of theoretical norms mapped out by the male figurehead Jean-François Lyotard, the femaleinitiated critiques of feminisms within these texts, too, invoke a “specter of the male gaze.”
Female voiceovers and voiceoffs within the texts examined here, mostly ranging from the
mid-1990s to 2006, complicate some of the analyses Silverman offers in relation to texts that
precede by forty to fifty years. However, the underlying premises of her argument are largely
confirmed; at a minimum they represent one acute and compelling interpretation. In examining
the role of the voiceover in relation to Sex and the City and Desperate Housewives and its
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absence in The Devil Wears Prada (2006), three defining formulas within these emergent
postmodern, postfeminist, audiovisual texts can be identified, each of which seems to be
participating in what Angela McRobbie describes in “Postfeminism and Popular Culture” (2004)
as “a well-informed and well-intentioned response” to feminisms that provokes quite oppositely
“all the more dismantling of feminist politics and the discrediting of the occasionally voiced need
for its renewal” (255-56).
On the surface, Carrie’s voiceover in Sex and the City declares her and her friends’
ownership of feminist agency, one that corresponds to the type of agency produced through
critiques of prescriptive gender roles in second wave feminist theories. To establish this agency,
Carrie often highlights each female protagonist’s choice among compound alternatives in
relation to issues such as heterosexuality, abortion, sexual autonomy, and other issues related to
gender equality and the female subject’s control over her own individual body. In the episode
“Boy, Girl, Boy, Girl,” for instance, Carrie’s voiceover simultaneously interrupts and shatters the
male/female gender binary, and this explosion of gender roles is, in fact, the primary focus of
Carrie’s voiceover, newspaper column, and subjective investigation throughout the entire fifth
season. In “Boy, Girl, Boy, Girl,” Miranda’s boyfriend Steve destabilizes Miranda’s femininity
by declaring, “Jesus, Miranda, it’s like you’re the guy sometimes”; Charlotte, posing as a man
for an art photography shoot, is instructed by the photographer, “forget Charlotte, you’re a man
now,” to which Charlotte responds, “I think I need a bigger sock”; and Samantha fires her
assistant because he attempts to assert himself as the “alpha-dog” in her business and then puts
him in his place by having sex with him and demanding control over the escapade. Carrie’s
voiceover hovers above the text, examining her friends’ involvement in these various gender
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bendings and her own engagement in a relationship with a bisexual man, and concludes that
maybe “the opposite sex has become ‘obsolete.’”
Carrie’s voiceover in the beginning of this episode seems to insinuate that these gender
bendings and the “lack of sexual orientation” they signify are a progressive “wave of the future”:
“If women can transform into men and men can become women and we can choose to sleep with
everyone, then maybe gender doesn’t even exist anymore.” But throughout the episode, Carrie
and her friends proceed to intensify the negative connotations already attached to nonheterosexual labels. As a final insult, Carrie turns politics into a game, as she does quite
frequently throughout the six seasons of the Sex and the City series, and suggests that choosing
to be anything other than heterosexual is not about “choice” but rather “confusion”: “Gay, bi,
straight, this party was a veritable pu-pu platter of sexual orientation [. . .] I was in Alice in
confused sexual orientation land [. . .] I realized they could do whatever they wanted, but deep
down, I was too old to play this game.” Carrie voiceover, therefore, delimits the range of
alternatives it brings to the discussion in Sex and the City and draws a distinct division between
legitimate “choices” and foolish “diversions.”
Sex and the City’s characters range from Charlotte, the prim and proper Cinderella figure
who is overly invested in fairy tale myths of princes and love, to Miranda the relationship cynic
and Samantha the city whore, with Carrie, providing the extradiegetic narration, falling
somewhere in between. Carrie’s existence between these extremes helps to generate the context
of her voiceovers as well, suggesting the voiceover’s function in mediating discussions of both
feminine and feminist norms as well as prescribing the eventual answers to questions about
normalized female roles raised within those discussions. Designating Sex and the City’s
purportedly progressive assessment of feminisms and female agency within these in-text
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discussions and voiceovers, the show has been documented as “tackl[ing] socially relevant
issues, such as the status of women in society,” and the perspectives of the female protagonists
therein have been deemed “all decidedly feminist” (wikipedia.com; Henry 67). However, each of
Sex and the City’s main characters find themselves at some point in the series becoming women
with too many years in the singles-market, too many sexual partners, and too much security, both
in their careers and in relation to their status as property owners. Their indignant attitudes
towards marriage and men, coupled with the ability to support themselves through high-status
careers and the threat of impending middle-age, put each of these women at risk of being the
potentially forever single spinster that the film Bridget Jones’ Diary puts on display. Exposing
the magnitude of this risk, Miranda, the character portrayed not only as the woman with the most
cynicism towards “love” and relationships but also as the woman most insistent upon selfreliance, suffers a series of panic attacks and paranoid fantasies about having her dead body
eaten by her cats because she has convinced herself that she is “going to die alone” (“Old Dogs,
New Dicks”).
With Charlotte warning the other three women that property ownership dissuades men
from marriage because “it’s emasculating” and “men don’t want a woman who’s too selfsufficient,” this series, a supposedly positive and pleasurable representation of single women’s
lives in New York, persistently brings the preference of remaining single into doubt (“Four
Women and a Funeral”). An episode that begins with the four characters celebrating their single
status, “They Shoot Single People Don’t They?,” quickly shifts towards the censorious question
mark positioned over Carrie’s chest in a news expose about her single status – “Single and
Fabulous?” – prefiguring what becomes the series’ preoccupation with marital doom and its
related disdain towards the single white female. Reading the article about Carrie outloud over
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their weekly Sunday brunch as if to say “I told you so,” Charlotte’s words underscore her earlier
forewarning that celebrating being single was “bad luck” and emphasize the newspaper’s
censuring of their prior night of celebration: “Single was fun at twenty, but you want to ask these
women how fun will all-night club hopping be at forty [. . .] filling their lives with an endless
parade of decoys and distractions to avoid the painful fact that they are completely alone” (“They
Shoot Single People Don’t They?”)
Initiating a repudiation of the article’s insinuation that female agency is only a “decoy”
used by women to evade any acknowledgement of their inescapable misery and thus generating a
dialogue between contemporary “feminist” perspectives and 1980s backlash media, Miranda
responds, telling her three friends: “Every couple of years, an article like this surfaces as a
cautionary tale to scare young women into marriage. [. . .] This piece of trash is nothing, I repeat,
nothing to do with us.” Despite the merit of Miranda’s observation and the four women’s
disavowal of the article’s portrayal of singledom as an indiscretion – a renunciation conveyed
through their collective statement, “Fuck them” – Carrie’s voiceover, which directly follows,
implies instead the four women’s “denial” regarding the grief and apprehension that their single
status habitually wreaks upon them: “I had a sneaking suspicion that they didn’t quite believe it.
Somehow, the question mark had leapt off my cover and onto each of them.” Rather than
questioning the “feminist misery” portrayed in both the 1980s news media and by the fictional
article “Single and Fabulous?,” the voiceover punctuates Miranda’s negation of the connection
between singledom and martyrdom, concluding that perhaps single women were only
“pretending to be happy with being single.” This deduction is fortified by yet another voiceover
at the end of the episode that indicates that Miranda had “left Denial,” but it is ultimately
confirmed throughout the sixth and final season of the Sex and the City as Carrie, Miranda, and
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Charlotte become happily married, with Samantha seemingly following in what is her first
“monogamous” relationship.26
The postmortem female voiceover of Mary Alice in Desperate Housewives, on the other
hand, frames and interprets Lynette, Susan, Bree, and Gabrielle’s attempt to relocate themselves
in the realm of heterosexual domesticity and normative femininity, often explaining the way
these attempts are impeded by each character’s tendency toward feminist responses and actions.
While the parody of suburbanhood enacted within Desperate Housewives might alone suggest a
continued need for second wave feminisms and a rather piqued response to feminist backlash
media, it is Mary Alice’s voiceover that pushes the interpretation of this supposed parody in the
opposite direction as Mary Alice insinuates that she and the filmic apparatus are more familiar
with these characters’ “true” desires than they themselves. In “The Sun Won’t Set,” Mary
Alice’s voiceover instructs the viewer to privilege her interpretation of the images and sounds
captured by the camera as the reality behind the façade of each character’s emancipated
performance: “Yes, cameras are tools designed to capture images, but in truth, they can capture
so much more. […] Cameras can quietly and clearly reveal to us our dreams, dreams we didn’t
even know we have.” Unlike Carrie’s voiceover in Sex and the City which establishes each
character’s “feminist” agency, Mary Alice’s voiceover in Desperate Housewives instead
acknowledges “feminist” agency as a prior subjective position that each character has disavowed
in one way or another, one seemingly so difficult to evade that its persistent reinsinuation of
itself onto Mary Alice’s normative subjective formation brings her to take her own life. Mary
Alice’s voiceover is thus aligned with what Silverman describes as a “temporal regression, a
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move back to a prior moment in the speaker’s life” to expose the root of the present subjective
position of the female subject so that that which is “inaccessible to the image, what exceeds the
visible” is revealed (52-53).
In Desperate Housewives’ dissection of the occasion at which female agency and
domesticity meet, the female characters exemplify a scope of traits parallel to those available in
Sex and the City while similarly magnifying the perils that plague women who cannot relinquish
enough of their self-centered agency to secure and sustain a blissful state of matrimony. Susan, a
hopeless divorce who is also hopeless for the love of a number of men, is relentlessly infantilized
to the point that it becomes clear that her daughter Julie is the adult of the family. But even Julie,
who regularly coaches her mother toward socially “appropriate” actions and responses, cannot
help Susan achieve adulthood status within the show. Bree, whose perfected domestic role is
exposed as a means of subverting her “feminist” desires and emotions to the realm of the
unconscious, fails to fulfill her role as mother and wife, even if the other women on Wisteria
Lane, as the postmortem narration makes clear, are almost completely deceived by her nearly
immaculate portrayal of domesticity. Despite her virtually flawless masquerade, Bree
precipitates her husband Rex’s death by delaying his transportation to the hospital in the midst of
his heart attack so that she can first “make the bed” and is seemingly responsible for her son’s
homosexual orientation and her teenage daughter’s unwed pregnancy as well. Lynette, in
opposition, a woman who in the beginning of the series has given up her career to raise three
unruly sons and one infant daughter, is never regarded by her peers as anything more than a “bad
mother.” This sentiment is exaggerated by the number and frequency of admonishing glares she
receives from neighbors staring into her yard from a distance in addition to the maternal
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instruction delivered to her by everyone from school teachers and police officers to nameless
strangers, all of which become intensified when she returns to work later in the series.
Mary Alice’s postmortem voiceover seemingly underlines for the audience what her
death is supposed to reveal to the other women of Wisteria Lane: neither adherence to female
agency nor fabricated desires to fulfill the domestic roles of mother and wife are enough to
produce female satisfaction. By positioning the disorder of each character’s domestic space
alongside the “secret desires” that produce what the text describes as these women’s “desperate”
actions, Desperate Housewives alludes to presence of both a hidden commitment to female
agency and a revulsion towards domesticity within the female body. But as Mary Alice’s
voiceover works to disentangle the meanings behind the chaos that these females contain within,
it becomes clear that these women’s failure to achieve “proper” forms of domesticity occurs
because they have been falsely convinced of their feminist desires and not because they have
arrived at those desires on their own terms. This attempt to negotiate a social interpretation of
feminism in the present moment is thus not simply confined to the female mind in its positioning
within the female voiceover; it is more importantly restricted within a state of death, symbolized
through its positioning in the mind of a dead narrator who claims to have only taken her
“memories” with her. Mary Alice’s empathetic descriptions of these characters’ struggle to cope
with the subjective divide between agency and domesticity, therefore, brings the voiceover closer
to an articulation that speaks from the “memory” of feminisms bygone, indicating that the still
living female characters may also reach a point at which dying becomes preferable to living with
the misery that these feminist tendencies yield.
Moreover, instead of constructing multiple or split subjectivity as radical modes of
subject formation as they are developed at least on the surface in Sex and the City, Mary Alice’s
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voiceover in Desperate Housewives determines the notion of multiple or split subjectivity to be a
liability, one that plays the leading role in perpetuating the chaos that surrounds Susan, Lynette,
Bree, Gabrielle, and herself:
Everyone has a little dirty laundry. When I was alive, I maintained many different
identities: lover, wife, and ultimately victim. Yes, labels are important to the
living. They dictate how people see themselves. Like my friend Lynette. She used
to see herself as a career women (image of Lynette doing laundry) and a highly
successful one at that. She was known for her power lunches (image of Lynette
feeding kids and yawning), her eye catching presentations (image of her kid’s
artwork on the fridge), and her ruthlessness in wiping out the competition (image
of Lynette windexing chocolate handprints off the window). Lynette gave up her
career to assume a new label – the incredibly satisfying role of full-time mother.
But unfortunately, for Lynette, this new label fell short of what was advertised. It
suddenly occurred to Lynette, her label was about to change yet again, and for the
next few years, she would be known as the mother of the boys who painted
Tiffany Axelrod blue. (“Who’s that Woman?”)
While Mary Alice’s postmortem narration of Lynette’s subjective struggles brings into doubt the
mainstream contention that motherhood is “the” foremost “incredibly satisfying role” for women
in American society, the voiceover speaks in the past tense about the labeling of Lynette as
career woman that occurs prior to bearing children and not about the label which she would
acquire upon returning to work postpartum – “bad mother.” Mary Alice’s voiceover thus alludes
to the difficulty of navigating the dual labels and responsibilities of career woman and mother.
Nonetheless, Mary Alice’s voiceover concludes, quite opposite of existing feminist analyses
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regarding this dilemma, that the ability to successfully navigate this split/multiple subjectivity is,
in fact, a delusion and that Lynette more specifically is deluding herself about the nonexistence
of her own “dreams” of motherhood and domesticity. Insinuating that her primary focus is on
Lynette in the beginning of her voiceover, Mary Alice extends her reading of multiple or split
female subjectivity and contradictory subject positions to all of the women in the series who she
looks down upon (in her figurative disdain of and pity for these characters in the voiceover and
from her literal position above the text): “Lynette had been struggling to balance her career and
family. [. . .] We make believe that work won’t come in the way of family. Yes, the game of
make believe is a simple one. You start by lying to yourself, and if you can get others to believe
those lies, you win” (“You’ll Never Get Away From Me”). Mary Alice thus equates these female
characters’ attempts to escape domesticity as part of a feminized childhood pastime – “the game
of make believe” – a game that can be won if the female subject is capable of convincing others
of her success in managing the subjective splitting that occurs in trying to occupy both public
and private spheres. Nonetheless, one problem remains: these women are not capable of
convincing anyone, especially themselves.27
The Devil Wears Prada is also a text that initiates an inquiry into the relevance of second
wave feminist paradigms in relation the construction of both normative femininity and the
female agency, paradigms that are similarly rendered inadequate for female subjects within the
text in relation to its temporal setting, the early 21st century. However, it is the lack of the
voiceover within The Devil Wears Prada that confines Andy to the tenets of second wave
feminisms forced upon her within the public sphere. Second wave feminisms and postfeminisms
are symbolically juxtaposed within this text through their inscription on Miranda and Andy’s
27
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bodies respectively. But because Andy cannot find an outlet for her thoughts, signified in her
inability to acquire a job as a journalist, she is forced to take a job at Runway magazine and
initiate her own subjective transformation to avoid being fired by her boss Miranda, who utterly
loathes Andy upon her arrival. Andy, thus, appears to have no attachment to feminisms until she
comes into contact with Miranda. Accordingly, the agency Andy arrives at does not signify
Andy’s ability to think for herself but instead suggests her obedience to Miranda, as Andy is seen
repeatedly abandoning her life and her perspectives to fulfill Miranda’s every command. Given
Miranda’s symbolic connection to the feminist figure portrayed within feminist backlash media,
Andy emerges as a character potentially ruined by the feminisms that Miranda represents and
imposes on Andy, and Andy’s character can only be redeemed when she decides that she is
nothing like Miranda and forsakes her. Andy’s agency is thus defined through her determination
to shed her agency, which occurs figuratively as well when, at the end of the film, Andy strips of
the garb that the fashion industry both provides to her and requires her to display.
The disparity between Miranda as a passé feminist persona and Andy as a character who
is swayed by Miranda’s belief system but uncertain about the way this influence effects her
decisions and life becomes most visible within one of the film’s concluding scenes. This scene,
the film’s climatic point and the second of the only two real discussions that occur between
Miranda and Andy within the film, becomes the crux upon which contemporary female
subjectivity can be explored within the film in relation to the second wave feminisms that
Miranda represents:
MIRANDA. You thought I didn’t know. I’ve known what was happening for
quite some time. Just took me a little while to find a suitable alternative for
Jacqueline. [. . .] So, I just had to tell Herb that Jacqueline was unavailable.
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Truth is, there is no one who can do what I do, including her. [. . .] Especially
because of the list. The list of designers, photographers, editors, writers,
models, all of whom were found by me and nurtured by me and promised me
they will follow me whenever and if ever I choose to leave Runway. So he
reconsidered. But I was very, very impressed by how intently you tried to
warn me. I never thought I would say this Andrea, but I really, I see a great
deal of myself in you. You can see beyond what people want and what they
need, and you can choose for yourself.
ANDY. I don’t think I’m like that. I couldn’t do what you did tonight, Miranda. I
couldn’t do something like that.
MIRANDA. You already did – to Emily
ANDY. That’s not what I . . . No that was different. I didn’t have a choice.
MIRANDA. Oh no, you chose. You chose to get ahead. If you want this life,
those choices are necessary.
ANDY. But what if this isn’t what I want. I mean, what if I don’t want to live the
way you live?
MIRANDA. Oh don’t be ridiculous Andrea. Everybody wants this. Everybody
wants to be us.
If Miranda can be read as synonymous with the media’s rendering of feminism throughout the
previous quarter century, then Miranda’s observation here suggests not only that she finds very
few feminists in her social proximity (seemingly only Andy) but also that Miranda believes that
all women want to but are incapable of becoming feminists for reasons not explained.

171

But as Andy throws her phone in a fountain in the next scene, designating her decision to
separate herself from Miranda’s imposing and exhausting demands, Andy attests to Miranda’s
deluded perception regarding the society that surrounds her, similar to Mary Alice’s revelation in
Desperate Housewives described above. It is also the moment in the film when Andy obstructs
Miranda’s predisposition to speak for Andy and locates agency within her own speaking voice.
As the film concludes, Andy, sitting at a café with her then ex-boyfriend Nate, tells him: “I
wanted to say you were right about everything. I turned my back on my friends and my family
and everything I believe in, and for what? [. . .] Nate, I’m sorry.” Andy therefore confirms that
Miranda’s life is worthless, or rather as Nate says, worth not much more than “shoes and shirts
and jackets and belts,” and validates the media’s designation of feminism as a choice that ignores
everyone else’s wants and needs, Andy’s included, but most importantly Nate’s. The film ends
here with the indication that Andy will follow Nate to Boston where he has finally obtained a
real occupation and Andy a position as a journalist. But notably, only when Andy obtains the
ability to articulate the necessity of disowning the second wave feminist paradigms written upon
Miranda’s subjectivity (and Andy’s too) is her voice rendered permissible for public
consumption. Thus Andy, as a postfeminist character, successfully navigates her way back to a
more normatively feminine role, one that fiercely rejects the feminism that Miranda both
represents and has tried to impose on Andy.
What Silverman identifies as the “loss of discursive potency” for the female voice in
classical cinema encounters a challenge in the types of women-centered, postmodern,
postfeminist texts represented by Sex and the City, Desperate Housewives, and The Devil Wears
Prada (55). As Silverman writes in The Acoustic Mirror:

172

Hollywood dictates that the closer a voice is to the “inside” of a narrative, the
more remote it is from the “outside,” i.e., from that space fictionally inscribed by
the disembodied voiceover, but which is in fact synonymous with the cinematic
apparatus. In other words, it equates diegetic interiority with discursive impotence
and lack of control, thereby rendering that situation culturally unacceptable for the
“normal” male subject. […] “Inside” comes to designate a recessed space within
the story, while “outside” refers to those elements of the story which seem in one
way or another to frame that recessed space. (53-54)
Female voiceovers within these texts do appear to signify the social prohibition of certain forms
of female thought, especially those with second wave feminist underpinnings. These social
prohibitions thus leave the female subject discursively impotent when she attempts to use what
these texts suggest are retrogressive modes of feminist critique to analyze the presumably
postfeminist social space in which she is implanted. However, these recent renderings of the
female voice also allow it to masquerade as a voice that speaks from what Silverman identifies as
the “transcendental auditory position” of omniscient narrator, a narrator who delineates a new
form of feminism for her spatiotemporal locale (55-57). The female voiceover is the primary
textual apparatus that vests the female voice with this authority because of the power
relinquished to the voiceover to interpret and reframe the experiences of the women in its scope.
(Notably, female voiceovers within these texts remain almost utterly incapable of dissecting or
explaining the actions of the men in their proximity.) But the secondary textual mechanism of
female authorship, explained earlier as founding an almost universal line of connection between
these postmodern, postfeminist texts, guarantees the female voice an audience for these
articulations, not to mention the televisual and filmic audiences themselves. But as this voice is
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positioned within the soundtracks of these texts, and thus not isolated as being equivalent with
and part of the filmic apparatus (the camera and the operator of that camera), the female voice is
simultaneously legitimized as speaker for the experiences of Woman through its connection with
female-authored confessional literature and delegitimized through its interaction with its binary
antithesis, the “male gaze.”
Because these texts are dependent upon discarding second wave feminist paradigms,
specifically those that universalize women’s experiences and instruct female subjects to make
“correct” feminist choices (such as having an abortion or rejecting heterosexual matrimony), the
female voiceover’s circumscription of new feminisms within these texts inches towards being the
mediated counterpart to Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism. Within these mediated
texts, in other words, the female voiceover seemingly opens up female subjectivity to allow for
multiplicity, fragmentation, and contradiction, all the while suggesting that the more appropriate
form of feminisms for these female characters is one that is “nonuniversalist,” “cross-cultural,”
“comparativist” and one that treats “gender as one relevant strand among others, also attending
to class, race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation” (“Social Criticism” 34-35).
The female as fragmented self is perhaps nowhere more evident in these texts than in the
female voiceover, the voice that frequently and repeatedly solidifies the female subject’s
subjective atomization. Like Marie Alice’s voiceover in Desperate Housewives, Carrie’s
voiceover in Sex and the City reveals and in some ways is the source of a constant splitting of
female bodies throughout the series as these female characters find themselves hard-pressed to
“choose” from the range of options that arise within the text in relation to the questions posed by
Carrie’s voiceover, a voiceover always approximate to the dialogues in which these options are
established. For example in the episode “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda,” when faced with an
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unexpected pregnancy that is the result of a one time “mercy fuck” with an exboyfriend (Steve)
who has recently lost a testicle, Miranda’s subjectivity is caught between her lack of desire for
children (“I’m not having it”), how a child might impede on her ability to perform effectively at
her job (“This is not in my plans right now”), the improbability towards future opportunities to
have children (“What if this is my baby?”), and the possible providence involved in conception
between a woman with a lazy ovary and a man with only one testicle (“It’s like the Special
Olympics of contraception.” “My stupid egg found its way to the three sperm he had left.”). In
addition, Miranda is faced with her ultrafeminine friend Charlotte’s inability to conceive a child
(“We’ve had sex without a condom “73 times. Have you any idea how much perfect fine semen
that is?”), the disdain for children that her atypical, afeminine friend Samantha expresses (“Don’t
even!”), Samantha and Carrie’s understanding of abortion as customary (Samantha has had two
and Carrie one), and the guilt that is precipitated by Steve’s friend and Carrie’s beau Aiden who
demands that a father has a right to know and should be part of the decision (“It’s his baby too.
So what, it’s all her decision? It seems like the guy gets the shit end of the stick.”).
Though fans and feminist critics alike often peddle Sex and the City’s seemingly frank,
uninhibited discussion of abortion as one of its most progressive aspects, these points of
perception mostly overlook the context in which the term “abortion” is set. In decontextualizing
the topic of abortion from the discussion that actually ensues, such analyses imply that simply
mentioning the term “abortion” is evidence of evolution toward equality or that it at least
suggests women’s control over their bodies. Notwithstanding the limited regulations placed upon
this series by the HBO cable network, these analyses neglect to consider that the subject of
abortion has received representation in television and film. Moreover, they fail to observe that
the available collection of televisual and filmic discussions of abortion all point toward a fixation
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within these mediated texts not on a woman’s right to “choose” but upon how men are
implicated in that choice and how much that choice strays from social norms. In an 1992
Melrose Place episode entitled “Leap of Faith,” to offer only one example, twenty-three year old
Jane, a woman who also discovers her unexpected pregnancy and is determined to terminate it, is
chastised throughout the episode for not telling her husband Michael, a man who has claimed to
not want a child but later threatens her with divorce because she withheld this secret from him.28
When considered in relation to Carrie’s initial positive response to Miranda’s “choice” to
have an abortion and Carrie’s subsequent suggestion to Miranda, following Aiden’s lead, that the
father has the right to know, the pattern within mainstream televisual discussions of abortion
becomes quite clear. Reflecting upon her own decision to have an abortion without telling the
father and the lie she tells Aiden (“No, I’ve never had one … Thank God”), Carrie’s closing
voiceover suggests that not telling the father might have been a mistake indeed:
So many roads, so many detours, so many choices, so many mistakes. As we
drive along this road called life, occasionally a gal will find herself a little lost.
And when that happens, I guess she has to let go of the coulda, woulda, shoulda,
buckle up, and just keep going. (“Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda”)
Though Miranda reaches the decision to have the abortion and proceeds to her appointment with
the determination to carry out that decision, it is seemingly Carrie’s suggestion to Miranda that
Steve might have a right to know (if not a right to choose for her) that causes Miranda to not go
through with the procedure. Thus while Miranda seems to have navigated her own contradictory
subject positions and reached a conclusion that was satisfactory to her and her current
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circumstances, Miranda’s decision is called into question and deemed inadequate by Carrie.
Because Carrie instructs Miranda not in relation to what Carrie would do or has done (or what
Miranda wants to do) but in relation to how she presumes this action would be judged by the
men in their proximity, a specter of the “male gaze” is called upon to make sense of Miranda’s
fragmentation, and Carrie and Miranda are ascertained to be unfit to make the decision
“appropriately.” Despite fragments of the feminist pre-text that, as Carrie says, “it’s the reviews
you give yourself that matter,” when woman speaks to herself or for herself in these texts, it’s
clearly the man behind the curtain who speaks for her (“Critical Condition”).
In moments like these that pervade Sex and the City, Desperate Housewives, and The
Devil Wears Prada, the “male gaze” can be isolated as the connective tissue that keeps the
female subject in tact. Moreover, in relation to the questions that these female voices raise on the
subjects of “feminine” and “feminist” spaces and subject positions, these female voiceovers are
implicated in delegitimizing their own voice as “they” position “themselves” within the focus of
the “male gaze.” Inasmuch as the questions raised within the voiceover explore the
constructedness of both femininity and female agency, they also reveal that the self-initiated,
introspective critique of feminisms (and primarily tenets of second wave feminisms), like
Nicholson and Fraser’s in “Social Criticism,” implores this specter of the “male gaze”
(seemingly an internalization of patriarchal standards) to draw the final conclusions for them.
However, unlike the fragility of male subjectivity outlined in Chapter Two in which the male
subject is always impeding an encroaching femininity and symbolic castration, the female
subject within these postmodern, postfeminist texts seems to face, instead, the interminable fear
that the “male gaze” will be deterred from its focus upon her body. What these texts seem to
suggest is that, at the point in which “male gaze” is diverted from the female subject, she might
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face total subjective dissemination and symbolic annihilation, a dread that actually culminates in
the fantasy sequences in Ally McBeal. Lingering in the female voiceover, therefore, the “male
gaze” is more than relegitimated as “proper.” It is demanded as primary, necessary, and
constitutive – the adhesive for and pulse of the shattered female body.
At this point, the female voice moves back into a position identified within the
underlying argument of Silverman’s analysis, and the authority seemingly assigned to her voice
can be revealed to be “reinvested in the male voice,” a male voice that, as Silverman asserts, “is
shown to orchestrate the fictional drama from behind the scenes” (57). Within these
differentiated voiceovers and voiceoffs, the female voice in fact becomes, as Silverman
conjectures, the hook upon which the phallus can be suspended, and through this deferral of
location, the male gaze is again rendered appropriate, as in socially accepted, and more often
than not desirable to the female subject and crucial to her survival, subjective formation, mental
stability. She does not want to remove herself as the object of the “male gaze”; rather she wants
to be consumed by the male gaze entirely. The “male gaze” is the thread that holds the female
body together, solidifies her subjective stability/unity, and helps to dislocate her from the
feminist crises in which she finds herself. But because locating the male gaze behind this female
voice is a rather difficult and complicated undertaking, the masquerade of the female voice as
transcendent authorial voice contributes to the seeming absence of the phallus, withholding
access to the vacuity between female representation and the origin of the male gaze and thus
adding to the mounting textual refusal of critical viewership.
Consequently, the simulated versions of postmodern feminisms that arise from the
introspective critiques of second wave feminisms located within these female voiceovers can
also be identified as byproducts of the “male gaze.” To the extent that the disavowal of second
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wave feminisms and the creation of postmodern feminisms in these mediated texts parallel
Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism,” the male gaze is called upon as a remedy for feminist
inclinations, feminist inclinations that have left these white female subjects scarred and
miserable. These mediated texts demonstrate that Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism
does not simply contain the potential to function as a metatheory but is imbued with the power to
write any feminism into oblivion that is not compatible with or acceptable to its contemporary
male counterpart (Lyotard in “Social Criticism” and the “male gaze” in these mediated texts).

The Discursive “I”: Questions and Definitions of Femininity and Feminisms
In search of moments where significations of female agency and gender equality might
emerge in these texts, though finding mostly that these significations habitually become first
enveloped in ambiguity before being finally renounced or as suggested by Foster relinquished,
feminism appears to constructed in these texts as neither a political position nor as a status
marker of gender equality. Instead, the way these postmodern, postfeminist mediated texts
repeatedly define feminism, as Astrid Henry explains in reference to Sex and the City, is
primarily as a subjective belief that is specific to the individualism of the commodity culture
within which these subjects bound themselves and, as follows, is founded upon the individual’s
right to “choose” (71). This definition is personified by the Cinderella-esque character Charlotte
in Sex and the City who, almost in a tantrum, screams before storming away from her friends:
“It’s my life and my choice! [. . .] I chose my choice! I chose my choice” (“Time and
Punishment”).
Nevertheless, the “choices” that these women make within these texts are rarely free of
ramification, and the circumference of those choices lacks the breadth of the choices actually
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available to women. Through these introspective critiques of supposedly “feminist” subjectivities
that, as each text progresses, increasingly limits “appropriate” choices, the texts’ focus on
feminism as “choice” slips incessantly away from representing each woman’s right to “choose”
and toward the punishment inflicted upon these characters because of those “choices.” Even
when a “choice” seems to compliment certain elements of normative femininity such as a female
character’s desire for marriage, it becomes clear that even “correct” choices must be executed
“correctly.” For instance, Charlotte’s marriage proposal to her first husband Trey and Trey’s
subsequent impotence suggests that a woman must be asked to marry rather than propose
marriage herself.
It is important to note that, while the female subject is propositioned to listen to the “male
gaze” within these mediated texts, none of these female characters succeed in “correctly” hearing
the male voice veiled within their own articulations and are punished for their acoustic lack. This
punishment is seen nowhere more abysmally than in Sex and the City’s last season and
Desperate Housewives’ third season when Samantha and Lynette, women with perhaps the most
agency in these shows, suffer from breast cancer, a punishment aimed at their sex and
sexualities. In examining how the appropriateness in choice is explored in questions that are
frequently raised by the female characters or female voiceovers within these texts, it becomes
clear that the questions regarding appropriate female response that are both raised and answered
by female characters, female voiceovers, and female authorship in these texts point toward much
more than each text’s status as postfeminist or even rigorously anti-feminist text. More
importantly, this questioning and answering process often designates the limitations of the
agency that women are allowed to possess (if it does not deny that agency altogether) and
subsequently positions feminist women (and often feminism) as those responsible for the
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consequences that these women face and the pain (both psychological and physical) that they
endure within these texts.
A few of the first questions in relation to my analysis of what I am describing here as
simultaneously postmodern and postfeminist texts might likely involve viewership, most
specifically: “Who” identifies these characters as feminists or as exhibiting feminist qualities?
“Which” feminist viewpoints are being identified? And “who” can speak to how viewers respond
to these “feminist” qualities or demonstrate that they will react to these representations at all?
While I have put a great amount of time in sifting through viewer responses on network hosted
Internet discussion boards, reading other feminist critics’ discussions with women who identify
these characters as feminists, and speaking with many young women and many of my students
(female and male) about what these female television personas signify, none of this research
qualifies me to answer these questions assertively or even assumingly.
Most of the responses that I have received or reviewed have focused on the range of
occupations and subject positions represented between the characters on these shows,
particularly in relation to Sex and the City and Desperate Housewives – their limitless “choices”
and their “free” sexualities. Yet many of these reactions have been from women with little to no
knowledge of feminisms and, likewise, a modest amount if any knowledge of feminist theories.
When I have inquired specifically whether or not these characters represent feminist points of
view (careful to not suggest the “feminist” label as to avoid the “I’m not a feminist” response I
received the first time I asked this question and on occasion when I posed the question of “label”
subsequent to the question of “point of view”), most responders said, yes, these characters do
personify feminist points of view to the extent that they represent gender equality (the answer to
the second question was varied and often required a little urging before a yes or no answer was
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supplied). So though I can provide no definitive answer to these questions regarding viewership,
I will suggest that these characters do, in the narrowest style, signify as feminists to a number of
viewers, again taking the term at its most nominal definition – a belief in or demonstration of
social equality.
Many of the these texts mark the emergence of female representations on screen that have
never before been addressed on television as feminist in this manner, most evident in the male
and female nudity set within a variety of sexual acts in Sex and the City wherein the female
subject can be viewed exercising control over the encounter and either enjoying the moment or
faking orgasms for the sake of termination. They choose when they have or do not have sex;
when and how to demand for sexual pleasure; whether to “try on” lesbianism, bisexuality, a man
with a large or small penis, or the teenage lawn boy; and whether to insert or remove themselves
from patriarchal order by either participating actively within it or by refusing to participate at all.
Within this project, the number of over-sexualized or overly feminized images in these texts are
not the problem, though the contradictory elements in “how” these images might signify are
important here as well. They are problematic to the extent that they imply that a woman is the
person responsible for her own “choices” and that such choice emerges from a feminist body
while always suggesting that these choices should be considered foremost in relation to the
“male gaze.” This becomes especially clear when Samantha ends her first monogamous (and first
lesbian) relationship with Maria in Sex and the City shortly after a number of male suitors arrive
at her door in the middle of the night expecting sex and cast judgment upon Samantha’s new
sexual orientation (“Ghost Town”).
But inasmuch as these characters represent feminists who are critical of theirs or others’
genders and sexualities in their supposedly progressive outlooks on life and society, I take Toril
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Moi’s definition of what she calls the “principle objective of feminist criticism” as a means of
clarifying the discrepancy between what might be an apolitical simulacra of feminist criticisms
on screen and the often politicized feminist criticisms within academia (xiv). “The principle
objective of feminist criticisms,” Moi maintains, “has always been political: it seeks to expose,
not to perpetuate, patriarchal practices” (xiv). In contrast, these mass-mediated texts appear to
partake in an often explicitly apolitical practice of exposing and yet participating knowingly
within patriarchal practices, even as they maintain a discursive distance from those practices
through the questions about normative femininity raised in these texts. These female
representations thus “appear” to move beyond previous assumptions regarding femininity,
similar to Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern positioning of feminism in relation to the
modernist feminisms denounced within “Social Criticism.” Nevertheless, even in their bold and
unencumbered sexual presence, these representations become a symbol of a regression from this
emergent form of female embodiment rather than a progression toward a less restrictive
definition of the feminine or a reduced emphasis on feminine rectitude.
A subsequent concern specific to this project and to these questions of viewership is the
division that is created by the question of “who” that seems to set apart women who do view
these characters as representative of feminist qualities (or social equality) and those who see
beyond the façade. One might take, for example, Susan Bordo’s flippant response to The Swan –
a reality television series in which desperately miserable women express self-hatred toward
themselves to qualify as needing to undergo numerous plastic surgeries, diets, workouts, and
psychological therapy and then convey self-love toward themselves, found supposedly within the
month of “transformation,” in order to qualify for the show’s beauty pageant finale. When asked
“What’s the deal [with The Swan], Bordo responded:
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I don’t really think there’s much new to say. The alliance of consumer capitalism,
cosmetic technology, and media culture – aided by the good old-fashioned lust for
spectacle – already went around the bend with Extreme Makeover. The Swan just
tinkers with and combines the formulas that have worked on other reality shows
[…] The sexism is nothing compared to the creepiness of how alike and
standardly, boringly “glamorous” they all look. I’ve been ranting and raving about
this stuff for 15 years. At this point, now that everyone else is suddenly realizing
that we’re living in an episode of The Twilight Zone, I find myself unable to get
too exercised. (22)
Bordo’s inability to get “exercised” about the “twilight zone” aspects of the show is just one
example of how serious critiques of these texts can be easily dismissed. This is especially clear if
one is familiar with Bordo’s work on female body image in Unbearable Weight and how The
Swan verifies, to a great extent, the analyses therein. Even though the suggestion of a “twilight
zone” world is critical in its own right if one is familiar with The Twilight Zone television series,
Bordo’s comment eschews the complexity of the text itself, wherein these obvious instances of
women buying into patriarchal definitions of femininity at the turn of the century in The Swan
are buried beneath a text whose representations of women parallel the feminist “misery” that the
mainstream media repeatedly locates within American society.
Similar to Nicholson and Fraser’s assumption that feminists in American society can
simply move beyond essentialist, foundationalist, modern discourses and become postmodern,
the insistence on this division between these two modes of reception fails to consider the
necessity of the interaction between the past and present that these texts enact in their
postmodern tease between female objectification, normative femininity, feminist agency, and
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second wave feminisms. To be more specific, one does not dive into Lyotard or Kristeva’s
theoretical work without some background in structuralist and psychoanalytic theories, and along
these lines, one does not begin identifying the differences between modes of representation that
entail notions of equality between “the sexes” without first understanding how the male/female
gender binary enables gendered oppression and subordination. Moreover, as Foster highlights in
relation to the move toward the postmodern where the subject seems powerless in reaching the
final moment of the process, one does not simply invoke the fully postmodern; nor does one,
through abrupt declaration, enter into an entirely “feminist” subjectivity.
Yet, within these assumptions – of the ability to become truly postmodern, reach equality
in society, or occupy a non-objectified and agency-filled female subject position – the similarity
between these differently signifying postmodern feminisms can be found – that to know about the
totalizing structure of modern discourses or about patriarchal oppression and to believe oneself
to have moved beyond either is to be altogether exempt.29 While using Bordo’s response to The
Swan is to take into consideration a feminist response to the most obvious (and, yes, most
horrifying) text, a text that many would not identify as feminist, it suggests an expectation for
audiences to undertake the task of reading/watching texts in a non-hegemonic manner and if

29

This is not to suggest that feminist theorists believe themselves to be exempt from producing modern discourses
in advocating postmodern critiques or to be exempt from patriarchal oppression because of a commitment to gender
equality and a desire to fight against female subordination. It is more of a comment upon the naivety of women who
have been told that they can be anyone and anything they want to be, who, like the characters of Sex and the City,
seem to believe that if they knowingly participate in the objectification of their bodies or in patriarchal culture, they
have agency and will not be subjected to its forces. To suggest a different understanding, one cannot simply
participate in a study that tracks acts of violence such as torture, rape, prisoner abuse, starvation, or any other
detrimental action against another human and claim without difficulty to be unaffected. In preparing for the
composition of this chapter, including 5 days and around 50 hours of viewing these texts, I found myself slipping
into a relatively depressed state of being. Even after four years of watching these texts critically, the constant
interplay of present knowledge and past experience continues to evoke these negative responses. It seems important
to any project that involves a desire for social equality to maintain a fairly close proximity to the experiences of the
various and overlapping inequalities.

185

necessary to read them against the grain. The impediment within the division between these two
types of viewership then, and the challenging aspect of this expectation of critical engagement, is
that the texts described here as postmodern and postfeminist are constructed as texts that are
critically engaged with women’s issues. In other words, these texts are structured to fulfill a
viewer’s desire to espouse a liberated self, and through simple reference of or allusion to
feminism and women’s equality, they evoke the insinuation of activist participation in the act of
watching/mirroring the text. Finally, in their construction as postmodern texts, the lines between
feminist and feminine, agency and submission, and margin and center is artificially blurred to
such a great extent that patriarchal significations can be identified as connoting gender equality
and feminist significations can be interpreted as oppressive, as is clearly demonstrated through
the regulation of these significations by the female voiceover itself (as well as the various modes
of female authorship within these texts).
These mediated texts thus point towards the importance of a feminist understanding of
postmodernity, especially in locating a mode of feminist critique that might attend to both the
framing that feminisms receive within these at least partially postmodern frameworks and the
extent to which the term “feminism” itself is destabilized. But these mediated texts also point
towards what seems to be most lacking in Nicholson and Fraser’s construction of their
postmodern feminism – a rigorous reflection on the questions that Angela McRobbie raises in
Postmodernism and Popular Culture (1994): who is “the discursive ‘I’ which speaks or writes,
to whom and with what purpose?” (63). While postmodernisms seem to open upon an
opportunity for what McRobbie calls “interrogating rather than assuming the relations between
who is talking to whom,” both Nicholson and Fraser’s postmodern feminism and the postmodern
feminisms being defined in these mediated texts close themselves off from any such
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investigation and render those questions irrelevant (71). But the questions of who is talking to
whom, what they are assuming, and what boundaries (both social and subjective) they are
defining and constricting in the process of speaking are precisely the forms of inquiry required if
any understanding of marginalization and oppression within these ostensibly postmodern
parameters is to transpire, and this is precisely why these questions are asked in this thesis. What
the three inquiries performed in the chapters of this thesis seem to reveal is that the dissemination
that is purported to be occurring across these supposedly postmodern texts (both theoretical and
mediated) in regard to feminisms does not really represent a multiplicity of feminisms. Instead,
these texts create the illusion of a democratic space while ultimately controlling its parameters
and necessarily excluding many of the feminist expressions that fall outside its tightly regulated
and narrowed boundaries.
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AFTERWORD: POSTMODERN FEMINISMS AND THE ROLE OF THE EXPONENTIALLY
“OTHERED” FEMALE SUBJECT
As a final note of commentary within this thesis, I would like to turn momentarily to the
fact that the primary texts under investigation within these thesis – Nicholson and Fraser’s
“Social Criticism,” What Women Want, Sex and the City, Desperate Housewives, and The Devil
Wears Prada – are primarily invested in the self-regulation of white female bodies. Across these
texts, second wave feminisms are problematically represented as signifying a subject position
occupied by white female subjects exclusively,1 a mimetic reproduction of what bell hooks
describes in From Margin to Center (1984) as the notion that “the women’s movement was
theirs [white women’s]” (11). I find it important to include this prologue not because this issue is
less important to my thesis than how the “male gaze” becomes part of the process of defining
postmodern feminisms. Rather, I include this prologue because I have found myself without the
time to fully address this issue in its own chapter and because I consider the way that diversity
functions within these texts in relation to the “male gaze” to be too imperative to not at least
offer a brief consideration. What I will suggest in this section is that white female subjects within
these texts are portrayed (or portray themselves) as incompetent in the task of removing their
second wave feminist underpinnings, and it is precisely during these crucial moments of
transformation that the exponentially Othered body enters the text or screen to provide external
instruction to the white female subject in completing this task. I will offer a few readings of the
dynamics surrounding the representations of and intimacy shared between black and white
female bodies in Sex and the City and Desperate Housewives and then offer a few concluding
comments about the function of “diverse” bodies in Nicholson and Fraser’s “Social Criticism.”
1

It is also important to note that these texts seem to establish postfeminisms and the postfeminist narrative structure
too as experiences specific to whiteness.
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Rather than embodying the self-corrective roles written on white female bodies in these
mediated texts, black female bodies are portrayed as being only implicated in the weekly cycle of
redefining the femininity of white bodies, or to be more accurate, their lack thereof. Thus, after
Sex and the City’s Miranda threatens to abdicate her maternal duties, lamenting – “I’m doing
everything I can, but I can’t please him; if he was 35 this is when we’d break up” – Kendel, a
black woman with a two scene cameo, arrives at Miranda’s door at 2:30 in the morning,
reproaching Miranda’s disregard to other mommies in her building and Miranda’s lack of
maternal skills (Brady – Miranda’s baby – has screamed incessantly for two weeks) (“Critical
Condition”).
Because she has not immersed herself in the “mommy” community, a “jury” of peers
who later sneer at her, Miranda is portrayed as the sole cause of her lack, a lack that hinges upon
her refusal of both the maternal role and their expertise. When Kendel reappears, she teaches
Miranda that she does not have to break up with her man to please him (words that resound over
a now complacent and silenced baby), and she assuages Miranda’s hopelessness by telling her:
“Miranda, you’re not a bad mother” (“Critical Condition”). As the scene continues, Miranda
discovers that Kendel, too, had to learn to be a good mother, suggesting an emergent female
“barrenness” that supersedes the intrinsic, socially expected, nurturing quality of all “worthy”
mothers. Such learning, nonetheless, requires knowledge gained from already “maternalized”
women, as opposed to Miranda’s single friends who leave her (as Kendel says) “screwed,” and
particularly women within the domestic parameters of the home as opposed to the work-related
and “social” spheres.
Fortifying this adherence to domesticity in Sex and the City, an elated black bachelorette,
who appears for only one momentary scene, convinces Charlotte, pouting in response to the
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bride-to-be’s celebration, that she need not surrender her life-long, Cinderella-bride fantasy to
the realm of fiction. Mollifying Charlotte’s fear that her second wedding might not be as special
as the first (a scene reminiscent of teenage “girl talk” about “the first time”), the unidentified
bachelorette underscores the gravity of entering the space of heterosexual wifedom, especially
considering Charlotte’s self-confessed, fast-approach to “past-prime” sexuality. As a result, this
scene effectively shifts former social norms regarding femininity to integrate the image of
Cinderella as an overripe divorcee looking for a less impotent, and thus more masculine, prince.
Aside from characters with little to no dialogue, few other African American women
appear in the 6 season series.2 As Kendel and the unidentified bachelorette function mostly as
catalysts for the restoration of Miranda and Charlotte’s blighted womanhood, relationships
between black and white female bodies are depicted as parasitic rather than symbiotic.
Furthermore, they reveal a cultural tendency to portray black, female bodies as “mammy figures”
in relation to white counterparts. This portrayal is intensified when contextualized in relation to
network descriptions of African American characters in post-9/11 texts such as E-Ring’s Jocelyn
Pierce, branded an “unofficial den-mother,” and The Unit’s Molly Blane, the key figure in
helping the newest Unit wife grow “acclimated as she struggles against the level of control the
Unit has over her personal life.” If the “male gaze” is read as the “master” in these texts, then
correspondingly, white, female bodies are repositioned within dominant patriarchal order “by”
black female bodies, bodies that, in Yarbrough and Bennett’s explanation of the mammy figure,
Mammy, everyone's favorite aunt or grandmother, sometimes referred to as ‘Aunt Jemima,’ is

2

A more thorough examination would look at the character Adeena who explains to Samantha that there is a reason
that white women should not date black men and the limo driver who takes Carrie out to “celebrate” after her book
release party.
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ready to soothe everyone's hurt, envelop them in her always ample bosom, and wipe away their
tears. She is often even more nurturing to her white charges than to her own children” (635-636).
More disturbing is the representation of Betty Applewhite in Desperate Housewives, a
black woman who not only provides instruction for those trying to maneuver what they
experience as the “psychosis” of domesticity but who also affords a point of deviance that
diminishes the magnitude of that “psychosis.” Portraying Betty as an extreme thus dichotomizes
the subjective schizophrenia that these different characters’ public/private representations signify
– Betty’s psychoses is permanent while white female characters can be redeemed, and most
specifically they can be set right by Betty. Ruthless, and thus irreparable, as her private madness
escapes literally into the public sphere (first the noises of her son and eventually his body), Betty
helps resecure other women’s mother-child relationships and their public personification of
“appropriate” femininity (the concealment of Bree’s alcoholism provides a dual example here).
Thus their mental defects are rendered surmountable. However, Betty inevitably comes to
embody the characteristics of the “sapphire” – evil, bitchy, stubborn, hateful, and, on top of this,
deceptive. The sapphire figure, “the wise-cracking, balls-crushing, emasculating woman,” as
Yarbrough and Bennett explain, “is usually shown with her hands on her hips and her head
thrown back as she lets everyone know she is in charge” (636). These characteristics are shaped
by the fact that Betty consents to domestic favors only to hide a secret kept, not behind closed
doors as the white female subjects’ secrets are, but in the basement, her almost sadistic treatment
of her supposedly deranged son Caleb, whose alleged assault of a white girl remains uncertain
until the last episode before Betty and her family are removed from the show.
While the postmortem voiceover to some extent blurs the surmountable/irreparable
binary separating Betty and the white female characters, often ambiguously alluding to “some
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women,” “other women,” or simply “we,” it nevertheless contextualizes the symbolic nature of
Betty’s explicit representation, as the extradiegetic dialogue overlaps Betty’s situatedness in the
camera’s gaze. Betty becomes a woman who “could not forget her past,” a statement that
references her past, and possibly, due to the ambiguity, African American history in general,
reverberating the poetic lines: “we are told over and over again/to forget about it/get over it/get
on with it/stop/rehashing ancient history” (anonymous). This voiceover’s meaning is reinforced
by the portrayal of her son’s alleged “crime” as an all but rewritten simulation of the case of 14year-old Emmett Till, a case that 50 years later is still “under investigation.” (And this is a
moment where an oppositional reading might hint toward the immanent danger that African
Americans face in deranged suburbia). Still, it is no insignificant matter that in March 2006, the
New York Daily News maintained that “Betty Applewhite and her problem child proved utterly
disposable” (Guthrie).
Lastly, because Betty imprisons both of her sons, resulting in an ongoing conflict
between her own interests and her sons’ freedom, her character further personifies the “sapphire”
figure, not only because of the marked ongoing “verbal duel” between the sapphire persona and
the men in her proximity, but also because of the occasion that this situation provides – the
emasculation of both men achieved by Betty’s obstruction of any attempted sexual encounters.
Insomuch as her portrayal represents a threat to suburbia, Betty, the visually “inappropriate”
prototype that others try so desperately to escape, becomes not only a body that disciplines but
also one that is disciplined into her stereotypical role.
In “Social Criticism,” the exponentially “Othered” female subject also is mentioned
rather briefly although she seems to be called upon to play a similarly momentous role in
providing the impetus for white feminist theorists to abandon the debilitating impediments of
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second wave feminisms – essentialism and foundationalism. Examined in relation to the
positioning of black female bodies (and one could add Hispanic, Asian, and queer female bodies
as well) in these postmodern, postfeminist mediated texts, Nicholson and Fraser’s reference to
the exponentially “Othered” female subject in “Social Criticism” (which receives only a one
paragraph “mention”) is disconcerting. Nicholson and Fraser seem to suggest that their
postmodern feminism would be most beneficial to these particular “Othered” subjects, as though
this postmodernization of feminisms were for “them” rather than to alleviate the guilt of white
female theorists, theorists who have tended to, as Nicholson and Fraser explain in this paragraph,
“elide differences among women and among the forms of sexism to which different women are
differently subject” (33). But like the positioning that black female subjects receive in Sex and
the City and Desperate Housewives, Nicholson and Fraser appear to cast “working-class women,
women of color, and lesbians” in the role of helping to repair the white female subject (33).
Moreover, because Nicholson and Fraser insinuate that the exponentially “Othered” female
subject would be the greatest beneficiary of their postmodernization of feminisms, Nicholson
and Fraser effectively align these “Othered” subjects with the “male gaze” of Lyotard, analogous
to the aligning of the black female subject with the “male gaze” in these mediated texts. Thus,
the “male gaze” is also granted the authority to speak for these exponentially “Othered” female
subjects as well.
In drawing this comparison between the positioning of the exponentially “Othered”
female subject in “Social Criticism” and these mediated texts, it becomes clear that Nicholson
and Fraser commit the error of “masking” the “implicit reference to white Anglo women” in
their own “classic feminist text” (33). Therefore in asking the question of “to whom” and “for
whom” are Nicholson and Fraser speaking, it does not seem to far from the mark to suggest that
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they are speaking for these exponentially “Othered” female subjects and instructing their white
feminist theorist contemporaries as to how these “Othered” female subjects can be spoken about
in the future. What this seems to suggest is that Nicholson and Fraser’s construction of their
postmodern feminism is not about coming to terms with the racism, ethnocentrism, and
homophobia inherent to a number of second wave feminisms. Rather, it suggests that the
beneficiaries of second wave feminisms – the white bourgeois female subject – can and
sometimes do unconsciously exploit the margins to write themselves into a centered subject
position.

194

LIST OF REFRENCES
Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. Introduction. “Postmodernism and
Postcolonialism.” The Post-colonial Studies Reader. Ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths,
and Helen Tiffin. New York: Routledge, 1995. 117-18.
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern.” The Post-colonial Studies
Reader. Ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. New York: Routledge,
1995. 119-24.
Barthes, Roland. “From Work to Text.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Ed.
Vincent B. Leitch. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001. 1470-75.
Bartky, Sandra Lee. Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression.
New York: Routledge, 1990.
Benhabib, Seyla. “Epistemologies of the Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-François
Lyotard.” Feminism/Postmodernism. Ed. Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge, 1990.
107-132.
---. “Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance.” Feminist Contentions: A
Philosophical Exchange. Ed. Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge, 1995. 17-34.
Bewitched. Dir. Nora Ephron. Perf. Nicole Kidman, Will Ferrell, Shirley MacLaine, and Michael
Caine. Columbia Pictures, 2005.
Bordo, Susan. “Love it/Shove it.” Bitch Magazine: Feminist Response to Popular Culture. 25
(2004): 22.
Braidoti, Rosi. Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in Contemporary Philosophy. Trans.
Elizabeth Guild. New York: Routledge, 1991.
Bridget Jones’ Diary. Dir. Sharon Maguire. Perf. Renée Zellweger, Colin Firth, Hugh Grant,
Gemma Jones, and James Faulkner. Little Bird, 2001.
Brooks, Ann. Postfeminisms: Feminism, Cultural Theory, and Cultural Forms. New York:
Routledge, 1997.
Buker, Eloise A. Review of The Play of Reason: From the Modern to the Postmodern, by Linda
Nicholson. American Political Science Review. 95.4 (2001): 983.
Butler, Judith. “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism.”
Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. Ed. Linda Nicholson. New York:
Routledge, 1995. 35-58.

195

“Change of a Dress.” Sex and the City. Dir. Susan Seidelman and Alison Maclean. Perf. Sarah
Jessica Parker, Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, John Corbett, James Remar,
and Willie Garson. HBO, Season 4. Episode 63.
Cixous, Helene. “Sorties.” Feminisms. Ed. Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires. New York: Oxford
UP, 1997. 231-35.
Collins, Kathleen. “Suburban Blight: The Battle of The Stepford Wives.” Bitch Magazine:
Feminist Response to Popular Culture. 26 (2004): 29-31.
“Color and Light.” Desperate Housewives. Dir. David Grossman. Perf. Teri Hatcher, Felicity
Huffman, Marcia Cross, Eva Longoria Parker, Alfre Woodward, Nicollette Sheridan,
Ricardo Chavira, and Brenda Strong. ABC, Season 2. Episode 32.
Cott, Nancy. The Grounding of Modern Feminism. New Haven: Yale UP, 1987.
“Critical Condition.” Sex and the City. Dir. Michael Patrick King. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker,
Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, and Kristin Davis. HBO, Season 5. Episode 72.
“Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda.” Sex and the City. Dir. David Frankel. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker,
Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, John Corbett, Kyle Maclachlan, and David
Eigenberg. HBO, Season 4. Episode 59.
“Boy, Girl, Boy Girl.” Sex and the City. Dir. Pam Thomas. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker, Cynthia
Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, David Eigenberg, Willie Garson, and Alanis
Morissette. HBO, Season 3. Episode 34.
The Devil Wears Prada. Dir. David Frankel. Perf. Meryl Streep, Anne Hathaway, Emily Blunt,
Stanley Tucci, and Adrian Grenier. Fox, 2006.
Down With Love. Dir. Peyton Reed. Perf. Renée Zellweger, Ewan McGregor, Sara Paulson, and
David Hyde Pierce. Epsilon Motion Pictures, 2003.
During, Simon. “Postmodernism or Post-colonialism Today.” The Post-colonial Studies Reader.
Ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. New York: Routledge, 1995. 12529.
Faludi, Susan. Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women. New York:
Daily/Doubleday Press, 1981.
Fiske, John. Media Matters: Race and Gender in United States Politics. Minneapolis: Minnesota
UP, 1996.
Flax, Jane. “The End of Innocence.” Feminists Theorize the Political. Ed. Judith Butler and Joan
W Schott. New York: Routledge, 1992. 445-63.

196

---. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary
West. Berkeley: California UP, 1990.
Foster, Hal. “Postmodernism in Parallax.” October 63 (1993) 3-20.
“Four Women and a Funeral.” Sex and the City. Dir. Allen Coulter. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker,
Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, Michael De Vries, and Chris Noth. HBO,
Season 2. Episode 17.
Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Dell, 1963.
Fuss, Diana. Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature, and Difference. New York: Routledge,
1989.
“Ghost Town.” Sex and the City. Dir. Michael Spiller. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker, Cynthia Nixon,
Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, Sonia Braga, John Corbett, David Eigenberg, and Kyle
MacLachlan. HBO, Season 4. Episode 53.
Gunew, Sneja. “Authenticity and the Writing Cure: Reading Some Migrant Women’s Writing.”
Grafts. Ed. Susan Sheridan. London: Verso, 1988. 111-24.
Guthrie, Marisa. “In Its Second Season, ‘Desperate Housewives’ is at a Dead End.” New York
Daily Press. 30 March 2006.
Henry, Astrid. “Orgasms and Empowerment: Sex and the City and Third Wave Feminism.”
Reading Sex and the City. Ed. Kim Akass and Janet McCabe. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.
hooks, bell. “Feminism: A Movement to End Sexual Oppression.” Feminisms. Ed. Sandra Kemp
and Judith Squires. New York: Oxford UP, 1997. 22-26.
---. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Boston: South End Press, 1984.
---. “Postmodern Blackness.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Ed. Vincent B.
Leitch. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001. 2478-84.
Kipnis, Laura. Against Love. New York: Pantheon Books, 2003.
---. “Feminism: The Political Conscience of Postmodernism.” Social Text. 21 (1989) 149-66.
“Leap of Faith.” Melrose Place. Dir. Bethany Rooney. Perf. Josie Bissett, Thomas Calabro, Amy
Locane, Doug Savant, Grant Show, Andrew Shue, Courtney Thorne-Smith, and Vanessa
Williams. FOX, Season 1. Episode 5.

197

Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 1979. Trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 2002.
McRobbie, Angela. “Postfeminism and Popular Culture: Bridget Jones the New Gender
Regime.” Feminist Media Studies. 4.3 (2004): 255-64.
---. Postmodernism and Popular Culture. New York: Routledge, 1994.
Modleski, Tania. Feminism without Women: Culture and Criticism in a “Postfeminist” Age.
New York: Routledge, 1991.
Moi, Toril. “‘I’m not a Feminist But …’: How Feminism Became the F-Word.” PMLA. 121.5
(2006) 1735-41.
---. Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory. New York: Methuen, 1985.
Mona Lisa Smile. Dir. Mike Newell. Perf. Julia Roberts, Kirsten Dunst, Julia Stiles, Maggie
Gyllenhaal, Marcia Gay Harden, and Ginnifer Goodwin. Columbia Pictures, 2003
Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Feminism and Film Theory. Ed.
Constance Penley. New York: Routledge, 1988. 57-68.
Nicholson, Linda J. Introduction. Feminism/Postmodernism. Ed. Linda J. Nicholson. New
York: Routledge, 1990. 1-18.
Nicholson, Linda J. and Nancy Fraser. “Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter
between Feminism and Postmodernism.” Feminism/Postmodernism. Ed. Linda
Nicholson. New York: Routledge, 1990. 19-39.
“No Ifs, Ands, or Buts.” Sex and the City. Dir. Nichole Holofcener. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker,
Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, John Corbett, David Eigenberg, and Willie
Garson. HBO, Season 3. Episode 35.
“Old Dogs, New Dicks.” Sex and the City. Dir. Alan Taylor. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker, Cynthia
Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, Chris Noth, and David Eigenberg. HBO, Season 2.
Episode 21.
“Politically Erect.” Sex and the City. Dir. Michael Patrick King. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker,
Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, Elizabeth Banks, David Eigenberg, Willie
Garson, and John Slattery. HBO, Season 3. Episode 32.
Press, Andrea L. Women Watching Television: Gender, Class, and Generation in the American
Television Experience. Philadelphia: Penn UP, 1991.

198

Sangari, Kumkum. “The Politics of the Possible.” The Post-colonial Studies Reader. Ed. Bill
Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. New York: Routledge, 1995. 143-50.
“Sex and the City.” Wikipedia.com. 2008. The Free Encyclopedia. 09 August 2007
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex_and_the_City>
“Sigmund Freud.” Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary. Ed. Elizabeth Wright.
Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992. 127-33.
Simpson, Mark. “Meet the Metrosexual: He’s Well Dressed, Narcissistic and Obsessed with
Butts. But Don’t Call Him Gay.” Salon.com. 22 July 2002. Salon. 8 November 2006.
<http://dir.salon.com/story/ent/feature/2002/07/22/metrosexual/>
Silverman, Kaja. The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988.
Something’s Gotta Give. Dir. Nancy Meyers. Perf. Jack Nicholson, Diane Keaton, Keanu
Reeves, Frances McDormand, Amanda Peet, and John Favreau. Columbia Pictures, 2003.
Spivak, Gayatri. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York, Routledge, 1988.
Stein, Gertrude. “Patriarchal Poetry.” Anthology of Modern American Poetry. Ed. Cary Nelson.
New York, Oxford UP, 2000. 55-83.
Stepford Wives. Dir. Bryan Forbes. Perf. Katharine Ross and Paula Prentiss. Columbia Pictures,
1975.
Stepford Wives. Dir. Frank Oz. Perf. Nicole Kidman, Matthew Broderick, Bette Midler, Glen
Close, and Christopher Walken. Dream Works, 2004.
The Way We Were. Dir. Sydney Pollack. Perf. Barbra Streisand, Robert Redford, Diana Ewing,
and Murray Hamilton. Columbia Pictures, 1973.
“The Sun Won’t Set.” Desperate Housewives. Dir. Stephen Cragg. Perf. Teri Hatcher, Felicity
Huffman, Marcia Cross, Eva Longoria Parker, Alfre Woodward, and Brenda Strong,
ABC, Season 2. Episode 31.
“They Shoot Single People, Don’t They?” Sex and the City. Dir. John David Coles. Perf. Sarah
Jessica Parker, Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, and Willie Garson. HBO,
Season 2. Episode 16.
“Time and Punishment.” Sex and the City. Dir. Michael Engler. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker,
Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, Ted King, and John Corbett. HBO, Season 4.
Episode 55.

199

“Touchy, Aren’t We.” By Geoffrey Nunberg. Fresh Air. Natl. Public Radio. WMFE, Orlando.
29 June 2006.
Vavrus, Mary Douglas. Postfeminist News: Political Women in Media Culture. Albany: SUNY
Press, 2002.
“Voices from a Postfeminist Generation.” New York Times Book Review. 17 October 1982, final
ed., sec. 6: 29+.
“Where There’s Smoke.” Sex and the City. Dir. Michael Patrick King. Perf. Sarah Jessica Parker,
Cynthia Nixon, Kim Catrall, Kristin Davis, and David Eigenberg. HBO, Season 3.
Episode 31.
“Who’s that Woman.” Desperate Housewives. Dir. Jeffrey Melman. Perf. Teri Hatcher, Felicity
Huffman, Marcia Cross, Eva Longoria Parker, and Brenda Strong. ABC, Season 1.
Episode 4.
Wiegman, Robyn. American Anatomies: Theorizing Race and Gender. Durham: Duke UP, 1995.
What Women Want. Dir. Nancy Meyers. Perf. Mel Gibson, Helen Hunt, Marisa Tomei, Alan
Alda, and Delta Burke. Centropolis, 2000.
Yarbrough, Marilyn with Crystal Bennett. “Cassandra and the ‘Sistahs’: the Peculiar Treatment
of African American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars.” Journal of Gender, Race,
and Justice. (Spring 2000) 626-57.
“You’ll Never Get Away From Me.” Desperate Housewives. Dir. Stephen Cragg. Perf. Teri
Hatcher, Felicity Huffman, Marcia Cross, Eva Longoria Parker, Alfre Woodward,
Nicollette Sheriden, Doug Savant, and Brenda Strong. ABC, Season 2. Episode 27.

200

